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ABSTRACT
It is generally argued that deposit insurance weakens depositor discipline and therefore intro-
duces a moral hazard for commercial banks. The traditional theory ignores the role of the regulator
in bank run models once deposit insurance is enacted. Chapter 2 proposes a new role that the regu-
lator who can declare a bank legally insolvent will play. The regulator, who may or may not be the
deposit insurer, makes decisions on the timing and resolution of failing banks based on the least cost
of the deposit insurer in the game. Deposit insurance leads to a loss of depositor discipline. How-
ever, regulator discipline is built from least-cost commitment. Moreover, the regulator discipline
always has a stronger effect than depositor discipline in preventing banks from speculating. Hence,
deposit insurance with least-cost commitment will not bring extra moral hazard issues from the
monitoring perspective. Chapter 2 supports the least-cost resolution policy in the United States.
During the Great Recession, liquidity did not flow out of the banking sector but was reallocated
internally. Deposits increased, but the volumes of all other short-term debt financing instruments,
except for T-Bills, decreased. Commercial banks, which have stable funding sources from deposits,
did not render liquidity backup to shadow banks but held the increased deposits as cash on hand.
Chapter 3 uses deposits and financial commercial paper outstanding as proxies for commercial and
shadow banking financing instruments because they are unique liabilities of commercial and shadow
banks, respectively. Using vector autoregressive models, I provide evidence that when liquidity
falls in shadow banks, commercial banks experience funding inflows. In normal times, commercial
banks render liquidity backup to shadow banks in the following weeks using the increased deposits.
However, the dynamic correlation breaks down in crisis times, which may have contributed to the
collapse of the shadow banking system during the Great Recession.
Using theoretical and simulation tools, Chapter 4 studies how strategic risk among investors
can help explain both underpricing and underreaction in initial public offerings (IPOs). We assume
ix
the post-IPO value of a firm is higher if the IPO raises more capital for the firm. Hence an IPO
subscriber faces strategic risk: the value of subscribing depends on the aggregate subscription rate.
As this risk is resolved immediately after the IPO, the IPO itself is underpriced. Moreover, since
individual investors have limited wealth, a higher offer price raises the risk of undersubscription.
Investors respond by demanding a larger discount: the offer price appears to underreact to public
news.
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Shadow banks, the specialized financial intermediaries that channel funding from lenders to
borrowers through a range of securitization and secured funding techniques1, arguably played a
critical role in undermining the whole financial system and bringing about the financial crisis from
2007 to 2008. First, mortgage-backed securities (henceforth, MBSes), especially subprime MBSes,
collapsed because of the housing bubble burst during the Great Recession. The unregulated shadow
banking system was blamed for taking on or producing excessive credit risks by offering excessive
mortgage loans and then securitizing the loans into MBSes. Second, the shadow banking system
suffered severe liquidity problems, especially for shadow banks that used MBSes as collateral to
raise funds. Somehow, it indirectly affected regulated commercial bank lending during the Great
Recession. Fleming (2012) notes that across its many liquidity facilities, the Federal Reserve
provided over $1.5 trillion of liquidity support during the crisis. After the Great Recession, the
shadow banking system and the subtle distinction between liquidity risks and credit risks become
hot topics in both academia and industry. The Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III also cover regulations
on the shadow banking system and new liquidity requirements. This dissertation is focused on these
topics.
1.1 Deposit Insurance
During the Great Depression, investors responded to the banking crisis by withdrawing deposits
from commercial banks and holding the cash on hand. The ratio of deposits to currency plunged
1This definition closely follows that of Pozsar et al. (2010). Although there exists plenty of borrowing and lending
business within the banking system, lenders and borrowers are outsiders of the banking system in this dissertation
unless otherwise stated. Lenders are mainly fixed-income investors who invest in mortgage-backed securities, asset-
backed securities, repurchase agreements, commercial paper, money market mutual funds, etc., but not bank deposits
or other commercial bank obligations. Investors in mutual funds or hedge funds could be generally considered lenders
if the mutual fund or hedge fund invests in the fixed-income products above. Borrowers include (but are not limited
to) producers who need funds to produce or consumers who need funds to invest in real estate or purchase automobiles.
Borrowers may borrow money from shadow banks directly or from commercial banks, and commercial banks securitize
the loans later as fixed-income products. For details, see Section 3.3.
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from about 12 to less than 5 between 1929 and 1933 (Schwartz (1963)). In reaction to the substantial
cash outflow, commercial banks had to liquidate their assets in fire-sale prices. Hence, the liquidity
risk of an entity is actually the refinancing risk when the entity has to roll over its debt. For
commercial banks in the Great Depression, they had difficulties in rolling over or refinancing their
deposits. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (henceforth, FDIC) was introduced during the
Great Depression to solve the liquidity problem of commercial banks. Deposit insurance is a
government bailout to depositors when financial institutions cannot fulfill the deposit contracts.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) first model the panic-based bank run. The panic-based liquidity risk
comes from the consistent beliefs of depositors that others would withdraw their deposits. In such
a way, liquidity risks can be separated from credit risks and lead to insolvency of commercial banks.
However, credit risks can bring about fundamental-based bank runs as well. Unlike panic-based
bank runs proposed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), fundamental-based bank runs are not totally
detrimental to social welfare. They are actually depositor discipline, a threat from depositors if
commercial banks take on excessive credit risks.
On one hand, deposit insurance is thought to have a positive role in preventing the panic-
based bank runs and stabilize the financial system. On the other hand, deposit insurance may
introduce a moral hazard issue. Without deposit insurance, bank managers have a strong incentive
to avoid risky loans and other investment because depositors will move their money to safer banks
when they feel unsafe about their deposits. The introduction of deposit insurance reduces the
depositor discipline (fundamental-based bank runs) that might otherwise penalize banks for risk-
taking behavior. Hence, it might even increase the overall fragility of the financial system.
Chapter 2 proposes a new perspective about the role that a regulator who can legally close a
bank will play. Banks typically fail after a gradual deterioration of fundamental rather than a single
adverse event. Thus, the timing of the closure of a bank directly affects the costs to the deposit
insurer2. When bank managers take on excessive risks, it increases the present value of expected
loss incurred by the deposit insurer because speculations have a higher probability of failure and
2In addition to close the bank, the regulator can also make an early intervention to restrict the activities of the
bank.
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only banks can achieve the excessive return if speculations success. When the regulator, may not
be the deposit insurer, makes a commitment to make the decision on the timing of the closure
of a bank based on the least present value of expected loss of the deposit insurer, it will punish
banks for risk-taking behavior like the depositor discipline. Although deposit insurance weakens
the depositor discipline, regulator discipline is built from the least-cost commitment3. Moreover,
the regulator discipline always has a stronger effect than depositor discipline in preventing banks
from speculating. Hence, deposit insurance with least-cost commitment does not bring extra moral
hazard issues from the depositor discipline perspective.
The basic model is based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and extended with moral hazard of
banks like Cooper and Ross (2002). After introducing the lemon project in the model, it gives banks
an avenue for moral hazard. The lemon project is so bad that it only has value for the banks. Hence,
the lemon project can capture the pure interest conflict between banks and depositors. However,
the model in Chapter 2 has two big differences from Cooper and Ross (2002). One is that the capital
of banks affects the budget constraint of banks in my model. Hence, as to the capital, my model is
relatively more general equilibrium than Cooper and Ross (2002). The other is the assumption of
depositor discipline. In Cooper and Ross (2002), when depositors monitor banks, they can make
the bank manager choose their favorable risk and investment. In my model, depositor discipline
comes from the threat of depositors in a way that depositors withdraw money from their banks
to other safer banks if depositors find their banks are likely to expropriate deposits. Flannery
(1994) argues that depositors may penalize poor management performance or excessive risk-taking
by withdrawing deposits. Hence, my assumption about depositor discipline is more realistic.
Empirically, Iyer et al. (2013) find the regulator has more information about banks’ financial
positions and depositors actually follow the regulator. After the enactment of the Dodd-Frank
Act, we have more reliable rules and regulations on the banking system. We could believe that
regulator discipline trumps depositor discipline in monitoring banks. It is worth mentioning that
deposit insurance protects depositors but not the commercial bank if a commercial bank fails. Thus,
3In some literature, it is called supervisory discipline.
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deposit insurance is not like a normal put option for commercial banks on their assets, which is
proposed by Merton (1977). The potential moral hazard issue can only come from the weakened
depositor discipline. Hence, the introduction of deposit insurance does not bring extra moral hazard
issues for commercial banks is the standpoint in Chapter 2.
1.2 Shadow Banking System
Since deposit insurance does not bring extra moral hazard issues for commercial banks, what
the influence of the deposit insurance? This is the question that Chapter 3 tries to answer. In terms
of the liability side of the balance sheet, deposit insurance separates the debt of the banking system
into two parts. One is deposits, which is covered by the deposit insurance4. The other is uncovered
shadow banking financing instruments5. Harvey and Spong (2001) point that growth in traditional
deposit funding sources has stagnated at many commercial banks after 1990 and has largely failed
to keep up with the growth in bank assets. Hence, commercial banks which face funding difficulties
in core deposits have to use funding instruments from shadow banking activities. Because of securi-
tization, many shadow banking activities migrated from commercial banks to become independent
unregulated entities and accounted for a large portion of the banking system before the Great Re-
cession. Some of these shadow banks are owned by bank holding companies (henceforth, BHCs),
which also hold commercial banks. BHCs are under rigorous regulator discipline, although regu-
lations before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act are not fully sound for their shadow banking
subsidiaries. The other shadow banks are completely independent of commercial banks or BHCs.
Because of loose regulations, independent shadow banks suffered the severest impact during the
Great Recession.
Chapter 3 studies the interdependence between shadow banks and commercial banks. They
offer similar financial products to investors. The fixed-income products offered by shadow banks
have a higher interest rate and risks than deposits. Hence, they are competitors to attract the
4Deposits are not fully covered by the FDIC in the United States. The uncovered deposits behave like shadow
banking financing instruments in the crisis.
5Because only short-term debt has liquidity risks for banks, the shadow banking financing instruments here exclude
loans that banks borrow from other entities.
5
most risk-averse investors6. When the market risks increase, investors hold fewer securities issued
by shadow banks and more deposits, and vice versa. One example is during the Great Recession,
when investors lost confidence in the securities offered by shadow banks and transferred their
wealth from shadow banks to commercial banks. Hence, commercial banks have a unique and
natural advantage in providing liquidity insurance to shadow banks if they want. Consider a case
where investors withdraw funds from shadow banks and deposit them into commercial banks during
a period of market stress. If commercial banks lend the same volume of funds to shadow banks
and all transactions work efficiently, no liquidity problem comes up in the whole banking system.
Money just behaves like ”what goes around comes around”. Investors still hold the same wealth in
the whole banking system if only they keep the same amount of fixed-income investment. Shadow
banks cannot raise enough money from investors, but they find an alternative funding source from
commercial banks. For commercial banks, deposit inflows serve as a hedge for outflows from new
loans given to shadow banks. I give the series of cash flows a name called ”Flight-to-Quality” circle
(henceforth FTQ circle).
During normal times or periods of moderate market stress, the FTQ circle functions well as
commercial banks are willing to lend increased deposits to shadow banks. However, the liquidity
backup broke down during the Great Recession, and it could possibly be one of the reasons that
caused the collapse of the shadow banking system.
Why is the liquidity backup in the FTQ circle important to the stability of the financial system?
My argument is that the liquidity backup from commercial banks to shadow banks is the radical
support for the confidence of investors when the financial market suffers the impact of credit risks.
The securities offered by shadow banks usually have collateral to protect investors from credit risks,
so they were considered to be safe assets before the Great Recession7. Based on the shadow banking
model of Gennaioli et al. (2013), fixed-income investors are extremely risk-averse. Hence, investors
6Compared to the investors who invest in equities, real estate and so on.
7It is the reason we usually call them asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities. For repos, investors have even
more controls over the collateral than normal collateralized borrowings. Collateral is exempted from the automatic
stay, so a party to a repo can unilaterally enforce the termination provisions of the agreement as a result of a
bankruptcy filing by the other party. For details, see Section 3.3.
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value the risky collateral at a much lower price than the risk-neutral financial intermediaries. The
collateral is priced nearly risk-neutral during normal times because of the liquidity offered by banks.
Even if investors dislike risks, they can accept collateral at about its risk-neutral price because they
believe that they can sell their collateral in a liquid market dominated by risk-neutral banks if
defaults happen. When moderate neglected credit risks are revealed in the market, investors ask
for more collateral and higher interest rate to offset the credit risks, and the market price of the
collateral temporarily decreases because of the underlying fundamental return rates based on the
credit risks. However, we are still in a nearly risk-neutral world if the market has sufficient liquidity.
Things change when the neglected credit risks are so large that the liquidity backup in the FTQ
circle breaks down like it was the case during the Great Recession. The liquidity of the market
declined largely due to the fact that commercial banks tighten their credit. Investors lose their
confidence and reveal their extreme risk-averse preferences. Collateral is priced with a high risk
premium because investors dominate the market this time. Risk-neutral arbitrageurs do not have
sufficient funds to turn the market back to the nearly risk-neutral state individually. The market
stays a long time with extreme risk-averse pricing before it goes back to risk-neutral again.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) propose the panic-based liquidity risk for commercial banks, be-
cause deposits have no collateral and deposit investors have the incentive to care about the solvency
of their commercial banks. However, shadow banking products usually have collateral. Hence, the
concern of investors goes to the value of the collateral. In my narrative, liquidity risks come from
the change of prevailing preferences in fixed-income markets. In terms of the banking system,
we live in a half-covered world. When liquidity backup from commercial banks to shadow banks
breaks down, the value of the collateral, which used to be decided by risk-neutral banks, is decided
by dominating extremely risk-averse fixed-income investors. Excluding neglected credit risks and
bubbles, the preference-based liquidity risks in this chapter can also partly explain the collapse of
MBSes during the Great Recession.
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1.3 Underpricing in Initial Public Offerings
In Chapter 4, my co-authors, Drs. David M. Frankel and Xiangou Deng, and I investigate
underpricing in initial public offerings (henceforth, IPOs). Using theoretical and simulation tools,
we study how strategic risk among investors can help explain both underpricing and underreaction
in IPOs. We assume the post-IPO value of a firm is higher if the IPO raises more capital for
the firm. Hence an IPO subscriber faces strategic risk: the value of subscribing depends on the
aggregate subscription rate. As this risk is resolved immediately after the IPO, the IPO itself is
underpriced. Moreover, since individual investors have limited wealth, a higher offer price raises
the risk of undersubscription. Investors respond by demanding a larger discount: the offer price
appears to underreact to public news.
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CHAPTER 2. DEPOSIT INSURANCE WITH LEAST-COST
COMMITMENT
Zhongzheng Zhou
2.1 Abstract
It is generally argued that deposit insurance weakens depositor discipline and therefore intro-
duces a moral hazard for commercial banks. The traditional theory ignores the role of the regulator
in bank run models once deposit insurance is enacted. This Chapter proposes a new role that the
regulator who can declare a bank legally insolvent will play. The regulator, who may or may not be
the deposit insurer, makes decisions on the timing and resolution of failing banks based on the least
cost of the deposit insurer in the game. Deposit insurance leads to a loss of depositor discipline.
However, regulator discipline is built from least-cost commitment. Moreover, the regulator disci-
pline always has a stronger effect than depositor discipline in preventing banks from speculating.
Hence, deposit insurance with least-cost commitment will not bring extra moral hazard issues from
the monitoring perspective. This Chapter supports the least-cost resolution policy in the United
States.
2.2 Introduction
Deposit insurance, a government bailout to depositors when financial institutions cannot fulfill
the deposit contracts, has been used for a long time all over the world. The recent Great Recession
has led to a new rebate about the advantage and disadvantage of deposit insurance. On one hand,
deposit insurance is thought to have a positive role in preventing the panic-based bank runs and
stabilize the financial system. On the other hand, deposit insurance may introduce a moral hazard
issue. Without deposit insurance, bank managers have a strong incentive to avoid risky loans and
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other investment because depositors will move their money to safer banks when they feel unsafe
about their deposits. The introduction of deposit insurance reduces the depositor discipline that
might otherwise penalize banks for risk-taking behavior. Hence, it might even increase the overall
fragility of the financial system.
This chapter proposes a new perspective about the role that a regulator who can legally close a
bank will play. Banks typically fail after a gradual deterioration of fundamental rather than a single
adverse event. Thus, the timing of the closure of a bank directly affects the costs to the deposit
insurer1. When bank managers take on excessive risks, it increases the present value of expected
loss incurred by the deposit insurer because speculations have a higher probability of failure and
only banks can achieve the excessive return if speculations success. When the regulator, may not
be the deposit insurer, makes a commitment to make the decision on the timing of the closure
of a bank based on the least present value of expected loss of the deposit insurer, it will punish
banks for risk-taking behavior like the depositor discipline. Although deposit insurance weakens
the depositor discipline, regulator discipline is built from the least-cost commitment2.
The basic model is based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and extended with moral hazard of
banks like Cooper and Ross (2002). After introducing the lemon project in the model, it gives banks
an avenue for moral hazard. The lemon project is so bad that it only has value for the banks. Hence,
the lemon project can capture the pure interest conflict between banks and depositors. However, the
model of this chapter has two big differences from Cooper and Ross (2002). One is that the capital
of banks affects the budget constraint of banks in my model. Hence, as to the capital, my model is
relatively more general equilibrium than Cooper and Ross (2002). The other is the assumption of
depositor discipline. In Cooper and Ross (2002), when depositors monitor banks, they can make the
bank manager choose their favorable risk and investment. In my model, depositor discipline comes
from the threat of depositors in a way that depositors withdraw money from their banks to other
safer banks if depositors find their banks are likely to expropriate deposits. Calomiris and Kahn
1In addition to close the bank, the regulator can also make an early intervention to restrict the activities of the
bank.
2In some literature, it is called supervisory discipline.
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(1991) view deposits as a means for monitoring banker’s behavior. Similarly, Diamond and Rajan
(2001) also emphasize the governance advantages of demand deposit. Flannery (1994) argues that
depositors may penalize poor management performance or excessive risk-taking by withdrawing
deposits. Hence, my assumption about depositor discipline is more realistic.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.3 is the basic model based on Diamond and Dybvig
(1983). Section 2.4 extend the basic model based on Cooper and Ross (2002). Section 2.5 gives
numerical examples of the model. Section 2.6 contains the empirical evidence. Section 2.7 is the
discussion and conclusion. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
2.3 The Basic Model
The basic model is based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983). There are three dates (t = 0, 1, 2),
a continuum [0, 1] of banks and a continuum [0, 1] of depositors in every bank. Depositors are ex
ante identical. Each depositor is endowed with one unit at date 0 and nothing thereafter. The
preference of each depositor is given by u(c1 + θc2), where c1 and c2 are consumption of date 1 and
2. θ ∈ {0, 1} is the taste type of the depositor. At the start of date 1, depositors are informed about
their taste types. Each depositor has a probability π to be the early type with θ = 0, which means
she can obtain utility exclusively from the consumption at date 1, while a probability 1− π to be
the late type with θ = 1, which means she cares about the sum of consumption at date 1 and date
2. By law of large numbers, π is also the fraction of depositors who are early type and 1 − π the
late type ex post. As in the first part of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), in this chapter I assume that
π is non-stochastic and known to all agents. The utility function u(·) satisfies u′(·) > 0, u′′(·) < 0,
u(0) = 0 and relative risk aversion coefficient is greater than one.
There are two technologies available for transferring resources over time, which are listed below.
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Date 0 1 2
Storage −1 1 0
0 −1 1
Production −1 1 0
−1 0 R
First, there is a storage technology, available to both banks and depositors, that yields one
unit at next date given one unit invested at the current date. Storage technology has no extra
return, but it is a short run investment, which means that at date 1, agents in the model can only
use storage technology. Second, there is a production technology, only available to banks, that
yields R > 1 at date 2 given one unit invested at date 0. The production technology is a long
run investment which is not completely liquid. The liquidation of production will yield only one
unit at date 1 given one unit invested at date 0. However, at date 0, the storage technology is
weakly dominated by the production technology. Hence, the banks will always use the production
technology at date 0. Without banks, depositors can only use the storage technology. Early type
depositors will consume one unit at date 1, i.e. c1 = 1. Late type depositors are indifferent with
any combination of consumption at date 1 and 2 that used up their individual one unit endowment,
i.e. c1 + c2 = 1. For convenience, I assume late depositors will consume c2 = 1.
2.3.1 First Best
Banks are all identical in the model. There is perfect competition among banks, and so they
make no profit. I also add the capital (equity) of the banks in my model for the purpose of studying
the interest conflict between depositors and banks. Each bank is required to hold a k unit of capital
with one unit of liability in demand deposits, and it can absorb one unit deposit at date 0 if the
depositors accept the bank’s offer. The bank will also invest the capital k through the production
technology at date 0. In first best, all banks will offer contracts that maximize the depositors’ ex
ante expected utility subject to the budget constraint only based on the deposit. The first best
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contract offered by each bank is δFB = (cFB1 , c
FB
2 ) solving
max
c1,c2
πu(c1) + (1− π)u(c2) (2.1)
s.t. 1 = πc1 +
(1− π)c2
R
(2.2)
The properties of utility function make sure that
1 < cFB1 < c
FB
2 < R (2.3)
u′′(c) < 0 implies that cFB1 < c
FB
2 and relative risk aversion coefficient −cu′′(c)/u′(c) > 1 implies
that 1 < cFB1 . The depositors will definitely accept the contract because they can only consume
c1 = c2 = 1 without the offer and u
′(c) > 0. With the contract, the early type depositors will
withdraw their money at date 1 with cFB1 and the late type depositors will withdraw their money
at date 2 with cFB2 .
The first best outcome is the only equilibrium in the model if and only if cFB1 ≤ 1 + k. When
1 + k < cFB1 , there is another bad bank run equilibrium in the model. As in Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) model, the late type depositors will withdraw their money at date 1 when they think that all
other late type depositors will do so. In this case, the bank will lose all its capital k and be bankrupt
at date 1. For late type depositors, waiting cannot give them the consumption cFB2 at date 2 but
nothing. If they withdraw their money at date 1, they have the probability of (1 + k)/cFB1 to get
the cFB1 , which is based on the sequential service constraint. Sequential service constraint means a
bank must service its depositors sequentially, on a first-come, first-served basis.
In this chapter, I will always assume that 1+k < c1, which means that capital is not high enough
to eliminate the bank runs. However, as to the first best in this chapter, it is the outcome that
contract δFB = (cFB1 , c
FB
2 ) works successfully with the probability of one. With the requirement of
minimum capital only, the regulator cannot achieve the first best, because the first best contract
is vulnerable to run (1 + k < cFB1 ).
14
2.3.2 Second Best
Because 1 + k < c1, the bank run equilibrium always exists in the model without any other
policy intervention from the regulator. Suppose that the bank run equilibrium will happen with
the exogenous probability of p and the bank runs will happen in the whole economy (all the banks).
It is a sunspots approach that builds the correlated equilibrium in the game as in Cooper and Ross
(2002), and Keister (2016). Another way to assign the probability of bank run equilibrium is from
global games method. Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) used the global games method to get the
unique equilibrium (switching strategies) in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and the probability of
bank run equilibrium is endogenous. Although the global games method can make the probability
of bank run equilibrium endogenous, it will complicate the model. As you will see below, the
sunspots method in this chapter can capture the spirit in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005).
At date 0, banks also need to raise their capital k from the investors besides one unit of deposit.
Investors are not like depositors. They are only late types and can use the production technology
at date 0 without banks. For simplicity, I assume that the required expected return Rk at date 2
given one unit invested at date 0 from investors is exogenous and Rk ≥ R because investors can
always use the production technology without banks to achieve R at date 2 definitely. Investors
can always anticipate the bank runs.
2.3.2.1 Unanticipated Bank Run
If depositors cannot anticipate the bank run which is possible because 1 + k < c1, the second
best contract offered by each bank is δSBU = (cSBU1 , c
SBU
2 ) solving
max
c1,c2
πu(c1) + (1− π)u(c2) (2.4)
s.t. (1− p)[(1 + k − πc1)R− (1− π)c2] = kRk (2.5)
1 + k < c1 (2.6)
c1 < c2 (2.7)
πu(c1) + (1− π)u(c2) > u(1) (2.8)
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The left hand side of equation (2.5) is the expected remaining capital at date 2 after the bank
pays all the contract with depositors. It should be greater than or equal to the required expected
return from investors (right hand side of equation (2.5)), which is the financing cost of the capital k.
Because banks operate in a competitive environment, we have the equality. It also can be written
in another way
1− k[ Rk
(1− p)R
− 1] = πc1 +
(1− π)c2
R
. (2.9)
Because Rk ≥ R and 1 − p < 1, Rk(1−p)R − 1 is greater than zero. Compare the equation (2.9) to
equation (2.2), we can find that the capital requirement k decreases the budgets of all banks for
deposit contracts because of the high cost of capital even though Rk = R when investors are risk
neutral. When k = 0, which means no minimum capital requirement, equation (2.9) and equation
(2.2) are the same. Hence, we have δSBU = δFB, that is cSBU1 = c
FB
1 and c
SBU
2 = c
FB
2 . However,
δSBU is still second best, because in a decentralized economy with only capital requirement (k = 0
in this case), bank run equilibrium always exists under the assumption 1 + k < c1. When this
chapter mention the first best, it is not only the deposit contract offered by the banks, but also
means that the contract can work successfully with the probability of one. The first best is the
outcome that the regulator wants to achieve.
Inequalities (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) are not the budget constraint for banks. They are the con-
ditions that second best contrast δSBU is a equilibrium in the model. Inequality (2.6) is the core
assumption in this chapter. When k = 0, cSBU1 = c
FB
1 > 0. With the increase of required capital k,
banks will have less budget for depositors according to equation (2.9). Hence, cSBU1 and c
SBU
2 will
decrease. Assumption 1 + k < c1 makes sure that required capital cannot be too high, otherwise
we will have p = 0 which means no bank run equilibrium exists. Inequality (2.7) always holds for
δSBU because of the strict concavity of the utility function. It makes sure that late type depositors
are willing to wait for date 2. Inequality (2.8) always holds for δSBU because cSBU1 > 1 + k > 1
and cSBU2 > c
SBU
1 > 1. It makes sure that depositors are willing to accept the contract.
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2.3.2.2 Anticipated Bank Run
If depositors can anticipate the bank run, the second best contract offered by each bank is
δSBA = (cSBA1 , c
SBA
2 ) solving
max
c1,c2
(1− p)[πu(c1) + (1− π)u(c2)] + pu(c1)
1 + k
c1
(2.10)
s.t. (1− p)[(1 + k − πc1)R− (1− π)c2] = kRk (2.11)
1 + k < c1 (2.12)
c1 < c2 (2.13)
πu(c1) + (1− π)u(c2) > u(1) (2.14)
The budget constraint of banks (2.11) is the same as in unanticipated case ((2.5) or (2.9)) because
investors can always anticipate the bank run. The ex ante utility function of the representative
depositor changed because now depositors will consider the utility under the bank run equilibrium.
Proposition 2.3.1. Let δSBU = (cSBU1 , c
SBU
2 ) solve (2.4) subject to (2.5) and δ
SBA = (cSBA1 , c
SBA
2 )
solve (2.10) subject to (2.11). They have the following relations with feasible exogenous variables
k ≥ 0 and p > 0,
∂cSBU1
∂k
< 0,
∂cSBA1
∂k
< 0,
∂cSBU1
∂p
< 0 (∗), ∂c
SBA
1
∂p
< 0.
(∗) only holds for k > 0.
For any given p and k, cSBA1 < c
SBU
1 < c
SBU
2 < c
SBA
2 . Feasible parameters k and p should be
low enough to make sure 1 + k < cSBA1 .
The proposition states that holding other exogenous variables unchanged, the increase of capital
requirement k or the probability of bank run equilibrium p will make banks offer the lower short term
interest c1 in both unanticipated bank run case and anticipated bank run case. For unanticipated
bank run case, it is straightforward because banks need to pay high cost to finance the required
capital k and the cost will increase if the probability of bank run equilibrium p goes up. Hence,
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the budget for banks to pay the depositors decreases below one unit according to equation (2.9).
The ex ante utility function of the representative depositor (2.4) remains the same, so cSBU1 and
cSBU2 will decrease. For anticipated bank run case, the budget constraint is the same as former
case. However, the ex ante utility function of the representative depositor (2.10) will also change
with k and p. The concavity of u(c) and u(0) = 0 makes sure that cSBA1 will decrease as well.
According to proposition 2.3.1 and analysis above, we know that when k = 0, cSBA1 < c
SBU
1 =
cFB1 and c
FB
1 > 1. To make sure the assumption 1 + k < c1 satisfied, the probability of bank run
equilibrium p should be low enough to get 1 < cSBA1 at k = 0. With the increase of k, c
SBA
1 will
decrease and get closer to one. However, there always exists the feasible parameter k to make sure
1 +k < cSBA1 . When 1 +k < c
SBA
1 is satisfied, the second best contracts δ
SBU and δSBA are indeed
two equilibria in unanticipated and anticipated bank run cases and they are both vulnerable to
run.
The proposition 2.3.1 captures the spirit of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005). Banks will offer
short term interest rate c1 lower than first best when they consider the endogenous probability of
bank runs. In the model of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), the probability of bank run equilibrium
p will change with short term interest rate c1 continuously, and they have positive relation. In this
chapter, p is greater than zero and unchanged when 1 + k < c1, and zero otherwise, but I only
consider the case that 1 + k < c1. Although p is exogenous in my model, banks will also offer short
term interest rate c1 lower than first best in two second best cases. As to the required capital of the
banks k, proposition 2.3.1 is intuitive in reality that the bank which has high capital offers lower
short term interest rate because depositors are willing to believe the banks with the high level of
capital.
The analysis above treats capital k as an exogenous variable. The proposition below discusses
the incentive of banks to keep the capital.
Proposition 2.3.2. In the case of the unanticipated bank run, the required capital will decrease the
expected utility of depositors. Hence, banks have no incentive to hold capital, and they only keep
capital as required. In the case of anticipated bank run, there exists a critical R∗k > R such that
18
required capital will decrease the expected utility of depositors if Rk > R
∗
k and the reverse holds if
Rk < R
∗
k. Hence, especially, when Rk = R, banks will hold capital as much as they can.
The unanticipated bank run case is straightforward. For the case of the anticipated bank run,
banks have a trade-off between the narrow budget and high bank run utility when holding the
capital. When Rk < R
∗
k, holding more capital can increase the utility of depositors. Hence, banks
will try to hold capital as much as they can. In this case, the capital requirement can be seen as
a cap of all capital in the economy. The assumption 1 + k < cSBA1 still holds for this case. As an
alternative, it is reasonable to think that Rk will increase with k, it can also explain that why banks
will not hold enough capital to eliminate the bank run 1 + k > cSBA1 . In reality, when the cost of
financing capital is low enough, banks will keep excessive capital than the minimum requirement
to show the comprehensive ability to deal with the market risks. Although they offer a lower short
term interest rate (∂c1/∂k < 0), depositors are still willing to accept the offer from the banks which
have the high capital.
2.3.3 Deposit Insurance
In the basic model, deposit insurance can achieve the first best without any cost like Diamond
and Dybvig (1983). At date 0, the regulator sets a deposit insurance policy. The deposit insurance
contract stipulates payments to the early and late type depositors as a function of the deposit
contract δ = (c1, c2) in the event that banks are unable to make its promised payments. Let the
payments to c1 as I(c1) and c2 as I(c2). If the bank fails at date 1, the depositors, who cannot
withdraw c1 based on the deposit contract from the bank, can get I(c1) based on the deposit
insurance contract from the regulator. Likewise, if the bank fails at date 2, the depositors, who
cannot withdraw c2 based on the deposit contract from the bank, can get I(c2) based on the deposit
insurance contract from the regulator. Importantly, if a bank fails at date 1, the late type depositors
cannot get I(c2) if they want to wait until date 2, but they can definitely get I(c1) at date 1 if they
cannot withdraw c1 before the failure of the bank. The regulator cannot fail.
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If the regulator sets I(c1) = c
FB
1 and I(c2) = c
FB
2 and k = 0, for any deposit contract from
banks δ = (c1 ≤ cFB1 , c2 ≤ cFB2 ), a late type depositor will always choose to wait even if she believes
that all other depositors will withdraw their money at date 1. If the bank fails at date 2, she can
get I(c2) = c
FB
2 , even if the bank fails at date 1 and she is the last one who goes to the bank,
she can still get I(c1) = c
FB
1 . Waiting is a dominant strategy for late type depositors. As to
banks, if they offer the contract δ = (c1 ≤ cFB1 , c2 ≤ cFB2 ), bank run cannot happen because of the
deposit insurance. The competitive environment makes banks to choose δ = (c1 = c
FB
1 , c2 = c
FB
2 )
with no capital requirement. In this case, the probability of bank run p is equal to zero. If Rk = R,
banks are indifferent to keep any level of capital and with any capital requirement k, competitive
banks will still offer the contract δ = (c1 = c
FB
1 , c2 = c
FB
2 ). The first best is achieved. The deposit
insurance is only an ex ante commitment, it will never be exerted, so it has no real cost.
2.4 The Extended Model
Chapter 2 focuses on the interest conflict between the banks and depositors under an equilib-
rium which is vulnerable to run. In the above basic model, the banks only have one production
technology to choose (although they can also choose the storage technology, it is weakly dominated
by the production technology). Hence, the competitive environment will make banks maximize the
expected utility function of the representative depositor. No interest conflict between the banks
and depositors in the basic model, so deposit insurance works perfectly in the basic model. The
extended model is based on Cooper and Ross (2002).
2.4.1 The Lemon Project
To allow the bank an avenue for moral hazard, assume that there is another production tech-
nology. The new production technology is also a long run investment but risky. Given one unit
invested at date 0, the new technology yields λR at date 2 with the probability v and 0 otherwise. If
the new production aborts at date 1, it has a liquidation value of one unit which is the same as the
old risk-free production technology. Assume that λ > 0 and vλ < 1, so the new risky technology
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has a higher return if it is successful but nothing otherwise. The risky production technology has
a lower expected return than the old risk-free technology. Hence, depositors and investors who
avert the risk will prefer the old risk-free technology although depositors cannot use the production
technology without the banks. The new risky production technology is called lemon project. At
last, assume vλR > 1 which means the expected return of the lemon project at date 2 is greater
than one. It is reasonable because the lemon project has the liquidation value of one unit at date
1.
Assume that bank managers are risk neutral and they will maximize the capital (equity) of the
bank. There still exists interest conflict between bank managers and investors because investors are
risk-averse. However, it is not the key point of this chapter. The lemon project has value for the
bank managers because it may generate a positive profit in the competitive environment. Consider
the extreme case that capital requirement k is zero; the most capital that the banks can lose is
zero. If a bank manager only chooses the old technology, the bank will still have zero capital at
date 2 after paying all the deposit contract which is the same as the worst case, losing zero capital.
However, if she goes to the lemon project, the bank has a positive probability v(1 − p) to earn
positive capital at date 2 after paying all the deposit contract under the condition that depositors
do not monitor the bank. The lemon project has value for the risk-neutral bank managers because
of the limited liability of the banks.
Formally, let i denote funds (per unit of deposit and capital) that a bank places in the lemon
project. The portfolio choice of a bank is determined from
max
i
(1− p){v[iλR+ (1 + k − i− πcSB1 )R− (1− π)cSB2 ] +
(1− v) max[(1 + k − i− πcSB1 )R− (1− π)cSB2 , 0]} (2.15)
The cSB1 and c
SB
2 in (2.15) are c
SBU
1 and c
SBU
2 in unanticipated bank run case and c
SBA
1 and c
SBA
2
in anticipated bank run case. From (2.15), it can be shown that the bank manager will use the
all in bet when decides the optimal portfolio i. The bank will place either all of the funds in the
lemon project (i = 1 + k) or all of the funds in the risk-free production technology (i = 0). In
21
addition, assume Rk <
1+k
k(1−p)R, it makes sure the bank has no capital left if the bank manager
chooses i = 1+k and the lemon project fails at date 2 when bank run equilibrium does not happen.
Proposition 2.4.1. For the portfolio choice from (2.15), the bank manager will choose i = 0 if
and only if
k ≥ k∗ = R(1− p)v(λ− 1)
R(1− p)v(1− λ) +Rk(1− v)
(2.16)
and i = 1 + k otherwise.
The k∗ in equation (2.16) is greater than zero because λ > 1, Rk ≥ R and vλ < 1. The
intuition is straightforward. When the required capital k is large, banks will lose large capital if it
fails. Lemon project has no value for the banks when they keep a high level of capital.
2.4.2 Depositor Monitoring
In Cooper and Ross (2002), they assume that after suffering a monitoring cost, depositors can
make banks choose the original risk-free production technology. It is unrealistic because when
banks go to the lemon project, they always do it secretly and depositors can find the misconduct
of banks after the lemon project has already begun. In this chapter, I use another more realistic
assumption about the monitoring behavior of depositors in the spirit of Calomiris and Kahn (1991),
and Diamond and Rajan (2001). The threat of bank runs solves the agency problems by the fact
that depositors who monitor banks will trigger a run if the bank is likely to expropriate depositor
funds. In the model setting, at date 0, banks can choose the lemon project or the old risk-free
project, and depositors cannot know the choice of banks. At date 1, depositors see the choice of
banks. Early type depositors always withdraw their money at date 1 to achieve c1. Late type
depositors decide to trigger a fundamental-based bank run or not if panic-based bank run does not
happen. The outcome of the lemon project (success or fail) can only be known at date 2.
The probability of bank run equilibrium p only refers to the panic-based bank run, and it is
exogenous. If panic-based bank run does not happen which means the normal deposit contract
equilibrium happens with the probability of 1 − p, the late type depositors may still trigger a
fundamental-based bank run if they find banks go to the lemon project and triggering a bank run
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is better than waiting to the date 2. The panic-based bank run has no relation to the fundamental
of banks. It is totally exogenous. Banks that only choose the risk-free project (no fundamental
problem) can still suffer a panic-based bank run because 1+k < c1. A fundamental-based bank run
is endogenous. It is due to the misconduct of banks. Only banks which invest the lemon project
would suffer the fundamental-based bank runs. In a word, when depositors (late type only in the
model) find that the banks which invest the lemon project, they may withdraw their money from
them to the banks that have no fundamental problems if it gives the depositors more utility.
In the model, at date 1, when late type depositors find that their banks go to the lemon project
(all in from the above analysis), they will still withdraw their money at date 1 (assume that they
have already seen the sunspot that shows no panic-based bank run happens) if and only if
u(c1)
1 + k
c1
− vu(c2) ≥ 0 (2.17)
The first part of inequality (2.17) is the utility that late type depositors can achieve if they trigger
a fundamental-based bank run. The second part is the utility of late type depositors if they wait.
From the inequality (2.17), let vSBU and vSBA satisfy the equations below
u(cSBU1 )
1 + k
cSBU1
− vSBUu(cSBU2 ) = 0, u(cSBA1 )
1 + k
cSBA1
− vSBAu(cSBA2 ) = 0 (2.18)
For the case of unanticipated bank run, if the lemon project has v ≤ vSBU , the late type depositors
will withdraw their money definitely at date 1 when their banks go to the lemon project. Hence,
the banks will definitely lose their capital k if they speculate on the lemon project. If the bank
managers only choose the risk-free project, they have probability of 1 − p to leave the Rk capital
for the investors at date 2. Hence, banks will not speculate on the lemon project if v ≤ vSBU in
the case of unanticipated bank run. The interesting thing is that the effect of monitoring behavior
from depositors does not depend on the λ of the lemon project. Only the probability of success v of
the lemon project is the critical value that whether banks will speculate on it or not. If v > vSBU
and the condition on k in equation (2.16) is not satisfied, all banks will go to the lemon project
and the deposit contract δSBU will change to a worse equilibrium. In a word, when condition on
k in equation (2.16) is not satisfied, the second best deposit contract δSBU = (cSBU1 , c
SBU
2 ) is an
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equilibrium only when v ≤ vSBU . The same is to the case of anticipated bank run. For the analysis
below, assume that v ≤ vSBU and v ≤ vSBA, so δSBU and δSBA are always equilibria. In this case,
the ex ante threat of fundamental-based bank run from (late type) depositors is credible. It works
like a ex ante commitment to prevent banks from the lemon project.
2.4.3 Deposit Insurance
The deposit insurance in the extended model will cause a moral hazard issue. If the regulator
sets the deposit insurance contract I(c1) = c
FB
1 and I(c2) = c
FB
2 and capital requirement k = 0 as
before, depositors will not monitor the bank any more. Waiting is always a dominant strategy for
late type depositors under such deposit insurance. Hence, all banks will speculate on the lemon
project, and the regulator will suffer the cost of deposit insurance (1 − v)(1 − π)cFB2 . When fully
deposit insurance is introduced, there are no more fundamental-based bank run and panic-based
bank run (p = 0), the cost of deposit insurance is from the failure of the lemon project. Because
the lemon project has a lower expected return than the risk-free project, the benefit from banks is
always lower than the cost of deposit insurance.
To solve the problem, Cooper and Ross (2002) proposed the minimum capital requirement.
From proposition 2.4.1, let p = 0, Rk = R in equation (2.16), we have when k ≥ k∗ = [v(λ−1)]/(1−
λv), banks will not speculate on the lemon project under the first best deposit insurance. First
best outcome is achieved by using the combination of capital requirement and deposit insurance.
Their proposition is correct. However, the capital requirement is too large to be feasible in reality,
even for very normal parameters. First, consider a simple numerical example that a lemon project
with v = 0.3, λ = 3 and λv = 0.9 < 1. The minimum capital requirement should be no less
than k∗ = [v(λ− 1)]/(1− λv) = 6 to prevent banks from speculating the lemon project with only
30% successful rate. k = 6 means that with one unit of the deposit in liability, banks need to
hold six units of capital in equity. It is ridiculous in reality for any financial institution. Financial
institutions often have a high level of financial leverage. According to the newest Basel III, banks
need to hold 4.5% tier one capital (equity), i.e. k = 0.045. In the next numerical example section,
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I will stick to the parameter k = 0.045. Second, the proposition from Cooper and Ross (2002)
is not feasible also because it will violate the core assumption 1 + k < c1 in the model. For a
lemon project, if 1 + k∗ > c1, the probability of panic-based bank run p is zero and first best
outcome is achievable, why we still need the deposit insurance. The regulator only needs to use the
capital requirement policy such that 1 + k = c1, and no panic-based bank run will happen. The
introduction of deposit insurance only causes the problem of moral hazard from the lemon project
and has no benefit at all. Third, the proposition from Cooper and Ross (2002) is based on the
assumption Rk = R, which is only reasonable when k is low.
2.4.4 The Regulator
In most related literature, the regulator only sets the policy but not a true player in the game.
It can be shown that the regulator can play an important role to solve the problem of moral
hazard. Assume that a lemon project exists in the economy with v ≤ vSBU and v ≤ vSBA, so
second best deposit contracts δSBU and δSBA are equilibria that are vulnerable to panic-based run
(1 + k < c1). Also assume that k
∗ in (2.16) of the lemon project cannot be satisfied under deposit
insurance contract I(c1) = c
FB
1 and I(c2) = c
FB
2 because 1 + k
∗ > c1. It is still possible to achieve
the first best outcome without any cost like the basic model. The regulator still sets the deposit
insurance contract I(c1) = c
FB
1 and I(c2) = c
FB
2 as before, but this time it will also minimize its
cost. Assume that the regulator also has the right to cease a bank at date 1 if the regulator finds
the bank speculates on the lemon project. In reality, the regulator has more information about the
bank than depositors. If depositors can know the misconduct of the bank at date 1, the regulator
can definitely know it too. In a way, when the regulator ceases a bank at date 1, it plays like the
same way that (late type) depositors trigger a fundamental-based bank run. With the introduction
of the first best deposit insurance, the ex ante threat (commitment) of the fundamental-based
bank run from depositors does not exist anymore, but the ex ante threat (commitment) from the
regulator can be built if the regulator will cease the bank when banks speculate on the lemon
project and it is the common knowledge. The deposit insurance transfers the moral hazard risk
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from depositors to the regulator (insurer), so the regulator has the incentive to monitor the banks
instead of depositors. The key point for the mechanism to success is that the insurer who gives the
deposit insurance and the regulator who can cease or make an early intervention on banks are the
same entity. The regulator, also the insurer, will make a decision on ceasing the bank or not based
on the principle of cost minimization.
If the regulator plans to cease the bank at date 1, it has two different methods of resolution.
First, the regulator will always pay late type depositors cFB2 at date 2 even the bank is closed at
date 1. In this method, the regulator will keep the balance sheet of the failed bank from date 1
to date 2 and it will cost the regulator C to do it3. In practice, the ceasing cost depends on the
specific types of resolution. If the regulator can find another healthy bank purchases all of the
assets of the failed bank and assumes all of the liabilities4, the ceasing cost is very low for the
regulator. However, when no bank is interested in the deposit franchise and an insured-deposit
transfer cannot be arranged, the regulator needs to keep the balance sheet of failed banks by itself
and the ceasing cost can be very high. I will refer the first method to the un-liquidating method
in this chapter. Second, the regulator will pay all depositors cFB1 at date 1 if they cannot get their
deposit from the bank. The bank is closed at date 1 and all assets are liquidated. The regulator
has no ceasing cost in this case. I will refer the second method to the liquidating method in this
chapter. In most cases, the un-liquidating method has a lower cost to the regulator compared to
the liquidating method because liquidation is not efficient. However, when the ceasing cost is very
high for the regulator, liquidating method can have a lower cost for the regulator. Although the
un-liquidating method always has a higher utility for the late type depositors compared to the
liquidating method, the regulator will still stick to the least-cost resolution. The deposit insurance
with least cost commitment in this chapter not only has the least-cost resolution in practice, the
requirement that chooses a method of resolution that minimizes the present value of the costs
incurred by the deposit insurer, but also has the least-cost timing of bank closure, the regulator
3I will refer C to the ceasing cost later.
4This is the purchase-and-assumption transaction, the healthy bank is willing to bid a negative net asset bank
because it values the customers of the failed bank or any other charter value.
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makes decision on ceasing or not ceasing a bank based on the cost of the deposit insurer. No matter
what method the regulator uses to cease a bank, if it did it, the bank would lose all the capitals.
The opportunity cost for the regulator to pay one unit at date 1 is R unit at date 2, because the
risk-free production technology is available to the regulator and the regulator will always use this
technology because it is weakly dominant than storage technology and the lemon project has no
value for the regulator.
Formally, assume that the regulator will use the least-cost requirement for the decision on
ceasing the bank or not at date 1 and all banks know the commitment. The regulator has the
incentive to do it because it is also the insurer. Rk = R must hold for all k > 0 because capital
requirement will decrease the budget of banks for depositors if Rk > R and first best cannot
be achieved. It is a reasonable assumption when k is low because, under the first best deposit
insurance, the probability of panic-based bank run p is zero. Investors can definitely achieve R
at date 2 given one unit invest in the capital at date 0 (if banks do not speculate on the lemon
project) without the risk of panic-based bank run. If k = 0, Rk will not affect the budget of banks
for depositors. Regulator sets the first best deposit insurance contract I(c1) = c
FB
1 and I(c2) = c
FB
2
and there are no more fundamental-based bank run and panic-based bank run (p = 0). At date 1,
when regulator finds that a bank goes to the lemon project (all in from the above analysis), it will
have costs below if it uses the un-liquidating method to cease the bank
(1− π)c2 − vλR(1 + k − πc1 − C). (2.19)
Assume C < 1 + k − πc1 in (2.19), which means the assets of the failed bank always has the
positive value at date 2 even considering the ceasing cost. It is reasonable because the regulator
can always displace the assets with no cost and just pay the liability (1 − π)c2 at date 2. The
regulator liquidates πc1 +C assets from the failed bank which speculates on lemon project at date
1 because the expected return (vλR) of lemon project is less than the opportunity cost (R). The
costs of regulator when it uses the liquidating method to cease the bank is
R[c1 − (1 + k)] (2.20)
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At date 1, the regulator needs to pay all the depositors cFB1 and she can get 1 + k from the bank
by liquidating the assets of the bank. The payment happens at date 1, so it needs to time the
opportunity cost R. According to (2.19) and (2.20), the regulator will choose the un-liquidating
method when it plans to cease the bank at date 1 if and only if
C ≤ R(c1 − 1)− (1− vλ)[(1− π)c2 +Rk]
vλR
(2.21)
When condition (2.21) is satisfied, the regulator will cease the bank at date 1 if and only if
(1− v)(1− π)cFB2 − [(1− π)c2 − vλR(1 + k − πc1 − C)] ≥ 0 (2.22)
The first part of inequality (2.22) is the cost of the regulator if she does not cease the bank at date
1. At date 2, when the lemon project fails, the regulator needs to pay the late type depositors cFB2
and she get nothing from the failed bank. The second part of inequality (2.22) is the cost of the
regulator if she ceases the bank at date 1 according to (2.19). Simplify inequality (2.22), we have
λ ≥ (1− π)c2
R(k − C) + (1− π)c2
(2.23)
From the condition (2.23), we can easily get the next proposition.
Proposition 2.4.2. If the capital requirement is greater than or equal to the ceasing cost of the
failed bank (k ≥ C), the deposit insurance with least-cost commitment will build the perfect regulator
discipline in a way that it prevents banks from any possible lemon project in the extended model.
In the extended model, deposit insurance eliminates the depositor discipline from monitoring
behavior. However, regulatory discipline is built from the least-cost commitment. The proposition
2.4.2 states that if the regulator uses another regulator discipline, capital requirement, and sets
k ≥ C, the combination of capital requirement and least-cost commitment will prevent banks from
speculating on any possible lemon project, even for the lemon projects with v ≥ vSBU and v ≥ vSBA
when depositor discipline is not credible. However, if the ceasing cost is too high (1 + C > c1),
regulator cannot use the combination of capital requirement and least-cost commitment to achieve
the perfect depositor discipline. If they can set the capital as high as the ceasing cost, the high
capital will eliminate the panic-based bank run (1 + k > c1) and deposit insurance is meaningless.
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If ceasing cost is high and we have k < C, the perfect regulator discipline is not available.
How is the regulator discipline when it compares to the depositor discipline? Depositor discipline
is not perfect. It is only credible for v ≤ vSBU and v ≤ vSBA according to the analysis above.
Let’s consider the worst case of depositor discipline from the least-cost commitment. When ceasing
cost is too high, and condition (2.21) is not satisfied. Hence, the regulator will choose to use the
liquidating method if it plans to cease the bank at date 1. Formally, when condition (2.21) is not
satisfied, the regulator will cease the bank at date 1 if and only if
(1− v)(1− π)c2 −R[c1 − (1 + k)] ≥ 0 (2.24)
Similarly, the first part of inequality (2.24) is the cost of the regulator if she does not cease the
bank at date 1. The second part of inequality (2.24) is the cost of the regulator if she ceases the
bank at date 1, according to (2.20). Let vFB satisfy the equation below
(1− vFB)(1− π)cFB2 −R[cFB1 − (1 + k)] = 0 (2.25)
If the lemon project has v ≤ vFB, the regulator will cease the bank at date 1 when a bank goes
to the lemon project even if ceasing cost is very high. In this case, the ex ante threat from the
regulator is credible. It works like a ex ante commitment to prevent banks from the lemon project5.
Proposition 2.4.3. Let vFB solves equation (2.25) and vSBU , vSBA solve equation (2.18). They
have the following relations
vSBU < vFB, vABU < vFB (2.26)
The commitment from regulator is always stronger than the commitment from depositors to prevent
banks from speculating. Hence, the first best deposit insurance with least-cost commitment will not
deteriorate interest conflict between banks and depositors from the monitoring perspective.
The conflict of interest between banks and depositors exists in a decentralized economy (no
deposit insurance). In the model, because of the asymmetric information and limited liability,
5Actually, regulator discipline may prevent banks from lemon project with v > vFB , because the liquidating
method is only one of the method that regulator can use. If ceasing cost is low, condition (2.21) is satisfied, regulator
can do better with un-liquidating method.
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banks have the incentive to speculate on the lemon project. The proposition 2.4.3 states that if in
the decentralized economy, the commitment of depositor monitoring prevents banks from the lemon
project (v ≤ vSBU or v ≤ vSBA), the least-cost commitment from the first best deposit insurance
will also prevent banks from the lemon project (v < vFB). For lemon project which has (v > vSBU
or v > vSBA), neither second best deposit contract δSBU nor δSBA is an equilibrium any more in
the decentralized economy because all banks go to the lemon project. Hence, it is easy to get the
next proposition.
Proposition 2.4.4. In the extended model, if second best deposit contract δSBU or δSBA is an
equilibrium in the decentralized economy, the deposit insurance I(c1) = c
FB
1 and I(c2) = c
FB
2 with
least-cost commitment can achieve the first best outcome with no cost for any k if Rk = R or k = 0
if Rk > R.
The deposit insurance in proposition 2.4.4 can achieve the first best outcome without bringing
extra moral hazard because of the least-cost commitment from the regulator. The traditional way
treats deposit insurance stable once the policy is enacted. The regulator is not a true player in the
game. In my model, the regulator can take actions on ceasing the bank according to the least-cost
principal. The effectiveness of proposition 2.4.4 in practice highly depends on how strong the degree
of ex ante commitment from the regulator it is. A coherent policy of resolving the failing bank
based on the least-cost principal is a strong commitment to preventing banks from speculating the
lemon project. If politic interventions on the resolution of banks frequently happened in history,
existing banks may take a chance to speculate and test the attitude of the regulator.
In the analysis above, the regulator is also the deposit insurer. It is possible to build a strong
commitment when the regulator who makes a decision on the resolution of insolvent banks is
different from the deposit insurer. If the regulator claims that she will make a decision on the
resolution based on the least-cost of the deposit insurer and all banks believe in the reputation of
the regulator, the deposit insurance with least-cost commitment still works. However, it is better
to have one entity to do both things. First, the least-cost principal generates the incentive for
deposit insurer to diligently monitor the bank instead of depositors. Separated entities may not
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work efficiently. Second, a unified entity can build a strong commitment that the regulator will
stick to the least-cost principal because it is the insurer.
2.5 Numerical Examples
In this section I illustrate the properties of the model with some numerical examples. Assume
the depositors’ utility function is given by
u(c) =
(c+ f)1−σ
1− σ
− (f)
1−σ
1− σ
. (2.27)
The function is a modified version of a standard CRRA function with σ being the relative risk
aversion coefficient. Parameter f makes sure u(0) = 0 is satisfied. For simplicity, parameters are
set as follows σ = 2 and f = 1. Parameter σ = 2 guarantees that the model always has real number
solutions. The utility function (2.27) becomes u(c) = c/(c + 1). It is easy to check the function
satisfies u′(c) > 0, u′′(c) < 0, u(0) = 0 and −cu′′(c)/u′(c) > 1 for c > 1.
As to remaining parameters, let Rk = R = 3 and p = 0.02. I consider the different fraction 1−π
of the late type depositors in next two tables. Table 2.1 shows the case that late type depositors is
greater than early type depositors with π = 0.3. Table 2.2 shows the case that late type depositors
is less than early type depositors with π = 0.7. For each case, I list the outcomes on capital of
k = 0 and k = 0.045. Parameter k = 0.045 is based on Basel III.
Table 2.1 Numerical Examples with π = 0.3
k c1 c2 E[u(c)] v
∗
Unanticipated bank run 0 1.1776 2.7717 0.6766 0.6249
without deposit insurance 0.045 1.1763 2.7694 0.6764 0.6536
Anticipated bank run 0 1.1337 2.8281 0.6724 0.6344
without deposit insurance 0.045 1.1304 2.8285 0.6726 0.6640
First best deposit insurance 0 1.1776 2.7717 0.6766 0.7254
with least cost commitment 0.045 1.1776 2.7717 0.6766 0.7950
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Table 2.2 Numerical Examples with π = 0.7
k c1 c2 E[u(c)] v
∗
Unanticipated bank run 0 1.0614 2.5704 0.5764 0.6738
without deposit insurance 0.045 1.0603 2.5686 0.5762 0.7047
Anticipated bank run 0 1.0553 2.6129 0.5746 0.6728
without deposit insurance 0.045 1.0540 2.6130 0.5748 0.7035
First best deposit insurance 0 1.0614 2.5704 0.5764 0.7612
with least cost commitment 0.045 1.0614 2.5704 0.5764 0.9363
The v∗ in the table refers to vSBU , vSBA and vFB in each equilibrium. We can find that
vSBU < vFB and vSBU < vFB in two tables as expected. E[u(c)] is the ex ante expected utility of
the representative depositor. First best outcome always trumps the two second best outcomes of
the decentralized economy in all cases. The only exception is the case when k = 0, cSBU1 = c
FB
1
and cSBU2 = c
FB
2 , so the expected utility of first best is the same as that of second best in the case
of unanticipated bank run. However, the second best deposit contract δSBU is still vulnerable to
run in this case. Because depositors are naive such that they cannot anticipate the potential bank
run, they perceive that they have the same happiness with the first best outcome.
2.6 Empirical Evidence
The key propositions of this chapter come from two aspects. One is that depositor discipline
is not very effective. The other is that the regulator has a strong commitment to sticking to the
least-cost principal.
2.6.1 Deposit Discipline
The depositor discipline is not effective in the model because the fundamental-based bank run
is not efficient for depositors. Only if the lemon project is very bad, the threat from depositors to
trigger a fundamental-based bank run is credible for banks. Empirical evidence on the discipline
of depositors is mixed. Flannery (1998) contends that depositors are not only concerned about
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the solvency of banks, but also about the solvency of insurer and willingness of the government to
support it. Park and Peristiani (1998) find evidence for market disciplines by depositors. Cook and
Spellman (1994) report that rates on small CDs generally vary with banks’ financial conditions.
However, Jagtiani and Lemieux (2001) find no evidence of market discipline in the CD market.
Bliss and Flannery (2002) note that effective deposit discipline involves two distinct components:
the ability of depositors to evaluate a bank’s financial position, and to produce or trigger change
at the bank management level. Iyer et al. (2013) find that depositors behave differently in a panic-
based bank run and a fundamental-based bank run. Hence, depositors have the ability to evaluate
the fundamental of banks.
2.6.2 Regulator Discipline
Iyer et al. (2013) also find that fundamental-based bank run resulted by depositors only begin
after the central bank audit shows that the bank is already insolvent. It supports the assumption
in this chapter that the regulator can definitely find the speculation of the bank if depositors can
do it. According to Iyer et al. (2013), the regulator has more information about banks’ financial
positions, and depositors actually follow the regulator.
The least-cost commitment in the model has two kinds of meanings, least-cost resolution and
least-cost timing of closure.
2.6.2.1 Least-Cost Resolution
In the United State, the least-cost resolution refers to the resolution method that minimizes
the present value of net losses incurred by the deposit insurer, regardless of other factors. After
the passage of FDICIA, which mandated the least-cost requirement, all policy objectives became
secondary to cost considerations in determining the resolution method. FDICIA provided fro
one exception to least-cost requirement, namely, the systematic risk exception. Before the FDIC
can invoke this exception, two-thirds of the FDIC Board Directors and two-thirds of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System must agree that complying with the least-cost requirement
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would have serious adverse effects on the economic condition or financial stability. Since its creation
in FDICIA, the systematic risk exception has never been used. In imposing this rather stringent
requirement, banks which are considered to be too big or too important to fail cannot enjoy any
additional bailout in the financial crisis.
Outside the United States, a least-cost requirement like one imposed on the FDIC is far from
universal. Government bailouts for banks are common in the European Union. Berger and Turk-
Ariss (2015) find that market discipline is stronger in the U.S. than the E.U., which is consistent
with the conclusion of this chapter.
2.6.2.2 Least-Cost Timing of Closure
Banks typically fail after a gradual deterioration of fundamental rather than a single adverse
event. Thus, the timing of the closure of a bank directly affects the costs to the deposit insurer.
As a bank approaches failure, uninsured, unsecured liabilities will either flee or attempt to become
insured or secured. In addition, bank managers will have an incentive to take on more risk in an
attempt to earn sufficient returns to save the bank from failure. Usually, however, these actions
result not in high returns to banks but in higher losses to the deposit insurer.
In the United States, FDICIA contains prompt corrective action provisions that formalize the
timing of regulatory actions and closure on the basis of capital ratios. Bennett (2001) points out
that formalizing early intervention may limit excessive risk-taking.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter proposes a new role that regulator who can declare a bank legally insolvent will
play. It supports the least-cost resolution policy in the United States. The recent Great Recession
has led to a new rebate about the least-cost requirement. Many experts in practice suggest that a
least-cost requirement that has enough flexibility to allow the deposit insurer to deal with systematic
risks may be advantageous. According to this chapter, flexibility means a weaker commitment from
the regulator. Regulator discipline may not be strong enough to rebuild the market discipline with
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the loss of depositor discipline. Moreover, the least-cost commitment in this chapter also includes
the least-cost timing of closure.
In addition, this chapter makes a contribution to by constructing a relatively general model
based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983) but additionally includes the capital of banks. It gives a new
theoretical foundation to evaluate the combination of capital requirement and deposit insurance.
Finally, recent empirical researches about deposit insurance are focused on two things. First,
how strong the depositor discipline is without deposit insurance. Second, whether deposit insurance
reduces the depositor discipline. This chapter gives a new perspective for empirical researches.
Empirical analysis should pay more attention to the behavior of banks and the regulator when
deposit insurance is in place.
2.8 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1
Proof. The budget constraint of banks in two cases ((2.5) and (2.11)) are the same and can be
written as
c2 =
R
1− π
− k[Rk − (1− p)R
(1− p)(1− π)
]− πR
1− π
c1. (2.28)
Because δSBU = (cSBU1 , c
SBU
2 ) solves (2.4) subject to (2.5), the first order condition is
f(cSBU1 , k, p) = u
′(cSBU1 )−Ru′(cSBU2 ) = 0. (2.29)
Use the implicit function theorem and obtain
∂cSBU1
∂k
= −
∂f(cSBU1 ,k,p)
∂k
∂f(cSBU1 ,k,p)
∂cSBU1
= −
Ru′′(cSBU2 )[
Rk−(1−p)R
(1−p)(1−π) ]
u′′(cSBU1 ) +
πR2
1−πu
′′(cSBU2 )
< 0, (2.30)
and
∂cSBU1
∂p
= −
∂f(cSBU1 ,k,p)
∂p
∂f(cSBU1 ,k,p)
∂cSBU1
= −
Ru′′(cSBU2 )[
kRk
(1−p)2(1−π) ]
u′′(cSBU1 ) +
πR2
1−πu
′′(cSBU2 )
< 0. (2.31)
The inequality (2.31) holds for k > 0. The numerators and denominators in both (2.30) and (2.31)
are less than zero because u′′(c) < 0. As to the case of anticipated bank run, δSBA = (cSBA1 , c
SBA
2 )
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solves (2.10) subject to (2.11). The first order condition is
g(cSBA1 , k, p) = (1− p)π[u′(cSBA1 )−Ru′(cSBA2 )] + p(1 + k)[
u′(cSBA1 )
cSBA1
− u(c
SBA
1 )
(cSBA1 )
2 ] = 0. (2.32)
Use the implicit function theorem and obtain
∂cSBA1
∂k
= −
∂g(cSBA1 ,k,p)
∂k
∂g(cSBA1 ,k,p)
∂cSBA1
. (2.33)
The numerator of equation (2.33) is as follows
∂g(cSBA1 , k, p)
∂k
= (1− p)πRu′′(cSBA2 )[
Rk − (1− p)R
(1− p)(1− π)
] + p[
u′(cSBA1 )
cSBA1
− u(c
SBA
1 )
(cSBA1 )
2 ] < 0 (2.34)
It is easy to check (1 − p)πRu′′(cSBA2 )[
Rk−(1−p)R
(1−p)(1−π) ] in inequality (2.34) is less than zero because of
the concavity of utility function. As to p[
u′(cSBA1 )
cSBA1
− u(c
SBA
1 )
(cSBA1 )
2 ] in inequality (2.34), we have
p[
u′(cSBA1 )
cSBA1
− u(c
SBA
1 )
(cSBA1 )
2 ] = p
u′(cSBA1 )c
SBA
1 − u(cSBA1 )
(cSBA1 )
2
= p
u′(cSBA1 )c
SBA
1 − [u(0) + u′(ξ)cSBA1 ]
(cSBA1 )
2
= p
u′(cSBA1 )c
SBA
1 − u′(ξ)cSBA1
(cSBA1 )
2 < 0
where ξ ∈ (0, cSBA1 ). Because u′′(c) < 0 and ξ < cSBA1 , p[
u′(cSBA1 )
cSBA1
− u(c
SBA
1 )
(cSBA1 )
2 ] is also less than zero.
Thus, the inequality (2.34) holds. The denominator of equation (2.33) is also negative according
to the second order condition, so
∂cSBA1
∂k is negative. Similarly,
∂cSBA1
∂p
= −
∂g(cSBA1 ,k,p)
∂p
∂g(cSBA1 ,k,p)
∂cSBA1
(2.35)
The numerator of equation (2.35) is as follows
∂g(cSBA1 , k, p)
∂p
= −π[u′(cSBA1 )−Ru′(cSBA2 )] +
Ru′′(cSBA2 )[
πkRk
(1− p)(1− π)
] + (1 + k)[
u′(cSBA1 )
cSBA1
− u(c
SBA
1 )
(cSBA1 )
2 ] (2.36)
The second part Ru′′(cSBA2 )[
πkRk
(1−p)(1−π) ] and third part (1 + k)[
u′(cSBA1 )
cSBA1
− u(c
SBA
1 )
(cSBA1 )
2 ] on the right hand
side of equation (2.36) are less than zero as shown before. As to the first part, using equation (2.32)
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we have
− π[u′(cSBA1 )−Ru′(cSBA2 )] =
p(1 + k)
1− p
[
u′(cSBA1 )
cSBA1
− u(c
SBA
1 )
(cSBA1 )
2 ] < 0 (2.37)
Hence, the numerator of equation (2.35) is negative. The denominator of equation (2.35) is also
negative according to the second order condition, so
∂cSBA1
∂p is negative.
The difference between δSBU and δSBA only comes from the ex ante expected utility of repre-
sentative depositor. In the case of anticipated bank run, depositors will consider the utility when
bank run equilibrium happens. The utility of bank run equilibrium has negative relation with short
term interest rate c1 as shown below,
d[u(c1)
1 + k
c1
]/dc1 = (1 + k)[
u′(c1)
c1
− u(c1)
(c1)
2 ] < 0 (2.38)
Hence, we have cSBA1 < c
SBU
1 . Because of the same budget constraint (2.28), the long term interest
rate should have reverse relation cSBA2 > c
SBU
2 . At last, according to equation (2.29), we have
cSBU1 < c
SBU
2 .
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2
Proof. In the case of unanticipated bank run, let value function V (k) satisfy
V (k) = max
c1,c2
πu(c1) + (1− π)u(c2) (2.39)
subject to the budget constraint of equation (2.28). Use the envelope theorem and obtain
V ′(k) = −(1− π)u′(cSBU2 )[
Rk − (1− p)R
(1− p)(1− π)
] = −u′(cSBU2 )[
Rk − (1− p)R
(1− p)
] < 0. (2.40)
Hence, the required capital will decrease the expected utility of depositors. Banks have no incentive
to hold capital and they only keep capital as required.
In the case of anticipated bank run, similarly, let value function U(k) satisfy
U(k) = max
c1,c2
(1− p)[πu(c1) + (1− π)u(c2)] + pu(c1)
1 + k
c1
(2.41)
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subject to the budget constraint of equation (2.28). Use the envelope theorem and obtain
U ′(k) = −(1− p)(1− π)u′(cSBA2 )[
Rk − (1− p)R
(1− p)(1− π)
] + p
u(cSBA1 )
cSBA1
= p[
u(cSBA1 )
cSBA1
−Ru′(cSBA2 )] + u′(cSBA2 )[R−Rk] (2.42)
From the first order condition of equation (2.32), we have
u′(cSBA1 )−Ru′(cSBA2 ) = −
p(1 + k)
π(1− p)
[
u′(cSBA1 )
cSBA1
− u(c
SBA
1 )
(cSBA1 )
2 ] > 0 (2.43)
Hence, the first part of equation (2.42) is positive as follows
p[
u(cSBA1 )
cSBA1
−Ru′(cSBA2 )] > p[u′(cSBA1 )−Ru′(cSBA2 )] > 0 (2.44)
The second part of equation (2.42) is zero when Rk = R, so U
′(k) > 0 and banks will hold capital
as much as they can. From equation (2.42), we can also derive the R∗k as follows
R∗k =
p
u′(cSBA2 )
[
u(cSBA1 )
cSBA1
−Ru′(cSBA2 )] +R (2.45)
It is easy to check that U ′(k) > 0 if Rk < R
∗
k and U
′(k) < 0 if Rk > R
∗
k.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1
Proof. Rewrite the portfolio choice of bank in (2.15) here
max
i
(1− p){v[iλR+ (1 + k − i− πcSB1 )R− (1− π)cSB2 ] +
(1− v) max[(1 + k − i− πcSB1 )R− (1− π)cSB2 , 0]}. (2.46)
Using the budget constraint (2.28), (2.46) becomes
max
i
(1− p){v[iλR+ kRk
(1− p)
− iR] + (1− v) max[ kRk
(1− p)
− iR, 0]} (2.47)
Consider i′ satisfies
kRk
(1− p)
− i′R = 0. (2.48)
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For i > i′, the objective function is increasing with i. Moreover, for i < i′, the objective function is
decreasing with i. Hence, i will be set to 0 or 1 + k since any interior choice of i is dominated by
one of these extremes. The profits of the bank are higher at i = 0 than at i = 1 + k if and only if
kRk ≥ (1− p)v[(1 + k)R(λ− 1) +
kRk
(1− p)
] (2.49)
given the assumption Rk <
1+k
k(1−p)R. From (2.49), it is easy to derive
k∗ =
R(1− p)v(λ− 1)
R(1− p)v(1− λ) +Rk(1− v)
(2.50)
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CHAPTER 3. LIQUIDITY BACKUP FROM COMMERCIAL BANKS TO
SHADOW BANKS
Zhongzheng Zhou
3.1 Abstract
During the Great Recession, liquidity did not flow out of the banking sector but was reallocated
internally. Deposits increased, but the volumes of all other short-term debt financing instruments,
except for T-Bills, decreased. Commercial banks, which have stable funding sources from deposits,
did not render liquidity backup to shadow banks but held the increased deposits as cash on hand.
This Chapter uses deposits and financial commercial paper outstanding as proxies for commer-
cial and shadow banking financing instruments because they are unique liabilities of commercial
and shadow banks, respectively. Using vector autoregressive models, I provide evidence that when
liquidity falls in shadow banks, commercial banks experience funding inflows. In normal times,
commercial banks render liquidity backup to shadow banks in the following weeks using the in-
creased deposits. However, the dynamic correlation breaks down in crisis times, which may have
contributed to the collapse of the shadow banking system during the Great Recession.
3.2 Introduction
Shadow banks, the specialized financial intermediaries that channel funding from lenders to
borrowers through a range of securitization and secured funding techniques1, arguably played a
1This definition closely follows that of Pozsar et al. (2010). Although there exists plenty of borrowing and lending
business within the banking system, lenders and borrowers are outsiders of the banking system in this chapter unless
otherwise stated. Lenders are mainly fixed-income investors who invest in mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed
securities, repurchase agreements, commercial paper, money market mutual funds, etc., but not bank deposits or
other commercial bank obligations. Investors in mutual funds or hedge funds could be generally considered lenders if
the mutual fund or hedge fund invests in the fixed-income products above. Borrowers include (but are not limited to)
producers who need funds to produce or consumers who need funds to invest in real estate or purchase automobiles.
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critical role in undermining the whole financial system and bringing about the financial crisis from
2007 to 2008. In terms of the liability side of the balance sheet, unlike regulated commercial
banks which are mainly and uniquely funded by deposits, shadow banks are primarily funded by
issuing fixed-income securities in wholesale money markets. During the Great Depression, investors
responded to the banking crisis by withdrawing deposits from commercial banks and holding the
cash on hand. The ratio of deposits to currency plunged from about 12 to less than 5 between 1929
and 1933 (Schwartz (1963)). Hence, most old school studies about bank runs are highly focused
on commercial banks. When there is a substantial and rapid decrease in deposits, commercial
banks suffer high pressure in liquidity risks, and in the worst cases, asset liquidation in fire-sale
price could happen. During the Great Recession, shadow banks suffered a similar experience
to commercial banks in the Great Depression. The funds of shadow banks plunged because of
the collapse of wholesale money markets. Shadow banks expected they could continuously issue
fixed-income securities to raise money like deposits of commercial banks. However, investors lost
confidence in the wholesale money markets, making it difficult for shadow banks to reissue their
securities as they matured. As a result, the funds of shadow banks dried up when the outstanding
levels of the fixed-income securities they issued shrank rapidly. The refinancing risks become
the severe liquidity risks in a way that shadow banks had to find alternative channels to raise
funds or liquidate their assets. After 2008, most of the literature concentrates on the collapse of
two important fixed-income products: repurchase agreements (henceforth repos) and asset-backed
commercial paper (henceforth ABCP)2. Gorton and Metrick (2012) document a systematic run on
one segment of bilateral repo markets. Both repo spreads and repo haircuts jumped up during the
Great Recession. Copeland et al. (2014) point that the run on the tri-party repo market is more
like the one in traditional commercial banks, which means the run is concentrated on some specific
Borrowers may borrow money from shadow banks directly or from commercial banks, and commercial banks securitize
the loans later as fixed-income products. For details, see Section 3.3.
2Other studies are concerned with runs on money market mutual funds. In this chapter, I treat money market
funds as investors like Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) because money market funds are the main investors in repos and
commercial paper. In addition, little money flows from money market funds directly to outside borrowers. Hence, it
is better to see money market funds as outside lenders but not shadow banks to avoid double counting errors. For
details, see Section 3.3.
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shadow banks (e.g. Lehman Brothers) but not system-wide. Acharya et al. (2013) analyze the
collapse of ABCP markets in 2008 and conclude that most losses of ABCP conduits are undertaken
by the sponsors (large financial institutes) but not outside investors. Although shadow banks faced
severe funds shortage during the Great Recession, commercial banks had a distinct experience this
time. Deposits increased dramatically as investors sought a safe haven for their money.
This chapter studies the interdependence between shadow banks and commercial banks. They
offer similar financial products to investors. The fixed-income products offered by shadow banks
have a higher interest rate and risks than deposits. Hence, they are competitors to attract the
most risk-averse investors3. When the market risks increase, investors hold fewer securities issued
by shadow banks and more deposits, and vice versa. One example is during the Great Recession,
when investors lost confidence in the securities offered by shadow banks and transferred their
wealth from shadow banks to commercial banks. Hence, commercial banks have a unique and
natural advantage in providing liquidity insurance to shadow banks if they want. Consider a case
where investors withdraw funds from shadow banks and deposit them into commercial banks during
a period of market stress. If commercial banks lend the same volume of funds to shadow banks
and all transactions work efficiently, no liquidity problem comes up in the whole banking system.
Money just behaves like ”what goes around comes around”. Investors still hold the same wealth in
the whole banking system if only they keep the same amount of fixed-income investment. Shadow
banks cannot raise enough money from investors, but they find an alternative funding source from
commercial banks. For commercial banks, deposit inflows serve as a hedge for outflows from new
loans given to shadow banks. I give the series of cash flows a name called ”Flight-to-Quality” circle
(henceforth FTQ circle) which is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
The FTQ circle consists of blue links 2©, 3© and 4©. The blue links 2© and 3© represent the fact
that securities issued by shadow banks and deposits are substitutes. The blue link 4© happens later
and is the key to the success of the FTQ circle. It represents that commercial banks lend increased
deposits from the link 3© to shadow banks. The FTQ circle is not totally new and it follows the spirit
3Compared to the investors who invest in equities, real estate and so on.
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Figure 3.1 Flight-to-Quality Circle
of Kashyap et al. (2002), and Gatev and Strahan (2006). They study the interdependence between
commercial banks and large corporations that issue non-financial commercial paper (henceforth,
CP) to raise money. During the periods of market stress, large corporations cannot issue enough
non-financial CP in the wholesale money market, so they resort to commercial banks as the last
lender by taking down the backup line of the non-financial CP (like the link 4©).
In this chapter, I argue that the FTQ circle is vulnerable to resist strong market impact and it
only works when the link 4© happens. During normal times or periods of moderate market stress,
the FTQ circle functions well as commercial banks are willing to lend increased deposits to shadow
banks through the link 4©. However, the link 4© broke down during the Great Recession and it
could possibly be one of the reasons that caused the collapse of the shadow banking system4.
Why is the link 4© in the FTQ circle important to the stability of the financial system? My
argument is that the liquidity backup from commercial banks to shadow banks is the radical support
4According to the forecast model in this chapter based on financial CP, the link 4© broke down from Sep. 2007 to
Apr. 2009. For details, see Section 3.5.
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for the confidence of investors when the financial market suffers the impact of credit risks. The
securities offered by shadow banks usually have collateral to protect investors from credit risks, so
they were considered to be safe assets before the Great Recession5. Based on the shadow banking
model of Gennaioli et al. (2013), fixed-income investors are extremely risk-averse. Hence, investors
value the risky collateral at a much lower price than the risk-neutral financial intermediaries. The
collateral is priced nearly risk-neutral during normal times because of the liquidity offered by banks.
Even if investors dislike risks, they can accept collateral at about its risk-neutral price because they
believe that they can sell their collateral in a liquid market dominated by risk-neutral banks if
defaults happen. When moderate neglected credit risks are revealed in the market, investors ask
for more collateral and higher interest rate to offset the credit risks, and the market price of the
collateral temporarily decreases because of the underlying fundamental return rates based on the
credit risks. However, we are still in a nearly risk-neutral world if the market has sufficient liquidity.
Things change when the neglected credit risks are so large that the link 4© in the FTQ circle breaks
down like it was the case during the Great Recession. The liquidity of the market declined largely
due to the fact that commercial banks tighten their credit. Investors lose their confidence and
reveal their extreme risk-averse preferences. Collateral is priced with a high risk premium because
investors dominate the market this time. Risk-neutral arbitrageurs do not have sufficient funds to
turn the market back to the nearly risk-neutral state individually. The market stays a long time
with extreme risk-averse pricing before it goes back to risk-neutral again.
My research differs from the existing literature in that it studies the liquidity risks based on
concurrent and dynamic correlations between commercial banks and shadow banks (the FTQ cir-
cle). Studies before the Great Recession are mostly focused on runs on commercial banks, which
is the black link 1© in Figure 3.1. By contrast, when crises occur today, we observe increases in
deposits, which are the blue link 3© in Figure 3.16. The introduction of deposit insurance could
5It is the reason we usually call them asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities. For repos, investors have even
more controls over the collateral than normal collateralized borrowings. Collateral is exempted from the automatic
stay, so a party to a repo can unilaterally enforce the termination provisions of the agreement as a result of a
bankruptcy filing by the other party. For details, see Section 3.3.
6Not only during the Great Recession. According to Gatev and Strahan (2006), the deposits increased when the
market suffered liquidity shocks from 1988 to 2002.
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probably explain the reverse cash flows in the links 1© and 3©. I also find that (uncovered) large
time deposits behave more like the securities offered by shadow banks. Studies after the Great Re-
cession are mostly focused on runs on shadow banks, which is the blue link 2© in Figure 3.1. There
also exists some literature that studies how runs on shadow banks (the link 2©) can undermine
the regulated commercial banking system because they are closely related in reality. However, no
study proposes the runs that come from the breakdown of the link 4© in the FTQ circle.
Although there exists a large number of independent shadow banks, commercial banks and
shadow banks are organizationally connected in two different frames. First, commercial banks
themselves are not pure. Commercial banks are funded not only by deposits, but also through
shadow banking channels. For example, repos are typical fixed-income products offered by shadow
banks (mostly dealer banks) to raise money. However, commercial banks can also use them for
financing like deposits. The amount funded by repo as a percentage of total assets of commercial
banks from April 1, 2008, to February 29, 2009, was 63 basis points (mean) and the median
was 2.7% (Afonso et al. (2010)). It is very small but still exists. Harvey and Spong (2001)
point that growth in traditional deposit funding sources has stagnated at many commercial banks
after 1990 and has largely failed to keep up with the growth in bank assets. Hence, commercial
banks which face funding difficulties in core deposits have to use funding instruments from shadow
banking activities. Obviously, the runs on shadow banking activities can influence the commercial
banks directly in such a way. Second, commercial banks and shadow banks can have the same
parent company. In the United States, commercial banks are held by bank holding companies
(henceforth, BHCs), which can have shadow banking subsidiaries. Copeland (2012) points out that
shadow banking subsidiaries of BHCs have been increasing over time and represent a quantitatively
important share of the BHCs’ total earnings. For example, ABCP conduits are special purpose
vehicles sponsored by large financial institutions, which are mostly BHCs7. In January 2007,
commercial banks (BHCs) accounted for $903 billion or 74.8% of ABCP outstanding. Among
7A special purpose vehicles or entity is a subsidiary of a company which is protected from the parent company’s
financial risk. Hence, the bankruptcy of the parent company would not jeopardize the subsidiary. In the context of
ABCP, investors do not need to worry about the failure risks of the sponsoring BHC.
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them, the largest BHC sponsoring ABCP conduits in the United States was Citigroup, with 16
conduits and $92.6 billion of ABCP outstanding. According to Acharya et al. (2013), regulatory
arbitrage was an important motive that BHCs set up ABCP conduits. ABCP conduits are off-
balance sheet financing for commercial banks. Although BHCs need to satisfy capital requirements
based on consolidated balance sheets, they could enjoy reduced regulatory capital if guarantees
(they provide to ABCP conduits in order to protect outside investors8) were skillfully structured
before the Great Recession9. Admittedly, there are regulations that require BHCs to prioritize
the interests of their commercial banks. During periods of market stress, it is difficult to believe
that BHCs can stand by while their shadow banking subsidiaries are getting in trouble. Hence,
the runs on shadow banking subsidiaries can influence the commercial banks indirectly in such a
way. Actually, Acharya et al. (2013) find that most losses of ABCP conduits are undertaken by
the commercial banks instead of outside investors during the Great Recession.
Because the probable problem of endogeneity lies in the real world as I stated in the last
paragraph, empirical counterparts identified to the FTQ circle need to avoid the conflict of interest
based on the organizational relations. In this chapter, I use the volume of deposits but not total
liabilities or total assets of commercial banks as the proxy for commercial banks in the FTQ circle
because of its purity. Only commercial banks can legally issue deposits to raise funds and it is the
essential difference between commercial banks and shadow banks. A decrease in deposits means
commercial banks can only raise fewer funds from the investors and it is the failure of refinancing of
deposits. Although commercial banks can also issue some kinds of shadow banking instruments to
raise funds, they are usually not allowed to issue financial CP. Hence, I use financial CP outstanding
as the proxy for shadow banks in the FTQ circle given that only shadow banks can legally issue
financial CP to raise funds. A decrease in financial CP outstanding means shadow banks can only
8Almost all sponsors provide guarantees to outside investors in ABCP conduits. ABCP has not only backed assets
which play a role like collateral but also guarantees from the sponsors. Hence, they were considered safe investment
even for the extreme risk-averse investors before the Great Recession. For details, see Section 3.3.
9In June 2009, the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) announced the Statements of Financial Ac-
counting Standards (FAS) 166 and 167, amending existing accounting rules for the consolidation of securitization
transactions. The United States banking agencies clarified in September 2009 that depository institutions (commer-
cial banks) would have to hold normal regulatory capital against consolidated securitization transactions and ABCP
conduits.
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raise fewer funds from the investors and it is the failure of refinancing of financial CP. Albeit BHCs
may use shadow banking subsidiaries to issue financial CP and pass the proceeds downstream into
commercial banks, the main issuers of financial CP are independent shadow banks (foreign financial
institutions, captive finance companies, and dealer banks) and they are competitors to commercial
banks as illustrated in the FTQ circle.
In the analysis at the industry level, I use weekly time series data regarding total deposits of
domestically chartered commercial banks and total financial CP issued in the domestic market
to estimate a series of vector autoregressions (henceforth, VARs). The change of deposits and
that of financial CP outstanding are concurrently negatively correlated all the time. They are
substitutes for fixed-income investors, and the blue links 2© and 3© in the FTQ circle demonstrate
the concurrent correlation. In normal times, there is a dynamic correlation between deposits and
financial CP outstanding. An increase in deposits leads to an increase in financial CP outstanding
in 1 to 3 weeks. Considering financial CP with an average maturity of about 30 days, it is enough
time for shadow banks to rebuild liquidity. However, the dynamic correlation as shown by the blue
link 4© in the FTQ circle disappears in times of market stress. In addition to the Great Recession,
the liquidity backup from the dynamic correlation also broke down from 2010 to 2011 (the peak of
the European sovereign debt crisis), and in the second half of 2014 (the oil prices crash). Given
that a large number of issuers of financial CP are foreign financial institutions headquartered in
Europe, we can easily expect that domestic commercial banks aborted the liquidity backup for
them during the peak of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010 and 2011. In 2014, after the
period of the shale oil boom in the united states, the oil price slumped by more than 50% since
peaking in June. There is no doubt that large oil and gas companies suffered severe impact because
of the price crash. Their captive finance companies (subsidiaries), the issuers of financial CP, were
therefore considered too risky to receive liquidity funds by commercial banks.
For BHCs, we can see them as mixtures of commercial banks and shadow banks. There indeed
existed some commercial banks that suffer a severe liquidity impact during the Great Recession.
However, the shortage of liquidity does not come from the deposits, but from the shadow banking
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activities in which the commercial banks are involved. When liquidity dried up during the Great
Recession, commercial banks that relied more heavily on core deposit and equity capital financing
could continue to lend compared to other banks (Cornett et al. (2011)). For the example stated
above, Citigroup set up most ABCP conduits and we know it was insolvent in 2008 even if it had
received funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (henceforth, TARP). In February 2009, the
New York Times reported the following:
”It would seem obvious that helping banks, not holding companies, would be the most
direct way to stimulate bank lending. But when TARP purchased preferred stock and
warrants, it bought them from holding companies, not their bank subsidiaries. While
TARP has been generous with bank holding companies, these companies have not been so
generous with their banks. Four large holding companies (JP Morgan, Citigroup, Bank of
America and Wells Fargo) initially received a total of $90 billion in TARP money in the
fall, but by the end of 2008 they had contributed less than $15 billion in equity capital to
their subsidiary banks10.”
Thus BHCs had larger liquidity problems in their shadow banking subsidiaries than in their com-
mercial banks. It is worth mentioning that although commercial banks can also face liquidity
problems if their deposits increase by less than the reduction in shadow banking securities they
issue, they still have much milder funding problems than independent shadow banks.
The two decades in the run-up to the Great Recession saw the emergence of a large number
of independent shadow banks. Some economists call the phenomenon dis-intermediation11. How-
ever, after the Great Recession, we saw the trend toward consolidation of independent shadow
banks in BHCs. Some economists call the migration of independent shadow banks into BHCs re-
intermediation. Cetorelli (2012) shows that, by 2011, BHCs controlled about 38% of assets of the
largest insurance companies, 41% of total money market mutual fund (henceforth, MMMF) assets,
and 93% of the assets of the largest brokers and dealers. Because BHCs have much higher reg-
10See ”The Bailout Is Robbing the Banks,” John C. Coates and David S. Scharfstein, New York Times, February
17, 2009.
11For dis-intermediation, only commercial banks are considered intermediaries.
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ulation cost and limitations compared to the independent shadow banks, many economists think
the re-intermediation is a paradox and expect more securitization-related activities will migrate
from BHCs to independently run shadow banks over time12. The theory in this chapter can partly
explain the re-intermediation paradox after the Great Recession. First, commercial banks are vir-
tual winners in the Great Recession compared to the independent shadow banks because they have
stable funding sources from deposits. The finding of Cetorelli (2012) is direct evidence that how
favorably BHCs thrive after the Great Recession. Hence, they had the ability to acquire inde-
pendent shadow banks during or after the Great Recession. Second, in addition to that ability,
BHCs also had the incentive to do so according to the FTQ circle. There are synergies for a BHC
to hold commercial banks and shadow banks together. Commercial banks serve as a hedge for
shadow banks as the consolidation internalizes the FTQ circle13. If the synergies from liquidity
management are greater than the regulation cost, we can see the re-intermediation. Last but not
least, the internalized FTQ circle can only hedge the liquidity risks in the fixed-income market, but
cannot eliminate them. When market credit risks are large enough, the core deposits of commercial
banks could be insufficient to hedge the shadow banking subsidiaries that BHCs hold. Call the case
of Citigroup during the Great Recession. Nowadays, commercial banks play fewer roles in BHCs
when they own more shadow banking subsidiaries. We need to care about not only the capital
adequacy but also the core deposits adequacy. Fortunately, liquidity requirements of BHCs have
been introduced in recent years14.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.3 provides some background of shadow banks and
a literature review. In Section 3.4, I estimate VAR models to provide empirical evidence that the
FTQ circle exists in normal times, but the blue link 4© broke down during the Great Recession.
Total data set is separated into three time periods: pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis in advance.
12The re-intermediation is not totally market-oriented. For example, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley received
government bailouts during the Great Recession. In return, they transited into BHCs to abide by more regulations
in 2008, even if they did not hold any commercial bank back then.
13The synergy shares the same spirit of Kashyap et al. (2002). In their study, that commercial banks take deposits
and lend via commitments together can generate synergies in liquidity management between the two activities because
both require banks to hold large balances of liquid assets. The increase in deposits can serve as a hedge for the take-
down of commitments during the crisis times.
14Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) comes into full effect in 2019. Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) was introduced
in 2018.
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Because the split points that isolate the Great Recession period from the total data time span are
chosen arbitrarily, I let the data itself reveal the exact times that the blue link 4© in the FTQ
circle broke down in Section 3.5. If the dynamic correlation between deposits and financial CP
outstanding via the blue link 4© exists, past deposits can help improve the prediction of future
financial CP outstanding. Using one-step forward-chaining cross-validation, I find that including
past deposits in the model can significantly increase the accuracy of prediction of financial CP
outstanding measured by the mean squared error except for the times during the Great Recession,
the peak of the European sovereign debt crisis, and the 2014 oil price crash. Section 3.6 contains
the discussion and conclusions.
3.3 Shadow Banks and the Great Recession
Where does the liquidity risk of an entity come from? It comes from the refinancing risk when
the entity has to roll over its debt. If an entity has borrowed money from others, it has to pay
back the principal and interest when the loan matures. Most entities plan to keep a stable capital
structure in the long term. They can issue long-term debt to achieve the goal, or issue short-term
debt and reissue it when it matures, doing this over and over until they reach the same long-term
goal. If an entity cannot reissue new debt when the old debt matures, it will experience a passive but
obligatory cash outflow. The cash outflow has more liquidity risks if it is unexpected. For example,
a non-financial company may raise funds for a 5-year investment by rolling over 3-month non-
financial CP or repeatedly getting 3-month loans from commercial banks. If it can successfully roll
over its debt 20 times, it seems as if the company issued 5-year debt for the investment. However,
if a credit crunch happens within 5 years, in which CP investors are not willing to repurchase the
security or commercial banks contract their credit, the company has to find alternative funding
sources, or in the worst case, liquidate the investment. In a way, we observe investors15 withdraw
their money from the company, which has been being lent to the company as debt investment.
15When a commercial bank lends a loan to a company, it is also a debt investor for the company.
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Commercial banks are different from normal companies in corporate finance because they have
a unique funding source from deposits. The principle of liquidity risks is totally the same if we
see deposits as the debt of commercial banks. A second example is a commercial bank issuing
3-month time deposits over and over to raise funds. Some investors may not repurchase the new
time deposits when the old ones mature; some investors may continue their time deposits; and
there are some new investors who begin to make time deposits. If the total deposits that investors
keep holding remain relatively steady, the commercial bank will have no liquidity risk. However,
if investors are no longer willing to make the time deposits they have been making, we observe
investors withdraw their money from the commercial banks. Hence, as a matter of fact, runs on a
commercial bank are the bank cannot roll over its deposits.
Generally speaking, the shorter the maturity of the debt, the greater the potential liquidity risk
of the entity because the entity has to roll over its debt more times. The exception is transaction
deposits, also known as demand deposits. Transaction deposits have infinitely short maturities given
that investors can withdraw them at any time. In other words, commercial banks have to reissue
transaction deposits every second and the investors actually repurchase the deposits every second.
For normal debt financing, it would have the highest refinancing risks and potential liquidity risks
for the issuing entity, due to the extremely short maturity. However, transaction deposits together
with small time deposits are called core deposits16 which are considered the most stable funding
source of commercial banks. When liquidity dried up during the Great Recession, commercial
banks that relied more heavily on core deposit and equity capital financing could continue to lend
compared to other banks (Cornett et al. (2011)).
Shadow banks also have their special kinds of debt financing instruments. The debt financing
instruments are not only liabilities of shadow banks, but also the assets of investors. In plain
words, investors no longer purchase the debt financing instruments which they used to purchase.
In addition to the special funding instruments, shadow banks and commercial banks also have
higher financial leverage compared to normal companies. Commercial banks usually have 10 times
16Except for large time deposits, other deposits are core deposits.
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leverage. Because of loose regulations, shadow banks can have much higher leverage. For example,
independent primary dealer banks before the Great Recession usually had from 20 to 30 times
leverage17. If an entity cannot roll over its debt, it may experience more liquidity risks if it has
higher leverage. Because the debt issued by shadow banks plunged during the Great Recession,
some literature also calls this phenomenon ”deleveraging”. When literature uses the term ”delever-
aging”, it considers the decrease in debt comes from the supply side (shadow banks)18. The special
mechanisms in shadow banks could make them have to reduce or liquidate a large asset holdings
with only a little decrease of funding19. By contrast, the leverage of the commercial banking sector
increased over the crisis because of the stable funding sources from deposits (He et al. (2010)).
In addition to funding and leverage, the liquidity risks of an entity also depend on its liquid
assets holdings. The more the liquid asset an entity has, the smaller the liquidation cost it suffers.
For example, reducing cash assets holdings in response to a decrease in debt has no liquidation
cost. Moreover, strictly speaking, the refinancing risks depend on the average remaining maturity
of debt but not the average maturity of the debt. For example, in 2007, a company funded by 10-
year bonds or loans with only 1 year left had more potential liquidity risks than another company
funded by 5-year bonds or loans with 4 years left. Hence, we need detailed data regarding all items
on and off the balance sheet of a commercial bank or shadow bank to measure its potential liquidity
risks. Berger and Bouwman (2009) propose a measure called Liquidity Creation (henceforth, LC)
for commercial banks. LC of a commercial bank is defined as the liquidity of liabilities minus the
liquidity of assets. A commercial bank has large LC if it holds more long-term loans (illiquid) and
is funded heavily by short-term time deposits or transaction deposits (liquid). LC is not precise
to measure liquidity risks in two aspects. First, the liquidity of liabilities is not equivalent to
the instability of them during crisis times. As stated above, core deposits could be highly liquid
and short-term, but they are the most stable funding sources of commercial banks. Second, the
17No independent primary dealer bank exists after the Great Recession. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley
transited into BHCs even if they did not hold any commercial bank back then. Lehman Brothers failed. Merrill
Lynch and Bear Stearns were acquired by Bank of America and J.P. Morgan Chase.
18By contrast, when literature uses the term ”runs”, it considers the reduction in debt comes from the demand
side (investors).
19For example, rehypothecation of collateral and haircuts of repos.
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liquidity of assets could change significantly during crisis times. Before the Great Recession, most
short-term fixed-income products issued by shadow banks were considered highly liquid assets by
investors20, but they collapsed over the crisis and investors had large liquidation cost to sell them.
Bai et al. (2018) construct a measure called Liquidity Mismatch Index (henceforth, LMI) to evaluate
the liquidity risks of BHCs. LMI fixes the problems of LC by giving liquidity risk weights to all
assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items. It is like the risk-based capital and assets in capital
requirements. However, the liquidity risk weights in LMI are not fixed but matched to the market
prices.
In this chapter, I use weekly time series data regarding the commercial banking sector and
the shadow banking sector to perform the analysis at the industry level, so it is impossible and
unnecessary to evaluate liquidity risks of any particular bank. I only consider liquidity risks from
the liability side when I evaluate the liquidity risks of commercial and shadow banking sectors.
By definition, commercial banks are different from shadow banks in liabilities. Hence, I define
deposits as the only commercial banking financing instrument to capture the essential difference
between commercial banks and shadow banks. All other short-term debt financing channels except
for treasury bills are shadow banking financing instruments21. Although it is possible to sum all
liquid assets in the commercial banking sector, it may not help improve the measure of liquidity
risks in the sector. We cannot simply add up the liquid assets of each entity to get the liquid buffer
of the whole sector. Moreover, liquidity risks stem from the liability side. Thus, we can reasonably
think that a decrease in deposits means commercial banks are facing liquidity risks, and a decrease
in shadow banking financing instruments means shadow banks are facing liquidity risks22.
Although this chapter only uses financial CP as the proxy for shadow banking financing in
formal regressions, it is beneficial to check total U.S. short-term debt financing instruments, also
known as money market financing instruments, and therefore build a big picture. Table 3.1 shows
annual (2003-2018) main debt financing instruments with maturity less than 1 year except for
20Here, investors could be commercial banks or shadow banks.
21Long-term debt financing is related to solvency problems but not liquidity risks.
22Although commercial banks also use shadow banking financing instruments to raise funds and BHCs may have
shadow banking subsidiaries, their funds are mainly from commercial banking financing instruments (deposits).
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deposits. Because deposits are the only commercial banking financing instrument and they are
most stable funding sources in crisis times, I list the total deposits in Table 3.1 which include long-
term time deposits and transaction deposits. Apart from deposits and treasury bills (henceforth
T-Bills), which are issued by the government, agency debentures, CP, and repos are typical shadow
banking financing instruments23. Although repos in Table 3.1 only contain tri-party repos, and I
estimate data for them before 2008 and data for agency debentures with tenor less than 1 year
before 2006 because of unavailability, the data in Table 3.1 is precise enough to give a big picture24.
All of the instruments had an increasing trend from 2003 to 2007. In 2007, the volume of
total shadow banking financing instruments, the sum of CP, repos and agency debentures, almost
equaled that of total deposits. CP and repos outstanding decreased from 2007 to 2009. The peak
of agency debentures was $1.124 trillion outstanding in 2008, and the volume fell to $652 billion
in 2009, since runs on government-sponsored enterprises (henceforth, GSEs), the issuer of agency
debentures, happened in the last quarter of 2008 and agency debentures in Table 3.1 use the last
quarter value in each year as the annual data25. Although the volume of all shadow banking
financing instruments decreased during the Great Recession, deposits increased as we expected,
especially from 2008 to 2009. It is worth mentioning that T-Bills increased from $1 trillion in 2007
to $1.861 trillion in 2008. There were many government bailouts during the Great Recession, so
the government needed to raise funds from investors and lent them to financial institutions. For
example, Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) find MMMFs, which are the main investors in repos, stopped
accepting private asset-backed securities as collateral in the tri-party repo market during the crisis.
T-Bills were the most preferred (or sometimes only) collateral that investors were willing to accept.
The government helped dealer banks to exchange their collateral with T-Bills so that they could
23Although corporate CP, which belongs to CP, is issued by large non-financial corporations. We can generally see
them as shadow banks with lower leverage.
24According to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), in early 2007, total U.S.
short-term debt financing accounted for approximately $5 trillion. CP was the largest instrument in this market with
more than $1.97 trillion outstanding. The second-largest instrument was T-Bills, which accounted for $940 billion
outstanding. Other important short-term debt instruments were time deposits and repos. In their statistics, they
only consider short-term deposits and net tri-party repos without general collateral financing (GCF) trades. It is the
reason that they have much fewer deposits and repos than that in my data. The main instruments listed in Table 3.1
covered most of the short-term debt financing market back then.
25Actually, repos also peaked in 2008 if we use higher frequency data. Repos outstanding in Table 3.1 is the annual
average value of daily data.
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still issue repos over the crisis. Hence, the volume of shadow banking financing instruments should
have been much lower if there had been no bailout. Investors only trusted the government during
the crisis. Only the government and deposits covered by the government could raise more funds.
After the Great Recession, deposits keep increasing but shadow banking financing instruments
remain at a relatively low and constant level. Nowadays, compared to the size of total deposits,
the size of shadow banking financing instruments listed in Table 3.1 is no longer large. Do we live
in a safer banking sector with more sufficient deposits? No. Many emerging shadow banks use
new shadow banking financing instruments that are not listed in Table 3.1. In addition, potential
liquidity risks may transfer directly into mutual funds and hedge funds. I will discuss this in the
section of concluding remarks.
Now, let’s take a look at the demand side: investors. Few individual investors invest in shadow
banking financing instruments directly. One of the main investors is MMMFs. According to
regulations, MMMFs can only invest in short-term fixed-income products, so the instruments in
Table 3.1 cover almost all of the products in the portfolio of MMMFs. MMMFs are also typical
shadow banks, and they experienced runs during the Great Recession. The product issued by
MMMFs to raise funds is also called the MMMF26. After Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, some
MMMF investors withdrew their money from their MMMFs when they realized their MMMFs
were holding financial CP and repos issued by Lehman Brothers. MMMFs had to liquidate some of
their assets listed in Table 3.1 and they also adjusted their portfolios. They reduced their holdings
of CP and repos, and expanded that of T-Bills, agency debentures, and deposits. If I treat MMMFs
as another shadow banking financing instrument, it will double count the money that flows from
outside into the shadow banking system. MMMFs are investors in the FTQ circle. They withdrew
their money from shadow banks and put it into commercial banks like the blue links 2© and 3©
in the FTQ circle during the Great Recession. In addition to MMMFs, general mutual funds and
hedge funds may also invest small parts of their funds into shadow banking financing instruments.
Large corporations can purchase shadow banking financing instruments to manage their liquidity
26For funds, the money they raise is not like debt or equity. For details, see the section of concluding remarks.
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assets. Hence, individual investors can indirectly invest in shadow banking products by holding
MMMFs (mainly), mutual funds and equity of large non-financial companies.
Table 3.2 shows the liquid financial assets of individual investors and their share of total27.
According to their share of the total, equity and mutual funds bottomed out and all fixed-income
assets peaked in 2008. It may be partly caused by the larger decline in the market value of
equity compared to that of fixed-income securities. Anyway, the market value of all fixed-income
assets increased from 2007 to 2008, which demonstrates that individual investors did not transfer
their funds from fixed-income investments to the other investments during the Great Recession.
Individual investors increased their holdings of MMMFs over the crisis, so in total, institution
investors could be the main trigger of runs on MMMFs28. The jump in the value of corporate
bonds from $1.195 trillion in 2007 to $2.150 trillion in 2008 is more likely from the supply side.
Corporations had difficulties issuing short-term CP and getting loans from commercial banks over
the crisis, so they resorted to issuing long-term bonds. Owing to the high interest rate, individual
investors were willing to keep more bonds for corporations that still have good fundamentals.
3.3.1 Shadow Banks
In this subsection, I concisely introduce the typical shadow banks discussed in this chapter.
Because this chapter studies the liquidity risks of shadow banks, the introduction is organized by
the order of shadow banking financing instruments in Table 3.1. Shadow banks, the entities, are
mentioned as issuers when each instrument is introduced.
Shadow banks first come from the securitization. When a traditional commercial bank makes
a loan to a borrower, it keeps the loan as an asset on its balance sheet. If a commercial bank
securitizes its loans and sells them to investors, a shadow bank emerges. To sell its securitized
loans, the commercial bank will set up a special purpose vehicle (henceforth, SPV), a bankruptcy
remotely subsidiary, to issue the securities. The SPV securities issuer is a shadow bank. Investors
27The term ”liquid” is not equal to ”short-term”. For example, corporate bonds are long-term debt instruments
but considered liquid financial assets by individual investors.
28Runs stopped on September 19, 2008, three days after it started, when the U.S. government announced that it
would provide deposit insurance to investments in MMMFs.
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are willing to buy the securities from the SPV but not the commercial bank because the failure
of the commercial bank will not affect the SPV and the securities. For the commercial bank, it
gets money from selling its loans and it can lend the money again. For the SPV, if it can sell
the securities with no debt from investors, then it has no liquidity risks. It is a process of dis-
intermediation. Security investors will receive the payment from the borrower directly and it seems
as if investors lend their money to the borrower. In most cases, the securities have collateral in
case borrowers default. If the collateral is real estate, the securities are mortgage-backed securities
(henceforth, MBSes). For the other collateral, they are asset-backed securities (henceforth, ABSes).
Table 3.3 shows the ABSes and MBSes outstanding in the United States from 2003 to 2018.
Agency MBSes are issued by GSEs such as Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. They should
not be confused with agency debentures. Agency debentures are the debt of GSEs, so they are
financing instruments for GSEs. However, GSEs issue agency MBSes for business and they are not
debt. Shadow banks usually prefer to have more funds to issue MBSes or ABSes. Hence, they
use the shadow banking financing instruments listed in Table 3.1 to raise funds. For examples,
GSEs issue agency debentures to raise funds. One the asset side, shadow banks hold MBSes and
ABSes before they can sell them or use them as collateral to raise more funds such as repos.
When shadow banking financing instruments collapsed during the Great Recession, shadow banks
had to liquidate their holdings of securitized assets. By contrast, commercial banks increased
securitized assets holdings because they had stable funding sources (He et al. (2010)). Because of
the liquidation, the market value of ABSes and MBSes plunged over the crisis. Agency MBSes
were saved by the U.S. Federal Reserve’s $1.25 trillion program to purchase agency MBSes, which
commenced on January 5, 2009, and was completed on March 31, 2010. Nowadays, Agency MBSes
account for $8.089 trillion in total $11.06 trillion securitized assets maybe because investors believe
a government bailout will happen again when a crisis arrives.
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3.3.1.1 Commercial Paper
Commercial paper includes ABCP, financial CP and corporate CP29. The maturity of CP is
usually between 1 and 90 days with an average at about 30 days, although it can legally be up to 270
days. ABCP is relatively new compared to financial CP and corporate CP. It is issued by ABCP
conduits which are SPVs sponsored by large financial institutions. The assets of ABCP conduits
are collateral of ABCP and they are usually long-term MBSes and ABSes. Given the normal term
structure of interest rates, ABCP conduits can earn profits by holding long-term securitized assets
and issuing short-term ABCP as debt. The sponsoring financial institutions are mainly commercial
banks and they usually provide guarantees to ABCP investors in case ABCP conduits default. In
January 2007, commercial banks (BHCs) accounted for $903 billion or 74.8% of ABCP outstanding.
According to Acharya et al. (2013), regulatory arbitrage was another important motive that BHCs
set up ABCP conduits. ABCP conduits are off-balance sheet financing for commercial banks.
Although BHCs need to satisfy capital requirements based on consolidated balance sheets, they
could enjoy reduced regulatory capital if guarantees were skillfully structured before the Great
Recession. Most losses of ABCP conduits were undertaken by the commercial banks instead of
ABCP investors during the Great Recession. In June 2009, the Financial Accounting Standard
Board (FASB) announced the Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) 166 and 167,
amending existing accounting rules for the consolidation of securitization transactions. The United
States banking agencies clarified in September 2009 that depository institutions (commercial banks)
would have to hold normal regulatory capital against consolidated securitization transactions and
ABCP conduits. Hence, we can see that the ABCP outstanding continues to decline after 2009 in
Table 3.4.
Corporate CP is issued by large non-financial corporations. It has no collateral, so only corpo-
rations with good reputations can issue it. Compared to long-term bonds, corporate CP has fewer
issue costs. It also usually has a backup (credit) line from commercial banks in case corporations
cannot reissue their CP in crisis times. Besides seeking loans from commercial banks, corporations
29For a more detailed introduction about CP during the Great Recession, see Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010).
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can also issue long-term bonds to replace the CP that they have difficulties reissuing. For example,
CP is an important source of financing for Coca Cola, representing about 30% of their liabilities in
2007. During the Great Recession, Coca Cola switched to alternative long-term financing, mostly
as a response to the reality that it could not reissue enough CP anymore. On March 3, 2009, Coca
Cola announced that it had sold $0.9 billion of five-year and $1.35 billion of ten-year notes to repay
its maturing CP. In table 3.2, we can see individual investors held much more corporate bonds
during the Great Recession (2008).
Financial CP is issued by large financial institutions. It also has no collateral. The main issuers
of financial CP are foreign financial institutions, accounting for $455 billion of total $772 billion
financial CP outstanding in 2007. Foreign financial institutions usually set up U.S. subsidiaries
to issue financial CP in the U.S. market. Other main issuers of financial CP are captive finance
companies. Captive finance companies are financial subsidiaries of manufacturers, with the purpose
of providing financing for the manufacturer. Others are shadow banks in the U.S. banking sector.
They could be commercial bank-related or independent. Commercial banks cannot legally issue
financial CP directly, but their BHCs can set up shadow banking subsidiaries to issue it. As an
example of independent shadow banks, Lehman Brothers was a main issuer of financial CP and its
bankruptcy triggered the following run on the financial CP market. Hence, most issuers of financial
CP are independent shadow banks and it is the reason why I choose financial CP as the proxy for
shadow banking financing instruments.
3.3.1.2 Tri-Party Repos
Repurchase Agreements have a similar process like collateralized borrowings, but investors have
more controls over the collateral. The collateral is exempted from the automatic stay, so an investor
in a repo can unilaterally enforce the termination provisions of the agreement as a result of a
bankruptcy filing by the counter-party. Hence, investors have fewer risks when purchasing repos
than when lending covered by collateral. In the tri-party repo market, a third party called a clearing
bank acts as an intermediary and alleviates the administrative burden between two parties engaging
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in a repo. Dealers issue repos in the tri-party repo market using their securitized asset holdings
as collateral. The largest dealers are primary dealers. Primary dealers are dealer banks that are
authorized to trade directly with the New York Fed. Most tri-party repos are overnight.
General collateral financing (GCF) in Table 3.5 are repos that trade between dealer banks.
Because the FTQ circle model in this chapter only considers the funds that flow from outside
into the shadow banking system, net repos outstanding without GCF should be used in my study.
Unfortunately, data before 2010 is unavailable.
3.3.1.3 Agency Debentures
Agency debentures are agency debt issued by GSEs. GSEs includes Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
Farm Credit, Federal Home Loan Bank, Farmer Mac, and Tennessee Valley Authority. Agency
debentures have no collateral, but GSEs have implicit government backup. From Table 3.6 we can
see that short-term debt plunged, but the long-term debt remained relatively stable during the
Great Recession30.
3.3.2 The Great Recession
In this section, I review how CP outstanding and deposits changed over the Great Recession.
Figure 3.2 shows the weekly CP outstanding, total deposits and cash at commercial banks from
Dec. 12, 2001, through Nov. 29, 2017. The gray-shaded area in Figure 3.2 is the time period of
the Great Recession. We can see the CP market had two prominent collapses during the Great
Recession. I label them as ABCP market collapse and Lehman’s Bankruptcy. The increase in
deposits accompanied by the ABCP market collapse was not significant. Only a fraction of funds
flew from ABCP into deposits directly. The others flew into financial CP, corporate CP, repos, etc.
According to Figure 3.3, the ABCP market collapse happened on August 9, 2007. Financial CP and
corporate CP still increased after the ABCP market collapse. The financial CP market collapse
happened after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, because Lehman
30The peak of short-term agency debentures was $1.124 trillion outstanding in 2008, and the volume fell to $652
billion in 2009, since runs on GSEs, the issuer of agency debentures, happened in the last quarter of 2008. Agency
debentures in Table 3.6 use the last quarter value in each year as annual data.
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Figure 3.2 Deposits and Cash at Commercial Banks, and CP Outstanding
The figure shows the weekly total deposits and cash at commercial banks, and CP Outstanding from Dec.
12, 2001, through Nov. 29, 2017. The gray-shaded area is the time period of the Great Recession (from Aug.
1, 2007, to Jun. 24, 2009). The ABCP market collapse was Aug. 9, 2007. Lehman’s bankruptcy was Sep.
15, 2008. Source: Federal Reserve’s H.8 statistical release and CP release.
Brothers was a main issuer of financial CP. No prominent collapse happened in corporate CP market
like other two CP markets during the Great Recession. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers also
triggered runs on the repo market and MMMFs. Lehman Brothers was a primary dealer bank
in the tri-party repo market, and after knowing the portfolio of MMMFs had financial CP and
repos from Lehman Brothers, MMMFs investors also withdrew their money from MMMFs. Hence,
we observe an unprecedented steep jump in deposits accompanied by the bankruptcy of Lehman
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Figure 3.3 ABCP, Financial CP, and Corporate CP Outstanding
The figure shows ABCP, Financial CP and Corporate CP Outstanding from Dec. 12, 2001, through Nov.
29, 2017. The gray-shaded area is the time period of the Great Recession (from Aug. 1, 2007, to Jun. 24,
2009). The ABCP market collapse was Aug. 9, 2007. Lehman’s bankruptcy was Sep. 15, 2008. Source:
Federal Reserve’s CP release.
Brothers. Investors transferred their funds from shadow banks (CP and repos) to commercial banks
(deposits).
From Figure 3.2, the cash31 holdings of commercial banks shows that commercial banks had
a relatively constant cash level before Lehman’s bankruptcy. Commercial banks always tried to
keep their cash at the level although their deposits continuously increased. The cash target did not
change even after the ABCP market collapse. It means commercial banks still did not keep the
increment of deposits as extra cash on hand after the beginning of the Great Recession. Things
31Cash includes reserves.
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changed after Lehman’s bankruptcy. Commercial banks kept almost all the increment of deposits
as extra cash on hand. Hence, the liquidity backup from commercial banks to shadow banks likely
broke down after Lehman’s bankruptcy.
It is worth mentioning that CP outstanding should have been much lower if unprecedented
government bailouts did not happen during the Great Recession. Runs on MMMFs stopped on
September 19, 2008, three days after it started, when the U.S. government announced that it would
provide deposit insurance to investments in MMMFs. Although the MMMF outstanding stopped
dropping, MMMFs still adjusted their portfolios by holding more T-Bills and deposits, and less
CP and repos. For the first time ever, the Federal Reserve decided to purchase CP directly like
investors. By early January 2009, the Federal Reserve was the single largest purchaser of CP and
owned CP worth $357 billion, or 22.4% of the market, through a variety of lending facilities.
3.4 Empirical Evidence: the FTQ Circle
From Section 3.3, we know that investors withdraw funds from commercial banks or shadow
banks is actually the decrease in commercial or shadow banking financing instruments. Hence,
to test the FTQ circle empirically, we first need to find empirical proxies for commercial and
shadow banking financing instruments. For commercial banking financing instruments, it is easy
because deposits are the only ones. For shadow banking financing instruments, we need to find an
empirical counter-party that only shadow banks can issue to raise funds, and what is more, the
issuing shadow banks are independent. It is especially difficult given that BHCs controlled much
more shadow banks after the Great Recession. This chapter chooses financial CP outstanding as
the proxy for shadow banking financing instruments because only shadow banks can legally issue
financial CP and main issuers are independent foreign financial institutions.
According to Figure 3.4, foreign financial institutions have accounted for an increasing share of
financial CP outstanding over time. The financial CP outstanding issued by U.S.-owned financial
institutions falls from more than 60% in 2002 to less than 20% in 2017. Although I do not collect
data regarding how much financial CP outstanding issued by U.S. financial institutions are from
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Figure 3.4 The Percentage of Financial CP Outstanding from U.S. Financial Institutions
The figure shows the percentage of financial CP outstanding that is issued by the U.S. owned financial
institutions from Dec. 12, 2001, through Nov. 29, 2017. The gray-shaded area is the time period of the
Great Recession (from Aug. 1, 2007, to Jun. 24, 2009). The ABCP market collapse was Aug. 9, 2007.
Lehman’s bankruptcy was Sep. 15, 2008. Source: Federal Reserve’s CP release.
independent shadow banks, the volume is not small, especially before the Great Recession. Captive
finance companies, subsidiaries of non-financial large corporations, are main financial CP U.S.
issuers. They are independent shadow banks. In addition, before the Great Recession, independent
dealer banks such as Lehman Brothers were also main financial CP issuers. Hence, most financial
CP issuers have no relation with U.S. BHCs and they are competitors by offering similar fixed-
income products for investors in the FTQ circle. Deposits have lower interest rates and fewer
risks than financial CP. Although there always exists some financial CP issued by shadow banking
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subsidiaries of BHCs, it is just like the large time deposits in total deposits32. They do not change
qualitative results in empirical tests.
Another difficulty in empirical tests comes from the frequency of data. In principle, the blue
links 2©, 3©, and 4© in the FTQ circle occur in sequence. In reality, few investors hold plenty of cash
on hand for some days, and most money transfers in investors’ portfolios are executed electronically
and instantaneously, so it is difficult to observe the time-lag between the links 2© and 3©. Given
weekly data used in this chapter, we can think the substitution of deposits for financial CP happens
within each week when investors are more risk-sensitive. Hence, the negative correlation between
the change of deposits and that of financial CP outstanding is weekly concurrent. The interest
of this chapter is not the time-lag between the links 2© and 3© but the observation of subsequent
liquidity backup from commercial banks to shadow banks. According to the FTQ circle, I need
high-frequency data to observe the link 4© that happens later after an increase in deposits, but not
too late for shadow banks to rebuild the liquidity. Given that the highest frequency observation
I could get from the data is weekly, the shadow banking financing instruments I pick to test
should have the average maturity above at least one week. Repos are not feasible because they
are mostly overnight. The link 4© in the FTQ circle may happen in a day. The liquidity backup
from commercial banks in a week may be too late for repos. However, financial CP has the average
maturity as about 30 days. Hence, the weekly data is enough to observe the link 4© in the FTQ
circle if it really exists. In addition, the timely liquidity backup is effective for shadow banks to
rebuild the liquidity.
After choosing the empirical proxies, we can simplify the FTQ circle into two hypotheses that
we need to test.
• Hypothesis 1: In each week, there exists a concurrent correlation between the change of
deposits and that of financial CP outstanding all the time. The concurrent correlation is
negative as shown by the links 2© and 3© in the FTQ circle.
32The large time deposits outstanding decreased over the Great Recession like shadow banking financing instruments
because they are uncovered.
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• Hypothesis 2: In normal times, there exists a dynamic correlation between deposits and
financial CP outstanding inter-weekly. An increase in deposits leads to an increase in financial
CP outstanding in the following several weeks as shown by the link 4© in the FTQ circle. In
crisis times, the dynamic correlation breaks down.
3.4.1 Methods and Data
I collect my data regarding commercial banks from the Federal Reserve’s H.8 statistical release.
Although data from the Call Reports contain much more detailed information about commercial
banks than H.8 data, the latter does offer the available highest frequency (weekly) look at com-
mercial banks. I choose the H.8 data regarding all domestically chartered commercial banks from
December 12, 2001, to November 29, 2017. Weekly data about financial CP are collected from
Federal Reserve’s CP release and matched to the H.8 data.
I separate my entire times series data into three windows: pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis. The
cutoff dates to split the period of the Great Recession are chosen arbitrarily. I choose August 1,
2007, one week before the ABCP market collapse, as the beginning of the crisis and June 24, 2009,
as the end of the crisis. In such a way, I have 100 data points for the crisis, and the financial CP
collapse is about in the middle of the crisis33. To test two hypotheses based on the FTQ circle, I
estimate a series of VARs, each using the data in the window pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis34.
Because both time series of deposits and financial CP outstanding are non-stationary in all the
three windows and they are not co-integrated, I normalize them as follows:
gDe,t = ln(
Depositt
Depositt−1
) ∗ 100; gCP,t = ln(
Financial CPt
Financial CPt−1
) ∗ 100.
33There exists a tradeoff in choosing the window crisis. If the chosen crisis is too short, observations in the crisis
may be too few to get significant regression coefficients. If the chosen crisis is too long, it may include excessive noise.
According to the nonprofit National Bureau of Economic Research (the official arbiter of U.S. recessions), the Great
Recession in the U.S. began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009. My choice begins four months before the
official one so that it can include the ABCP market collapse. Qualitative results in this chapter do not change if I
use the official time window.
34Since I have time series data, and VAR models can identify the concurrent correlation and dynamic correlation
for time series data with endogenous variables, I use the VAR models to identify the two hypotheses. Another way
to identify the breakdown of liquidity backup during the Great Recession is to use a time dummy variable for the
Great Recession. For the dummy variable method, I have to ignore the probable problem of endogeneity between
deposits and financial CP outstanding. In addition, only Hypothesis 2 can be identified by the dummy variable. For
details, see Section 3.7.
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Time series of gDe,t and gCP,t are actually weekly growth rates and they are stationary in all the
three windows35. Table 3.7 shows the summary statistics for time series of gDe,t and gCP,t. We can
see the mean of the percentage change in deposits is highest in the crisis as 0.188, but the standard
deviation does not increase from the pre-crisis to the crisis. Hence, deposits have a stable high
growth rate in the crisis. By contrast, the growth rate of financial CP outstanding has the lowest
mean and the highest volatility in the crisis.
Figure 3.5 Concurrent Scatter Plots for Weekly Growth Rates of Deposits and Financial
CP
From Figure 3.5 and Table 3.8, we can see time series of gDe,t and gCP,t have negative correlation
coefficients all the time. However, it is not sufficient to justify Hypothesis 1 because there may exist
an endogeneity problem between the growth rate of deposits and that of financial CP outstanding.
To solve the possible endogeneity problem, I use VAR models that include two endogenous variables
(gDe,t and gCP,t). I always choose the lag order as 4 in my VAR models because lag 4 means 4
weeks, and given that the average maturity of financial CP is 30 days, the liquidity backup after
35In some literature, the growth rate of deposits is defined by gDe,t = 100∗(Depositt−Depositt−1)/Depositt−1. For
the small absolute value of rDe,t = Depositt/Depositt−1, the two definitions are very close, because ln(1+rDe,t) ≈ rDe,t.
In this chapter, I always use log-difference to calcultate growth rates, since it is symmetry, and consistent with the
forecast model in Section 3.5. Qualitative results in this chapter do not change if I use the alternative definition.
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4 weeks may not be effective in helping even if it exists36. The fitted VAR(4) model I estimate in
each time window has the following formula: gDe,t
gCP,t
 =
 φ01
φ02
+
 φ111 φ112
φ121 φ
1
22

 gDe,t−1
gCP,t−1
+
 φ211 φ212
φ221 φ
2
22

 gDe,t−2
gCP,t−2
+
 φ311 φ312
φ321 φ
3
22

 gDe,t−3
gCP,t−3
+
 φ411 φ412
φ421 φ
4
22

 gDe,t−4
gCP,t−4
+
 a1t
a2t
 .
Here, residuals
 a1t
a2t
 are a sequence of serially uncorrelated vectors with mean zero and
covariance matrix Σ =
 σ11 σ12
σ21 σ22
 if the VAR(4) model is correctly fitted. We can calculate the
correlation coefficient between residuals a1t and a2t using ρ12 = σ12/
√
σ11 ∗ σ22. If Hypothesis 1 is
true, then ρ12 is negative in all three time windows. To justify Hypothesis 2, we expect to find that
some of φ121, φ
2
21, φ
3
21 and φ
4
21 are significantly positive in the pre-crisis and the post-crisis, but not
significant in the crisis.
3.4.2 Results
Table 3.9 summarizes the VAR(4) results in all the three time windows. Let’s first look at the
residuals at = (a1t, a2t). If the VAR(4) model is correctly fitted in any time window, residuals at
should have no autocorrelation and no heteroskedasticity. In the pre-crisis, the p-value of Ljung-
Box test based on 10 lags of at is 0.014, so we can reject the null hypothesis that residuals at have no
autocorrelation at 5% significance level. However, because commercial banks have an incentive to
exaggerate their deposits when they report their financial statements quarterly, including seasonal
dummy variables (from lag 1 to lag 13) can raise adjusted R2 in equation gCP,t from 0.133 up to
0.213 and that in equation gDe,t from 0.389 to 0.540. The p-value of Ljung-Box test based on 10 lags
of at jumps up from 0.014 to 0.243. In addition, the p-value of Ljung-Box test based on 10 lags of
36According to information criteria (AIC and BIC), lag order 3 or 4 is usually optimal in the pre-crisis and the
post-crisis, but lag order 1 or 2 is optimal in the crisis.
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standardized residuals ãt = at/σt rises from 0.087 to 0.270. Hence, considering seasonal effects, the
fitted model has no autocorrelation and no heteroskedasticity in the pre-crisis37. The VAR(4) may
also be correctly fitted in the crisis given large enough p-values of Ljung-Box tests based on at and
ãt. By contrast, the residuals at are not well-behaved in the post-crisis. There may exist missing
variables that should be included in the model. Another possible reason is the model structure has
changed for the time span of the post-crisis. The post-crisis has 440 data points across more than
8 years. I treat it as normal times in this section, but the dynamic correlation between deposits
and financial CP outstanding still breaks down in some periods of the post-crisis38. Anyway, no
crisis after 2009 is as prominent as the Great Recession. Hence, in this section, I ignore the possible
structural change in the post-crisis. The correlation coefficients between a1t and a2t are −0.301,
−0.356 and −0.475 in the three time windows. They further demonstrate that Hypothesis 1 is true
all the time though they are larger than what we get in Table 3.8. The change of deposits and the
change of financial CP outstanding are concurrently negatively correlated.
In the pre-crisis, except for the intercept, only coefficients of the growth rate of deposits are
significant. For equation gCP,t, the coefficients of gDe,t−1, gDe,t−2 and gDe,t−3 are significantly
positive. Hence, an increase in deposits leads to an increase in financial CP outstanding in the
following one to three weeks, and shadow banks have enough time to rebuild the liquidity. It is
worth mentioning that the dynamic correlation is unidirectional. The change of financial CP is
affected by the past movements of the change of deposits. However, past movements of the change
of financial CP outstanding do not significantly affect the change of deposits, even though the two
series have substantial concurrent negative correlation. From the Granger causality tests, we can
also see that the change of deposits Granger causes that of financial CP outstanding, but the change
of latter does not Granger cause that of deposits. Hence, commercial banks dominate the market
in the pre-crisis.
37The estimation results of VAR(4) models with seasonal dummy variables are given if request. Qualitative results
do not change.
38For details, see Section 3.5.
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In the crisis, no coefficient is significant at all. Actually, according to the F-test of the whole
model (not reported in Table 3.9), two equations about gCP,t and gDe,t are not significant. Hence,
no dynamic correlation between deposits and financial CP outstanding exists. The liquidity backup
shown by the link 4© in the FTQ circle breaks down.
In the post-crisis, the dynamic correlation between deposits and financial CP outstanding
emerges again. For equation gCP,t, the coefficient of gDe,t−2 is significantly positive. Hence, an
increase in deposits leads to an increase in financial CP outstanding in the following two weeks.
The dynamic correlation is not unidirectional anymore although the significant coefficients of the
change of financial CP outstanding on the change of deposits are relatively small (−0.069 and
−0.031).
In summary, Hypothesis 2 is also supported by the results of VAR(4) models.
3.4.3 Other Variables of Commercial Banks
In this subsection, I estimate VAR(4) models for some other variables of commercial banks and
financial CP outstanding. On the liability side, besides deposits, large time deposits are also an
interesting variable. They are uncovered by deposit insurance. During the Great Recession, the
volume of large time deposits decreased like financial CP. Thus, I expect the concurrent negative
correlation between large time deposits and financial CP outstanding still exists but weaker than
deposits, given that commercial banks and independent shadow banks are competitors. However,
commercial banks are not willing to use the increase in large time deposits as the liquidity backup
to shadow banks because of the high risks. The dynamic correlation between large time deposits
and financial CP outstanding does not exist all the time. On the asset side, I estimate VAR(4)
models for cash, liquid assets and (total) assets with financial CP outstanding respectively39. When
investors make deposits from commercial banks, on one hand, deposits are the debt of commercial
banks. On the other hand, deposits are the cash of commercial banks if they keep the cash on
hand. If I replace deposits with cash in the VAR(4) models, I should have the same qualitative
39Liquid assets include cash and securities.
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results as Table 3.9. It means in a week, when there is an increase in deposits, commercial banks
would keep the deposits as cash on hand but not lend them. In the following weeks, the cash goes
to shadow banks if no crisis happens. If within one week, cash does not increase when there is an
increase in deposits, my story is not valid even though the fact of two hypotheses exists in deposits.
I calculate the growth rates as follows:
gLTDe,t = ln(
Large Time Depositt
Large Time Depositt−1
) ∗ 100; gCash,t =
Casht
Casht−1
∗ 100;
gLAsset,t = ln(
Liquid Assett
Liquid Assett−1
) ∗ 100; gAsset,t =
Assett
Assett−1
∗ 100;
Table 3.10 shows the regression results for large time deposits. As we expected, the concurrent
correlation between the change of large time deposits and that of financial CP outstanding is still
negative all the time, although they are weaker than the case of deposits. The dynamic correlation
is more subtle. In the crisis, an increase in large time deposits can even lead to a decrease in
financial CP outstanding. It could be the liquidity spirals (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008)). In
normal times, we can see the change of commercial banks’ attitudes towards large time deposits. In
the pre-crisis, liquidity backup from large time deposits happens in two or three weeks, but in the
post-crisis, it only happens in four weeks. Commercial banks are more prudent to offer liquidity
backup that comes from the increase in large time deposits. After the Great Recession, commercial
banks realize that large time deposits possess more liquidity risks than they thought before.
From Table 3.11 and Table 3.12, we can see the results for cash and liquid assets are similar
to the case of deposits in normal times. Regression results (not reported in the chapter) also show
that the change of cash and that of deposits have strong positive concurrent correlation within
one week. Hence, within one week, commercial banks keep most increment of deposits as cash
on hand. Things change in the crisis. Not only gCash,t and gLAsset,t do not Granger cause gCP,t,
but also absolute values of correlation coefficients of residuals are relatively small with −0.081 from
residuals of gCash,t and gCP,t, and −0.064 from residuals of gLAsset,t and gCP,t. For (total) assets, the
correlation coefficient of residuals of gAsset,t and gCP,t is −0.292, and it is nearly as low as the case
of deposits. Within one week, which is a relatively short term, when there is a decrease in financial
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CP outstanding, there is an increase in deposits, and total assets also have to keep up with the
corresponding change of deposits because of the accounting equation. However, commercial banks
may no longer keep the increase in deposits as cash or liquid asset on hand within one week given
the relatively insignificant concurrent correlations shown before.
3.4.4 Robustness Tests
To simplify the analysis, I only include two endogenous variables in VAR(4) models before.
Although the residuals are well-behaved, potentially omitted variables are worth further studies in
case I ignore some possible crucial relations. In this subsection, I estimate VAR(4) models with
three endogenous variables: the growth rate of deposits (gDe,t), the growth rate of financial CP
outstanding (gCP,t) and one of the potentially omitted variables. The potentially omitted variables
considered in this chapter are about interest rates. If deposits and financial CP outstanding are
sales quantities of commercial and shadow banking financing products, interest rates are prices.
Because different commercial banks have different interest rates, and there are different kinds of
deposits, it is difficult to find a proxy for interest rates of total deposits. I first consider the 3-
month T-Bill rate as the potentially omitted variable. T-Bills are similar to covered deposits in
that they are default risk-free fixed-income products. If commercial banks match the interest rates
of their deposits against the T-Bill rate, an increase in the T-Bill rate could lead to an increase
in deposits. In weekly data, T-Bills and deposits are more likely substitutes. Hence, I expect an
increase in the T-Bill rate to lead to a decrease in deposits. Next, the spread (Paper-TBill) between
the 3-month AA-rated financial CP rate and the 3-month T-Bill rate could possibly explain the
change of financial CP outstanding. An increase in the Paper-TBill spread means not only a higher
return rate but also higher liquidity and potential credit risks in the investment of financial CP.
If investors perceive the return more than risks, then a positive concurrent or dynamic correlation
may exist between the change of spread and gCP,t. In the other case, if the large spread is offered
by shadow banks when they have difficulties in rolling over their debt, then it reflects more about
the liquidity and potential credit risks.
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In addition to the T-Bill rate and the Paper-TBill spread, risks in the whole banking sector are
also crucial to the transfer of funds between deposits and financial CP. Intuitively, when the risks
increase, investors prefer to invest more in deposits and less in financial CP, and vice versa. In most
of the literature, the spread (a.k.a. TED spread) between the 3-month London inter-bank offered
(henceforth, Libor) rate and the 3-month T-Bill rate is used as the proxy for the risks. In this
chapter, I further subdivide the TED spread into two parts: (1) the spread (Libor-OIS) between
the 3-month Libor rate and the 3-month overnight indexed swap (henceforth, OIS) rate which is
a proxy for credit risks; (2) the spread (OIS-TBill) between 3-month OIS rate and the 3-month
T-Bill rate which is a proxy for liquidity risks.
In order to save space, I first report Granger and Instantaneous causality tests for VAR(4)s that
include one more potentially omitted variable respectively in Table 3.14. If an omitted variable
indeed significantly influences gDe,t and gCP,t, I report detailed results of regressions including the
variable next. Statistics and p-values (in parentheses) testing the null that the variable on the left
side does not Granger or instantaneously cause the other two variables are shown in Table 3.1440.
The Granger causality tests check the significance of dynamic correlations, and the Instantaneous
causality tests check that of concurrent correlations. From Table 3.14, we can see the concurrent
correlation between the growth rate of deposits and the growth rate of financial CP outstanding in
Hypothesis 1 always exists, even if I include one of the potentially omitted variables in the VAR(4)
models41. Besides, the dynamic correlation between the growth rate of deposits and the growth
rate of financial CP outstanding exists in normal times but breaks down in the crisis like Hypothesis
2 after I consider the potentially omitted variables.
Except for the Libor-OIS spread, no potentially omitted variable has significant dynamic or
concurrent correlations with gDe,t and gCP,t in normal times, but they are indeed worth being
included in the models when the crisis happens. In normal times, the prices of deposits and
40I also test the effective federal funds rate, which is a proxy for the interest rate of deposits, to see if it is a
potentially omitted variable. However, it is insignificant all the time and has almost no effect on deposits and
financial CP outstanding. I drop it to save space.
41In this chapter, I use first differences but not log-difference growth rates for all interest rates because some interest
rates are negative. Qualitative results do not change if I first add a constant value to interest rates and then transform
them into log-difference growth rates.
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Figure 3.6 The Spreads
The figure shows the spreads from Dec. 12, 2001, through Nov. 29, 2017. Paper-TBill: the spread between
the 3-month AA-rated financial CP rates and the 3-month T-Bill rates. Libor-OIS: the spread between the
3-month London inter-bank offered rates and the 3-month overnight indexed swap rates. OIS-TBill: the
spread between the 3-month overnight indexed swap rates and the 3-month T-Bill rates. The gray-shaded
area is the time period of the Great Recession (from Aug. 1, 2007, to Jun. 24, 2009). The ABCP market
collapse was Aug. 9, 2007. Lehman’s bankruptcy was Sep. 15, 2008. Source: Federal Reserve’s CP release,
Bloomberg, U.S. Treasury.
financial CP, and the liquidity risks in the banking sector are totally endogenously decided by
gDe,t and gCP,t. The credit risks in the banking sector (Libor-OIS spread) have significant dynamic
explanatory power in the pre-crisis, but the power disappears in the post-crisis. By contrast, the
potentially omitted variables are exogenously decided in the crisis. From Figure 3.6, we can see
that spreads widen in the crisis, and it is very likely unexpected to commercial banks and shadow
banks. Hence, all potentially omitted variables have explanatory power in the crisis.
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Table 3.15 shows the estimation results of VAR(4) that includes the Libor-OIS spread in the
pre-crisis. As we expected, an increase in the credit risks of the banking sector leads to an increase in
deposits and a decrease in financial CP outstanding in two weeks. The results of VAR(4)s include
each potentially omitted variable in the crisis are reported in Table 3.16, 3.17, 3.18, and 3.19
respectively. During the Great Recession, gDe,t and ∆T-Bill,t are concurrently negatively correlated,
and an increase in T-Bill rates leads to an increase in financial CP outstanding and a decrease
in deposits, since deposits and T-Bills are substitutes. gCP,t and ∆Paper-TBill,t are concurrently
negatively correlated, and an increase in Paper-TBill spread leads to a decrease in financial CP
outstanding. It proves that in the crisis, shadow banks have difficulties to reissue their financial
CP even if they offer high additional interest rates. Investors perceive the high additional return of
financial CP as high risks. Finally, investors transfer their funds from financial CP to deposits when
the banking sector has increases in credit risks (Libor-OIS spread) and liquidity risks (OIS-TBill
spread) in the crisis. As to concurrent correlations, ∆Libor-OIS,t is negatively correlated with gCP,t
and positively correlated with gDe,t, but ∆OIS-TBill,t is only positively correlated with gDe,t. Hence,
investors do not think liquidity risks have an instant negative influence on financial CP like credit
risks.
3.5 The Forecast Model: When Liquidity Backup Breaks Down
In Section 3.4, I mark out the time window of the Great Recession as the crisis in advance. The
VAR(4) model for gDe,t and gCP,t is not significant in the crisis. Although the crisis set has 100
data points, it still could be too small to have significant results. In this section, I do not presume
the crisis times but let the data reveal them according to the FTQ circle. If my FTQ circle model is
correct, when the liquidity backup of the blue link 4© breaks down, it is the time that markets have
a crisis. How to find the specific time that the liquidity backup from commercial banks to shadow
banks breaks down? The dynamic correlation between gDe,t and gCP,t stemming from the blue link
4© can help improve the prediction of future financial CP outstanding in normal times. An increase
in deposits leads to an increase in financial CP outstanding. Hence, to predict future financial
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CP outstanding, including the past value of deposits is more accurate than using the past value of
financial CP outstanding alone. If including the past value of deposits cannot substantially increase
the accuracy of the prediction of financial CP outstanding, it means the dynamic correlation breaks
down, and it is the crisis time. I expect that the data will reveal the liquidity backup breaks down
during the most time of the Great Recession beforehand, or the FTQ circle model may be wrong.
Figure 3.7 One-Step Forward-Chaining Cross-Validation
The time span I use to make predictions is longer than that I use to estimate the VAR(4) models
in Section 3.4. I collect weekly data regarding deposits and financial CP outstanding from January
3, 2001, to January 16, 2019. Totally, there are 942 observations. Figure 3.7 shows the one-step
forward-chaining cross-validation method I use to compare the prediction accuracy of different
models. Each training set (blue squares) has 60 data points, and the corresponding test set (red
circle) is the next observation after the training set. Hence, each model has to be estimated in
total 882 training sets respectively, and the 882 fitted models are used to predict the 882 test sets.
Finally, we have time series of 882 squared errors from the difference between the true value and
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the predicted value in test sets for each model, and they are the measure to judge the prediction
accuracy of different models.
I set the size of training sets as fixed 60 data points even if there exist more historical data
when we predict relatively recent test sets. Although including more data points in training sets
can help estimate the yearly seasonality, the time series of squared errors will have a decreasing
trend because more recent test sets have more data points in their corresponding training sets. To
give a fair condition for each group of the training set and test set, I assume the 60 weeks Markov
property. Given 60 weeks in each training set, I ignore the yearly seasonality. However, it does not
undermine the analysis in this section because the goal of this section is not to find a model that
can best predict weekly financial CP outstanding but justify including past deposits can improve
the prediction in normal times.
For univariate models with only financial CP outstanding, a simple random walk with drift
model regarding the log value can give a good prediction according to the mean squared error
(henceforth, MSE) in test sets. Hence, the univariate model I use to predict financial CP outstand-
ing is:
Univariate Model: ln(Financial CPt+1) = d+ ln(Financial CPt) + εt
where εt is a normal i.i.d. error and financial CP outstanding is in million dollars. It is the same
as we usually assume the price of a stock follows the geometric Brownian motion. Complicated
univariate models like ARIMA-GARCH models or artificial neural networks models cannot sub-
stantially reduce the MSE. The multivariate model including deposits I use to predict financial CP
outstanding is:
Multivariate Model:

ln(Financial CPt+1) = d1 + ln(Financial CPt) + ε1t+
β[ln( ̂Depositst+1)− ln(Depositst)]
(1− γ1L13)[ln(Depositst+1)− ln(Depositst)] = d2 + (1− γ2L13)ε2t
where ε1t and ε2t are normal i.i.d. errors, and deposits and financial CP outstanding are in million
dollars. Compared to the univariate model, financial CP outstanding depends on not only the drift
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and its value in last week but also the predicted deposits ( ̂Depositst+1). The predicted deposits
( ̂Depositst+1) are estimated by a seasonal random walk with drift model. The quarterly (13 weeks)
seasonality exists in deposits because commercial banks tend to exaggerate their deposits when
they report their financial statements every quarter42. It is the reason I cannot use the VAR model
to predict financial CP outstanding. Even seasonal VAR models cannot capture the seasonality
in deposits like the univariate seasonal model for deposits. Admittedly, the seasonal random walk
with drift model is not the best model to predict deposits. However, to achieve the goal in this
section, it is enough and straightforward. I only need to test if including deposits and keeping
all other things unchanged in the univariate model of financial CP outstanding can improve the
prediction accuracy in normal times.
Figure 3.8 shows 40 weeks moving averages of squared errors for univariate and multivariate
models. To make the MSE more readable, the squared error in Figure 3.8 is calculated as follows:
Squared Error = (ln(Financial CP)− ̂ln(Financial CP))2 ∗ 10000
where financial CP outstanding from test sets is in million dollars. Except for the four gray-shaded
columns, the multivariate model has fewer MSEs than the univariate model as we expected, which
means there exists a dynamic correlation between deposits and financial CP outstanding. The
liquidity backup was broken from September 2007 to April 2009 first time as shown by the first
gray column. It is almost the generally accepted time period of the Great Recession. The second
and third gray columns are from January 2010 to April 2010 and from September 2010 to May
2011, respectively. We know the European sovereign debt crisis peaked between 2010 to 2011.
Foreign financial institutions account for more than 75% of total financial CP outstanding after
2010 (Figure 3.4), and most of them are headquartered in Europe, so it is not hard to understand
that U.S. commercial banks stop the liquidity backup from increased deposits to European finan-
cial institutions during the European debt crisis. According to my forecast model, there exists a
mitigation gap between the second and third gray columns. Further studies need to check if the
crisis truly mitigates between April 2010 to September 2010. The last gray column in Figure 3.8
42Financial CP outstanding does not have quarterly seasonality alone.
79
is between June 2014 to November 2014. Crude oil prices (Brent or WTI) plunged more than 50%
in this period. The more detailed reasons behind the breakdown of liquidity backup are still worth
further studies.
The model in this section is not for the financial crisis forecast. Commercial banks change
their strategies about the change of deposits when they realize a crisis is coming. Somehow, they
can forecast the arrival of a potential crisis using their risk management models. In addition, the
breakdown of liquidity backup does not necessarily result in the collapse of financial CP. We only
observe the prominent collapse following the Lehman’s Bankruptcy. Liquidity backup is a guarantee
for investors’ confidence. When it breaks down, a trigger such as a large impact of credit risks may
set off the collapse of financial CP.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
During the Great Recession, not all funds flew out from the banking system. Deposits increased,
but the volumes of all other short-term financing instruments decreased. Commercial banks that
relied more heavily on core deposit and equity capital financing could still lend and purchase
securitized assets compared to other banks. After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, commercial
banks kept the unprecedentedly large increase in deposits as cash on hand, which could be crucial
liquidity backup for shadow banks (see Table 3.2). This may have been due to the counter-party
risks or the newly introduced policy by the Federal Reserve to pay interest on bank reserves. Or
sometimes, commercial banks would rather squeeze their credit and acquire securitized assets at
fire-sale price liquidated by shadow banks than offer liquidity backup to high risky counter-parties
(Acharya et al. (2010)). Although there were unprecedented government bailouts after Lehman’s
bankruptcy, securitized assets have already been priced at extremely risk-averse preference from
fixed-income investors. Using their securitized assets as collateral, shadow banks cannot raise
enough funds compared to times when securitized assets are in nearly risk-neutral pricing. No
liquidity can arbitrage securitized assets back to nearly risk-neutral pricing, and even if any, it
takes a too long time to go back, and survival could be a problem.
80
After the Great Recession, BHCs were potential winners and owned more and more shadow
banking subsidiaries. Although the number of independent shadow banks decreased, we have the
internal FTQ circle in BHCs. BHCs can enjoy the synergy by holding commercial banks and shadow
banks together. However, deposits may not be enough for some BHCs to survive in the next crisis.
Funds will transfer from some BHCs to others, and regulations should be able to stimulate BHCs
with rich liquidity to help BHCs in trouble but not stand by and profit from the trouble. This
chapter also proposes that regulations should focus on not only sufficient capital, but also sufficient
core deposits.
Nowadays, new kinds of shadow banks spring up. It is important to differentiate between
pure dis-intermediation and banking activities. For example, peer-to-peer lending is pure dis-
intermediation if the lending platform only channels funds from lenders to borrowers, and all risks
transfer from borrowers to lenders. However, lending platforms usually have their own liquidity
management and sometimes offer guarantees to investors for protection. The credit risk retention
can stimulate platforms to monitor borrowers, but it also brings about the liquidity risks given
that lending platforms are not pure platforms anymore. Another example of new rising shadow
banks is the mortgage lending company. Some mortgage lenders are ultimately funded by agency
MBSes. During the Great Recession, agency MBSes were saved by government bailouts. Agency
MBS investors may expect the implicit bailouts will happen again, so agency MBSes dominate the
securitized asset market today (Table 3.3). If agency MBSes suffer runs in the future, mortgage
lenders that rely on the agency MBS financing will suffer liquidity problems too. Even if the
government saves the agency MBSes again, taxpayers will undertake the final cost.
The FTQ circle model in this chapter also has implications for international finance. When a
country raises capital internationally, it can still have sufficient capital when normal fluctuation in
the economy of the country happens. The capital outflow is offset by the inflow from the liquidity
backup. However, when a severe crisis happens inside the country, the liquidity problem may break
out. In reality, European financial institutions issue financial CP in the United States, and the
liquidity backup broke down during the European debt crisis.
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Finally, there is one caveat: this chapter only considers the liquidity risks and therefore, the
liability side of financial institutions. Most financial institutions failed in the Great Recession
because of their holdings of MBSes, especially subprime MBSes. When the prices of their assets
(mostly MBSes) declined, financial institutions could be insolvent even with no liquidity problem.
The neglected credit risks and bubbles in prices of collateral (mostly real estate) largely account
for the price decline of securitized assets. Liquidity risks also play a role in explaining the price
decline. As the story in this chapter, when the liquidity backup from commercial banks broke
down, shadow banks could not roll over their debt and had to liquidate their securitized assets.
The liquidation leads to the further price decline of MBSes. Excluding the neglected credit risks
and bubbles, MBSes are priced from nearly risk-neutral to extremely risk-averse valuation because
extremely risk-averse investors dominate the markets. It is hard to say that the failed financial
institutions hold a large number of MBSes intentionally or they cannot resell the MBSes they issued
or underwrote. From a risk-neutral perspective, their holdings of MBSes may be correct, but they
cannot survive into the time when markets are full of liquidity and dominated by nearly risk-neutral
arbitragers again.
3.7 Supplementary Analyses
Since I have time series data, and VAR models can identify the concurrent correlation and
dynamic correlation for time series data with endogenous variables, I use the VAR models to
identify the two hypotheses about deposits and financial CP outstanding in most parts of this
chapter. In this section, I use a time dummy variable for the Great Recession to identify the
breakdown of liquidity backup during the Great Recession, i.e., Hypothesis 2. For this method, I
have to ignore the probable problem of endogeneity between deposits and financial CP outstanding.
In addition, Hypothesis 1 cannot be identified by the time dummy variable.
Each column in Table 3.20 reports a linear regression of the same dependent variable: the
growth rate of financial CP outstanding at date t (gCP,t) but different independent variables. Ct−1
is the time dummy variable, which equals one if the time t − 1 happens in the Great Recession.
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If Hypothesis 2 truly exists, I expect to find significantly positive coefficients of lag terms of the
growth rate of deposits, i.e. gDe,t−1, gDe,t−2, or gDe,t−3, which means an increase in deposits leads
to an increase in financial CP outstanding. Meanwhile, some interaction terms between lag terms
of the growth rate of deposits and the time dummy variable, i.e. gDe,t−1 ∗ Ct−1, gDe,t−2 ∗ Ct−1,
or gDe,t−3 ∗ Ct−1, are significantly negative. Hence, it demonstrates that liquidity backup from
commercial banks to shadow banks was weak during the Great Recession compared to other times.
Compared to Model (1), Model (3), and Model (5), Model (2), Model (4), and Model (6) allow
autoregressive effects for the growth rate of financial CP outstanding by including lag terms of
gCP,t in the independent variables. Model (1) and Model (2) are basic models with only first-order
lag terms. The signs of coefficients of gDe,t−1 and gDe,t−1 ∗ Ct−1 are as expected, but they are not
significant. The R2s are very low compared to the VAR models, so it seems that Model (1) and
Model (2) are not correctly fitted.
Model (3) and Model (4) have up to third-order lag terms. As I expected, they have significantly
positive coefficients of lag terms of the growth rate of deposits, i.e. gDe,t−1, gDe,t−2, and gDe,t−3,
and significantly negative interaction terms between lag terms of the growth rate of deposits and
the time dummy variable, i.e. gDe,t−1 ∗ Ct−1, gDe,t−2 ∗ Ct−1, and gDe,t−3 ∗ Ct−1. Hence, one week
time-lag is not enough to depict liquidity backup from commercial banks to shadow banks.
For models in the last two columns of Table 3.20, I further elaborate Model (3) and Model (4)
by including two variables about risks in the banking system. First, the weekly change in the spread
between the 3-month London inter-bank offered rate and the 3-month overnight indexed swap rate
(∆Libor-OIS,t), which is a proxy for credit risks. Second, the weekly change in the spread between the
3-month overnight indexed swap rate and the 3-month T-Bill rate (∆OIS-TBill,t), which is a proxy for
liquidity risks. Model (5) and Model (6) still have significant coefficients on lag terms of the growth
rate of deposits and one interaction term between the growth rate of deposits and the time dummy
variable. In addition, the coefficient of ∆Libor-OIS,t−1 ∗gDe,t−1 is significantly negative, which means
when credit risks in the banking system are large, if there is an increase in deposits, commercial
banks offer significantly less liquidity backup to shadow banks in the next week. Intuitively, when
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facing large credit risks in the banking system, commercial banks would rather keep the increase in
deposits on hand than offer liquidity backup to high risky counter-parties. It is worth mentioning
that the coefficient of ∆Libor-OIS,t−1 is not significant, which means credit risks themselves have
no direct correlation with the change of financial CP outstanding. Moreover, liquidity risks have
nothing to do with the willingness of commercial banks to offer liquidity backup.
3.8 References
Acharya, V. V., Schnabl, P., and Suarez, G. (2013). Securitization without risk transfer. Journal
of Financial Economics, 107(3):515–536.
Acharya, V. V., Shin, H. S., and Yorulmazer, T. (2010). Crisis resolution and bank liquidity. The
Review of Financial Studies, 24(6):2166–2205.
Afonso, G., Kovner, A., and Schoar, A. (2010). What happened to us interbank lending in the
financial crisis.
Bai, J., Krishnamurthy, A., and Weymuller, C.-H. (2018). Measuring liquidity mismatch in the
banking sector. The Journal of Finance, 73(1):51–93.
Berger, A. N. and Bouwman, C. H. (2009). Bank liquidity creation. The Review of Financial
Studies, 22(9):3779–3837.
Brunnermeier, M. K. and Pedersen, L. H. (2008). Market liquidity and funding liquidity. The
Review of Financial Studies, 22(6):2201–2238.
Cetorelli, N. (2012). A principle for forward-looking monitoring of financial intermediation: Follow
the banks. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics Blog.
Copeland, A. (2012). Evolution and heterogeneity among larger bank holding companies: 1994 to
2010. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, 18(2):83–93.
Copeland, A., Martin, A., and Walker, M. (2014). Repo runs: Evidence from the tri-party repo
market. The Journal of Finance, 69(6):2343–2380.
Cornett, M. M., McNutt, J. J., Strahan, P. E., and Tehranian, H. (2011). Liquidity risk management
and credit supply in the financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(2):297–312.
Gatev, E. and Strahan, P. E. (2006). Banks’ advantage in hedging liquidity risk: Theory and
evidence from the commercial paper market. The Journal of Finance, 61(2):867–892.
Gennaioli, N., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (2013). A model of shadow banking. The Journal
of Finance, 68(4):1331–1363.
84
Gorton, G. and Metrick, A. (2012). Securitized banking and the run on repo. Journal of Financial
Economics, 104(3):425–451.
Harvey, J. and Spong, K. (2001). The decline in core deposits: what can banks do? Financial
Industry Perspectives, page 35.
He, Z., Khang, I. G., and Krishnamurthy, A. (2010). Balance sheet adjustments during the 2008
crisis. IMF Economic Review, 58(1):118–156.
Kacperczyk, M. and Schnabl, P. (2010). When safe proved risky: Commercial paper during the
financial crisis of 2007-2009. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(1):29–50.
Kashyap, A. K., Rajan, R., and Stein, J. C. (2002). Banks as liquidity providers: An explanation
for the coexistence of lending and deposit-taking. The Journal of Finance, 57(1):33–73.
Krishnamurthy, A., Nagel, S., and Orlov, D. (2014). Sizing up repo. The Journal of Finance,
69(6):2381–2417.
Pozsar, Z., Adrian, T., Ashcraft, A., and Boesky, H. (2010). Shadow banking. FRB of New York
Staff Report, 458(458):3–9.
Schwartz, A. J. (1963). A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 [by] Milton Friedman
[and] Anna Jacobson Schwartz. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
85
Table 3.1 Annual U.S. Main Short-Term Debt Financing Instruments ($ billions)
Year
Commercial Repurchase Treasury
Deposits
Agency
Paper Agreements Bills Debentures
2003 1, 341 1, 244 929 4, 095 445
2004 1, 334 1, 518 1, 001 4, 428 566
2005 1, 529 1, 838 961 4, 817 485
2006 1, 806 2, 106 941 5, 181 518
2007 2, 005 2, 427 1, 000 5, 477 832
2008 1, 739 2, 239 1, 861 5, 889 1, 124
2009 1, 303 1, 728 1, 793 6, 548 652
2010 1, 074 1, 717 1, 773 6, 742 567
2011 1, 081 1, 871 1, 521 7, 208 517
2012 993 2, 064 1, 629 7, 944 460
2013 1, 034 1, 932 1, 592 8, 490 533
2014 1, 047 1, 781 1, 458 9, 047 636
2015 1, 028 1, 801 1, 514 9, 657 718
2016 1, 020 1, 788 1, 818 10, 244 552
2017 996 1, 958 1, 956 10, 752 529
2018 1, 088 2, 103 2, 340 11, 170 544
This table reports annual (2003-2018) main debt financing instruments with maturity less than 1 year,
a.k.a. money market financing instruments, except for deposits. Deposits are total deposits of domestically
chartered commercial banks including long-term time deposits and transaction deposits. They are the annual
average value of weekly data obtained from the Federal Reserve’s H.8 statistical release. Commercial Paper
outstanding is the annual average value of weekly data obtained from the Federal Reserve’s CP release.
Repurchase Agreements are only tri-party repos. Their annual average collateral value is calculated by daily
data obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The data before 2008 about repos is estimated by
the author because of a lack of data availability. Treasury bills outstanding is the year-end value of monthly
data obtained from the U.S. Treasury. Agency debentures outstanding is the year-end value of quarterly
data obtained from Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA). The data about agency
debentures before 2006 is estimated by the author because of a lack of data availability.
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Table 3.2 Annual U.S. Household Liquid Financial Assets ($ billions, Percent)
Year Equity Deposits
Mutual Treasury Municipal
MMMF
Corporate
Total
Funds & Agency Bonds Bonds
2003
6, 973 4, 524 2, 674 762 626 909 670 17, 111
40.8% 26.4% 15.5% 4.5% 3.7% 5.3% 3.9% 100%
2004
7, 640 4, 941 3, 074 884 1, 514 878 601 19, 531
39.1% 25.3% 15.7% 4.5% 7.7% 4.5% 3.1% 100%
2005
8, 307 5, 311 3, 299 866 1, 630 926 810 21, 150
39.3% 25.1% 15.6% 4.1% 7.7% 4.4% 3.8% 100%
2006
10, 220 5, 789 3, 858 815 1, 687 1, 097 831 24, 297
42.1% 23.8% 15.9% 3.4% 6.9% 4.5% 3.4% 100%
2007
10, 075 6, 210 4, 343 919 1, 777 1, 343 1, 195 25, 862
39.0% 24.0% 16.8% 3.6% 6.9% 5.2% 4.6% 100%
2008
5, 601 6, 660 2, 795 1, 140 1, 916 1, 577 2, 150 21, 839
25.6% 30.5% 12.8% 5.2% 8.8% 7.2% 9.8% 100%
2009
7, 338 6, 798 3, 875 1, 154 1, 994 1, 306 1, 706 24, 171
30.4% 28.1% 16.0% 4.8% 8.2% 5.4% 7.1% 100%
2010
8, 704 6, 937 4, 503 1, 352 2, 073 1, 121 1, 332 26, 021
33.5% 26.7% 17.3% 5.2% 8.0% 4.3% 5.1% 100%
2011
8, 191 7, 605 4, 489 960 1, 969 1, 103 1, 325 25, 643
31.9% 29.7% 17.5% 3.7% 7.7% 4.3% 5.2% 100%
2012
9, 496 8, 114 5, 331 1, 113 1, 830 1, 119 1, 091 28, 094
33.8% 28.9% 19.0% 4.0% 6.5% 4.0% 3.9% 100%
2013
12, 649 8, 480 6, 340 1, 410 1, 839 1, 120 1, 087 32, 925
38.4% 25.8% 19.3% 4.3% 5.6% 3.4% 3.3% 100%
2014
14, 314 9, 063 6, 829 1, 060 1, 696 1, 033 1, 090 35, 085
40.8% 25.8% 19.5% 3.0% 4.8% 2.9% 3.1% 100%
2015
13, 837 9, 563 6, 758 1, 680 1, 642 1, 044 1, 144 35, 668
38.8% 26.8% 18.9% 4.7% 4.6% 2.9% 3.2% 100%
2016
15, 209 10, 187 7, 251 1, 847 1, 673 1, 023 846 38, 036
40.0% 26.8% 19.1% 4.9% 4.4% 2.7% 2.2% 100%
2017
17, 877 10, 331 8, 685 1, 882 1, 570 1, 054 456 41, 855
42.7% 24.7% 20.7% 4.5% 3.7% 2.5% 1.1% 100%
Households include nonprofit organizations. Liquid financial assets exclude such illiquid assets as
pension fund reserves, equity in the non-corporate business, etc. Source: Federal Reserve Flow of
Funds, L.101.
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Table 3.3 Annual U.S. Asset-Backed and Mortgage-Related Securities Outstanding ($ bil-
lions)
Year ABSes Non-Agency MBSes Agency MBSes Total
2003 995 1, 366 4, 349 6, 710
2004 1, 100 1, 896 4, 405 7, 402
2005 1, 281 2, 556 4, 662 8, 499
2006 1, 657 3, 299 5, 091 10, 047
2007 1, 964 3, 585 5, 801 11, 349
2008 1, 830 3, 188 6, 279 11, 297
2009 1, 712 2, 716 6, 636 11, 065
2010 1, 508 2, 424 6, 835 10, 766
2011 1, 359 2, 128 6, 948 10, 434
2012 1, 280 1, 878 6, 960 10, 118
2013 1, 286 1, 703 7, 040 10, 028
2014 1, 349 1, 623 7, 219 10, 191
2015 1, 384 1, 528 7, 367 10, 278
2016 1, 397 1, 385 7, 638 10, 420
2017 1, 469 1, 299 8, 005 10, 773
2018 1, 677 1, 294 8, 089 11, 060
Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA).
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Table 3.4 Annual U.S. Commercial Paper Outstanding ($ billions)
Date ABCP Financial CP Corporate CP Total
2003 680 528 134 1, 341
2004 663 550 121 1, 334
2005 763 623 142 1, 529
2006 970 693 142 1, 806
2007 1, 059 772 175 2, 005
2008 764 783 192 1, 739
2009 558 597 148 1, 303
2010 403 547 125 1, 074
2011 370 543 167 1, 081
2012 317 479 197 993
2013 275 544 216 1, 034
2014 242 540 265 1, 047
2015 231 522 275 1, 028
2016 255 492 273 1, 020
2017 242 468 285 996
2018 238 548 301 1, 088
Source: Federal Reserve’s H.8 statistical release.
Table 3.5 Annual U.S. Tri-Party Repos Outstanding ($ billions)
Year Tri-Party Repos GCF Net Tri-Party Repos
2010 1, 717 333 1, 384
2011 1, 871 306 1, 565
2012 2, 064 293 1, 772
2013 1, 932 257 1, 675
2014 1, 781 202 1, 579
2015 1, 801 221 1, 580
2016 1, 788 179 1, 609
2017 1, 958 123 1, 835
2018 2, 103 134 1, 969
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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Table 3.6 Annual U.S. Agency Debentures Outstanding ($ billions)
Year Short-Term Long-Term Total
2006 518 2, 114 2, 632
2007 832 2, 074 2, 906
2008 1, 124 2, 085 3, 208
2009 652 2, 074 2, 726
2010 567 1, 971 2, 538
2011 517 1, 810 2, 327
2012 460 1, 636 2, 096
2013 533 1, 525 2, 058
2014 636 1, 393 2, 029
2015 718 1, 278 1, 995
2016 552 1, 420 1, 972
2017 529 1, 406 1, 935
2018 544 1, 322 1, 865
Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA).
Table 3.7 Summary Statistics for Weekly Growth Rates of Deposits and Financial CP
(Percent)
Window Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Pre-Crisis
gDe,t 294 0.132 1.062 −2.327 −0.595 0.864 3.241
gCP,t 294 0.113 1.638 −6.023 −0.900 1.228 5.234
Crisis
gDe,t 100 0.188 1.019 −2.094 −0.513 0.883 4.227
gCP,t 100 −0.313 2.824 −11.769 −1.691 1.169 10.456
Post-Crisis
gDe,t 440 0.118 0.745 −2.340 −0.392 0.631 2.216
gCP,t 440 −0.031 2.148 −7.396 −1.330 1.403 11.980
Table 3.8 Concurrent Correlation Coefficients for Weekly Growth Rates of Deposits and
Financial CP and t-Test
Window Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
Correlation Coefficient −0.445 −0.276 −0.502
t-Value −8.498 −2.847 −12.140
df 292 98 438
p-Value 5.0E-16 0.003 2.2E-16
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Table 3.9 VAR(4)s for Weekly Growth Rates of Deposits and Financial CP
Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
gCP,t gDe,t gCP,t gDe,t gCP,t gDe,t
gCP,t−1 0.028 −0.048 0.170 0.047 −0.166∗∗ 0.012
(0.062) (0.034) (0.113) (0.039) (0.054) (0.016)
gDe,t−1 0.567
∗∗∗ −0.603∗∗∗ −0.225 −0.093 −0.154 −0.191∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.062) (0.325) (0.113) (0.183) (0.053)
gCP,t−2 0.115 −0.042 0.097 −0.050 0.104 −0.069∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.034) (0.114) (0.040) (0.055) (0.016)
gDe,t−2 0.709
∗∗∗ −0.468∗∗∗ −0.616 0.026 0.751∗∗∗ −0.439∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.067) (0.323) (0.112) (0.175) (0.050)
gCP,t−3 0.044 −0.017 −0.105 0.004 −0.029 0.007
(0.062) (0.034) (0.114) (0.040) (0.056) (0.016)
gDe,t−3 0.554
∗∗∗ −0.525∗∗∗ −0.105 −0.164 0.342 −0.336∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.069) (0.327) (0.114) (0.180) (0.052)
gCP,t−4 0.021 −0.048 0.039 0.024 0.149∗∗ −0.031∗
(0.062) (0.034) (0.110) (0.038) (0.054) (0.016)
gDe,t−4 0.117 −0.033 0.277 0.190 0.197 0.197∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.066) (0.319) (0.111) (0.183) (0.053)
const −0.172 0.367∗∗∗ −0.078 0.195 −0.153 0.207∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.057) (0.318) (0.111) (0.115) (0.033)
Observations 290 290 96 96 436 436
R2 0.157 0.406 0.122 0.156 0.104 0.378
Adjusted R2 0.133 0.389 0.042 0.078 0.087 0.367
Σ
2.347 −0.385 7.843 −0.972 4.228 −0.577
−0.385 0.696 −0.972 0.949 −0.577 0.350
ρ
1 −0.301 1 −0.356 1 −0.475
−0.301 1 −0.356 1 −0.475 1
Granger Causality 0.171 1.5E-09 0.595 0.303 1.4E-05 2.3E-05
at Ljung-Box Q2(10) 0.014 0.686 2.8E-05
ãt Ljung-Box Q2(10) 0.087 0.118 2.2E-05
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Granger Causality is the p-value of excluding the variable. at Ljung-Box test is a portmanteau test for
autocorrelation in residuals. ãt = at/σt are standardized residuals. ãt Ljung-Box test is a portmanteau test
for heteroskedasticity in residuals.
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Table 3.10 VAR(4)s for Weekly Growth Rates of Large Time Deposits and Financial CP
Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
gCP,t gLTDe,t gCP,t gLTDe,t gCP,t gLTDe,t
gCP,t−1 0.009 −0.013 0.245∗ −0.045 −0.147∗∗ 0.037∗
(0.061) (0.039) (0.109) (0.050) (0.048) (0.017)
gLTDe,t−1 0.144 −0.183∗∗ 0.242 0.115 −0.247 0.083
(0.094) (0.060) (0.244) (0.112) (0.138) (0.049)
gCP,t−2 0.043 0.031 0.083 −0.005 −0.016 −0.004
(0.060) (0.038) (0.108) (0.049) (0.049) (0.017)
gLTDe,t−2 0.236
∗ −0.157∗ −0.660∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.221 0.067
(0.094) (0.061) (0.235) (0.108) (0.138) (0.049)
gCP,t−3 −0.036 0.031 −0.193 0.012 −0.078 −0.012
(0.060) (0.038) (0.107) (0.049) (0.049) (0.017)
gLTDe,t−3 0.219
∗ −0.150∗ −0.327 −0.249∗ 0.003 0.050
(0.095) (0.061) (0.238) (0.109) (0.138) (0.049)
gCP,t−4 0.014 −0.023 0.078 0.038 0.141∗∗ −0.022
(0.060) (0.039) (0.107) (0.049) (0.048) (0.017)
gLTDe,t−4 −0.202∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.583∗ 0.088 0.277∗ 0.077
(0.095) (0.061) (0.247) (0.113) (0.137) (0.049)
const 0.036 0.244∗∗∗ −0.198 0.017 −0.016 −0.018
(0.104) (0.067) (0.280) (0.128) (0.101) (0.036)
Observations 290 290 96 96 436 436
R2 0.075 0.127 0.179 0.260 0.068 0.041
Adjusted R2 0.049 0.102 0.103 0.192 0.050 0.023
Σ
2.575 −0.321 7.338 −1.102 4.397 −0.247
−0.321 1.061 −1.102 1.542 −0.247 0.551
ρ
1 −0.194 1 −0.328 1 −0.159
−0.194 1 −0.328 1 −0.159 1
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 3.11 VAR(4)s for Weekly Growth Rates of Cash and Financial CP
Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
gCP,t gCash,t gCP,t gCash,t gCP,t gCash,t
gCP,t−1 0.009 0.009 0.227
∗ 0.173 −0.140∗∗ 0.047
(0.059) (0.203) (0.106) (0.304) (0.050) (0.093)
gCash,t−1 0.062
∗∗∗ −0.826∗∗∗ 0.010 −0.356∗∗∗ −0.033 −0.277∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.058) (0.036) (0.104) (0.027) (0.050)
gCP,t−2 −0.001 0.314 0.135 0.044 0.021 0.043
(0.058) (0.201) (0.106) (0.306) (0.050) (0.094)
gCash,t−2 0.067
∗∗∗ −0.505∗∗∗ −0.058 0.073 0.074∗∗ −0.214∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.067) (0.038) (0.109) (0.027) (0.050)
gCP,t−3 −0.038 −0.411∗ −0.141 −0.309 −0.091 0.319∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.203) (0.106) (0.305) (0.050) (0.093)
gCash,t−3 0.100
∗∗∗ −0.586∗∗∗ −0.013 0.042 −0.020 −0.147∗∗
(0.019) (0.067) (0.038) (0.109) (0.027) (0.051)
gCP,t−4 0.090 −0.684∗∗∗ 0.047 −0.632∗ 0.126∗ −0.072
(0.059) (0.204) (0.105) (0.303) (0.050) (0.093)
gCash,t−4 0.068
∗∗∗ −0.248∗∗∗ 0.062 0.157 −0.011 0.095
(0.017) (0.058) (0.036) (0.104) (0.026) (0.049)
const 0.114 −0.066 −0.193 0.942 −0.026 0.270
(0.093) (0.321) (0.304) (0.877) (0.101) (0.188)
Observations 290 290 96 96 436 436
R2 0.110 0.513 0.128 0.233 0.079 0.167
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.500 0.048 0.163 0.061 0.151
Σ
2.478 −1.137 7.790 −1.806 4.345 −2.206
−1.137 29.342 −1.806 64.612 −2.206 15.189
ρ
1 −0.133 1 −0.081 1 −0.272
−0.133 1 −0.081 1 −0.272 1
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 3.12 VAR(4)s for Weekly Growth Rates of Liquid Assets and Financial CP
Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
gCP,t gLAsset,t gCP,t gLAsset,t gCP,t gLAsset,t
gCP,t−1 0.015 0.072 0.253
∗ 0.004 −0.140∗∗ 0.032
(0.060) (0.065) (0.106) (0.091) (0.050) (0.037)
gLAsset,t−1 0.108 −0.531∗∗∗ 0.205 −0.271∗ −0.067 −0.279∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.060) (0.121) (0.104) (0.070) (0.051)
gCP,t−2 −0.018 0.130∗ 0.135 0.001 0.037 −0.006
(0.059) (0.064) (0.107) (0.092) (0.051) (0.037)
gLAsset,t−2 0.082 −0.312∗∗∗ −0.170 0.097 0.225∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.064) (0.121) (0.104) (0.070) (0.051)
gCP,t−3 −0.032 −0.075 −0.167 −0.244∗∗ −0.094 0.118∗∗
(0.060) (0.065) (0.106) (0.092) (0.050) (0.037)
gLAsset,t−3 0.262
∗∗∗ −0.388∗∗∗ −0.086 0.035 −0.029 −0.162∗∗
(0.059) (0.064) (0.120) (0.103) (0.071) (0.051)
gCP,t−4 0.043 −0.044 0.093 −0.153 0.126∗ −0.034
(0.060) (0.065) (0.107) (0.092) (0.050) (0.037)
gLAsset,t−4 0.099 −0.011 0.184 0.185 −0.018 0.073
(0.056) (0.061) (0.119) (0.102) (0.068) (0.049)
const 0.064 0.172 −0.231 0.243 −0.042 0.258∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.104) (0.299) (0.258) (0.104) (0.075)
Observations 290 290 96 96 436 436
R2 0.084 0.329 0.151 0.212 0.082 0.178
Adjusted R2 0.058 0.310 0.073 0.139 0.064 0.162
Σ
2.552 −0.409 7.590 −0.415 4.331 −0.959
−0.409 3.003 −0.415 5.622 −0.959 2.284
ρ
1 −0.148 1 −0.064 1 −0.305
−0.148 1 −0.064 1 −0.305 1
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 3.13 VAR(4)s for Weekly Growth Rates of Assets and Financial CP
Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
gCP,t gAsset,t gCP,t gAsset,t gCP,t gAsset,t
gCP,t−1 0.003 0.010 0.216
∗ 0.012 −0.154∗∗ 0.014
(0.061) (0.023) (0.106) (0.028) (0.052) (0.012)
gAsset,t−1 0.419
∗ −0.412∗∗∗ −0.049 −0.095 −0.426 −0.223∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.061) (0.416) (0.111) (0.224) (0.051)
gCP,t−2 0.012 0.027 0.098 −0.003 0.064 −0.024∗
(0.061) (0.023) (0.107) (0.029) (0.052) (0.012)
gAsset,t−2 0.515
∗∗ −0.195∗∗ −1.111∗∗ 0.295∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗ −0.295∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.064) (0.417) (0.111) (0.219) (0.050)
gCP,t−3 −0.040 0.029 −0.129 −0.002 −0.072 0.025∗
(0.061) (0.023) (0.106) (0.028) (0.052) (0.012)
gAsset,t−3 0.583
∗∗∗ −0.267∗∗∗ −0.023 0.060 0.130 −0.274∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.064) (0.423) (0.113) (0.222) (0.050)
gCP,t−4 0.036 −0.018 0.103 −0.0002 0.153∗∗ −0.021
(0.061) (0.023) (0.104) (0.028) (0.051) (0.011)
gAsset,t−4 0.178 0.053 1.228
∗∗ 0.100 0.191 0.165∗∗
(0.166) (0.061) (0.419) (0.112) (0.222) (0.050)
const −0.141 0.266∗∗∗ −0.196 0.092 −0.076 0.119∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.044) (0.304) (0.081) (0.107) (0.024)
Observations 290 290 96 96 436 436
R2 0.067 0.243 0.189 0.133 0.108 0.268
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.222 0.115 0.053 0.091 0.254
Σ
2.598 −0.229 7.244 −0.566 4.208 −0.360
−0.229 0.357 −0.566 0.518 −0.360 0.216
ρ
1 −0.238 1 −0.292 1 −0.378
−0.238 1 −0.292 1 −0.378 1
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 3.14 Robustness Tests for Omitted Variables
Potentially Omitted Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
Variable (top row) Granger Instant Granger Instant Granger Instant
(1)
∆T-Bill,t
0.753 0.858 2.397 5.234 1.558 4.074
(0.645) (0.651) (0.017) (0.073) (0.133) (0.130)
gDe,t
6.893 23.799 1.339 13.540 3.437 82.149
(8.3E-09) (6.8E-06) (0.225) (0.001) (0.001) (2.2E-16)
(2)
∆Paper-TBill,t
0.630 0.843 2.444 10.507 0.264 0.006
( 0.753) (0.656) (0.015) (0.005) (0.977) (0.997)
gDe,t
8.057 24.525 1.113 8.040 4.157 80.412
(1.6E-10) (4.7E-06) (0.355) (0.018) (6.4E-05) (2.2E-16)
(3)
∆Libor-OIS,t
2.751 1.860 2.806 15.928 0.579 3.384
( 0.005) (0.395) (0.005) (3.5E-04) (0.796) (0.184)
gDe,t
6.694 20.659 0.756 18.705 3.752 82.330
(1.6E-08) (3.3E-05) (0.642) (8.7E-05) (2.4E-04) (2.2E-16)
(4)
∆OIS-TBill,t
1.132 1.034 3.169 3.655 0.757 1.902
(0.339) (0.596) (0.002) (0.161) (0.641) (0.386)
gDe,t
7.220 24.069 1.397 10.098 3.562 81.879
(2.8E-09) (5.9E-06) (0.198) (0.006) (4.3E-04) (2.2E-16)
Granger and Instantaneous causality tests for VAR(4)s with three endogenous variables: the growth rate
of deposits (gDe,t), the growth rate of financial CP outstanding (gCP,t) and one of the potentially omitted
variables. The potential omitted variables are (1) ∆T-Bill,t: the weekly change in the 3-month T-Bill rate;
(2) ∆Paper-TBill,t: the weekly change in the spread between the 3-month AA-rated financial CP rate and
the 3-month T-Bill rate; (3) ∆Libor-OIS,t: the weekly change in the spread between the 3-month London
inter-bank offered rate and the 3-month overnight indexed swap rate; (4) ∆OIS-TBill,t: the weekly change in
the spread between the 3-month overnight indexed swap rate and the 3-month T-Bill rate. The table reports
the F-Test statistics and p-values (in parentheses) testing the null that the variable on the left side does not
Granger cause the other two variables in Granger columns. In addition, it also reports the χ2 statistics and
p-values (in parentheses) testing the null that the variable on the left side does not instantaneously cause
the other two variables in Instant columns. All statistics that are significant at the 5% significance level are
in bold.
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Table 3.15 VAR(4) Includes the Libor-OIS Spread in the Pre-Crisis
Pre-Crisis
gCP,t gDe,t ∆Libor-OIS,t
gCP,t−1 0.019 −0.035 −0.001
(0.063) (0.034) (0.001)
gDe,t−1 0.593
∗∗∗ −0.635∗∗∗ −0.003∗
(0.116) (0.062) (0.001)
∆Libor-OIS,t−1 −3.271 2.329 0.299∗∗∗
(5.293) (2.840) (0.058)
gCP,t−2 0.092 −0.027 0.0001
(0.063) (0.034) (0.001)
gDe,t−2 0.717
∗∗∗ −0.493∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.127) (0.068) (0.001)
∆Libor-OIS,t−2 −13.449∗ 8.093∗∗ −0.039
(5.486) (2.944) (0.061)
gCP,t−3 0.029 −0.005 0.0001
(0.062) (0.033) (0.001)
gDe,t−3 0.539
∗∗∗ −0.527∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.132) (0.071) (0.001)
∆Libor-OIS,t−3 2.372 4.006 −0.165∗∗
(5.566) (2.987) (0.061)
gCP,t−4 0.025 −0.047 0.001∗
(0.062) (0.033) (0.001)
gDe,t−4 0.123 −0.035 0.001
(0.123) (0.066) (0.001)
∆Libor-OIS,t−4 −5.027 1.455 −0.133∗
(5.360) (2.876) (0.059)
const −0.176 0.375∗∗∗ 0.00004
(0.106) (0.057) (0.001)
Observations 290 290 290
R2 0.183 0.441 0.217
Adjusted R2 0.148 0.417 0.183
ρ
1 −0.275 −0.072
−0.275 1 −0.015
−0.072 −0.015 1
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
97
Table 3.16 VAR(4) Includes the T-Bill Rate in the Crisis
Crisis
gCP,t gDe,t ∆T-Bill,t
gCP,t−1 0.166 0.054 −0.014
(0.114) (0.039) (0.009)
gDe,t−1 −0.376 −0.102 −0.017
(0.343) (0.116) (0.026)
∆T-Bill,t−1 0.591 0.416 −0.057
(1.424) (0.481) (0.107)
gCP,t−2 0.139 −0.035 −0.008
(0.116) (0.039) (0.009)
gDe,t−2 −0.424 −0.047 −0.057∗
(0.340) (0.115) (0.025)
∆T-Bill,t−2 3.532
∗ −1.351∗∗ −0.153
(1.393) (0.471) (0.104)
gCP,t−3 −0.094 0.002 −0.005
(0.114) (0.038) (0.009)
gDe,t−3 −0.063 −0.145 −0.005
(0.332) (0.112) (0.025)
∆T-Bill,t−3 −1.413 −0.463 0.052
(1.453) (0.491) (0.109)
gCP,t−4 0.063 0.003 0.004
(0.110) (0.037) (0.008)
gDe,t−4 0.420 0.104 −0.022
(0.323) (0.109) (0.024)
∆T-Bill,t−4 0.187 −0.947 −0.083
(1.473) (0.498) (0.110)
const 0.029 0.110 −0.033
(0.326) (0.110) (0.024)
Observations 96 96 96
R2 0.196 0.270 0.127
Adjusted R2 0.079 0.165 0.0003
ρ
1 −0.337 0.026
−0.337 1 −0.233
0.026 −0.233 1
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 3.17 VAR(4) Includes the Paper-TBill Spread in the Crisis
Crisis
gCP,t gDe,t ∆Paper-TBill,t
gCP,t−1 0.004 0.087
∗ 0.020
(0.118) (0.044) (0.015)
gDe,t−1 −0.104 −0.111 0.064
(0.306) (0.113) (0.039)
∆Paper-TBill,t−1 −2.324∗ 0.657 −0.068
(0.895) (0.332) (0.114)
gCP,t−2 0.048 −0.041 −0.008
(0.120) (0.045) (0.015)
gDe,t−2 −0.496 −0.012 0.049
(0.306) (0.113) (0.039)
∆Paper-TBill,t−2 −3.034∗∗ 0.470 −0.055
(0.899) (0.333) (0.114)
gCP,t−3 −0.077 0.008 0.032∗
(0.114) (0.042) (0.014)
gDe,t−3 −0.024 −0.183 0.014
(0.306) (0.113) (0.039)
∆Paper-TBill,t−3 −1.163 0.286 0.108
(0.947) (0.352) (0.120)
gCP,t−4 0.135 0.006 −0.002
(0.110) (0.041) (0.014)
gDe,t−4 0.436 0.168 0.027
(0.300) (0.111) (0.038)
∆Paper-TBill,t−4 0.690 0.087 −0.023
(0.914) (0.339) (0.116)
const −0.236 0.234∗ −0.034
(0.302) (0.112) (0.038)
Observations 96 96 96
R2 0.276 0.208 0.130
Adjusted R2 0.171 0.093 0.004
ρ
1 −0.301 −0.349
−0.301 1 0.077
−0.349 0.077 1
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 3.18 VAR(4) Includes the Libor-OIS Spread in the Crisis
Crisis
gCP,t gDe,t ∆Libor-OIS,t
gCP,t−1 0.081 0.051 −0.016∗
(0.111) (0.041) (0.007)
gDe,t−1 0.371 −0.225 0.003
(0.336) (0.125) (0.020)
∆Libor-OIS,t−1 −6.873∗∗ 1.754∗ 0.462∗∗∗
(2.065) (0.770) (0.122)
gCP,t−2 −0.020 −0.023 0.00001
(0.119) (0.044) (0.007)
gDe,t−2 −0.128 −0.033 0.008
(0.337) (0.126) (0.020)
∆Libor-OIS,t−2 −2.745 −0.087 0.025
(2.214) (0.825) (0.131)
gCP,t−3 −0.121 0.007 0.009
(0.119) (0.044) (0.007)
gDe,t−3 −0.171 −0.135 −0.001
(0.332) (0.124) (0.020)
∆Libor-OIS,t−3 3.360 −0.962 −0.220
(2.206) (0.822) (0.130)
gCP,t−4 0.212 −0.008 0.001
(0.115) (0.043) (0.007)
gDe,t−4 0.270 0.174 0.028
(0.312) (0.116) (0.018)
∆Libor-OIS,t−4 0.716 0.578 −0.053
(1.952) (0.728) (0.115)
const −0.304 0.234∗ −0.009
(0.311) (0.116) (0.018)
Observations 96 96 96
R2 0.291 0.217 0.415
Adjusted R2 0.189 0.104 0.330
ρ
1 −0.294 −0.186
−0.294 1 0.442
−0.186 0.442 1
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 3.19 VAR(4) Includes the OIS-TBill Spread in the Crisis
Crisis
gCP,t gDe,t ∆OIS-TBill,t
gCP,t−1 0.123 0.076
∗ 0.009
(0.112) (0.038) (0.007)
gDe,t−1 −0.251 −0.117 0.005
(0.333) (0.113) (0.020)
∆OIS-TBill,t−1 −2.346 −0.379 −0.103
(1.689) (0.576) (0.103)
gCP,t−2 0.108 −0.026 0.009
(0.115) (0.039) (0.007)
gDe,t−2 −0.385 −0.037 0.046∗
(0.329) (0.112) (0.020)
∆OIS-TBill,t−2 −5.386∗∗ 1.901∗∗ −0.142
(1.664) (0.567) (0.102)
gCP,t−3 −0.081 0.004 0.005
(0.113) (0.038) (0.007)
gDe,t−3 −0.076 −0.124 −0.017
(0.321) (0.109) (0.020)
∆OIS-TBill,t−3 −0.231 0.952 0.099
(1.768) (0.603) (0.108)
gCP,t−4 0.128 −0.008 −0.0002
(0.109) (0.037) (0.007)
gDe,t−4 0.465 0.106 −0.003
(0.310) (0.106) (0.019)
∆OIS-TBill,t−4 −1.938 1.238∗ −0.118
(1.784) (0.608) (0.109)
const −0.197 0.243∗ −0.015
(0.308) (0.105) (0.019)
Observations 96 96 96
R2 0.239 0.297 0.173
Adjusted R2 0.129 0.196 0.053
ρ
1 −0.290 −0.057
−0.290 1 0.199
−0.057 0.199 1
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Figure 3.8 40 Weeks Moving Averages of Squared Errors for Univariate and Multivariate
Models
The figure shows 40 weeks moving averages of squared errors for univariate and multivariate models. The
gray-shaded areas are the time periods when the multivariate MSE is larger the univariate MSE and therefore,
the possible crisis times. The first gray column is from Sep. 2007 to Apr. 2009 (the Great Recession). The
second and third gray columns are from Jan. 2010 to Apr. 2010 and from Sep. 2010 to May 2011, respectively
(the European debt crisis). The fourth gray column is from Jun. 2014 to Nov. 2014 (2014 Oil price crash).
Lehman’s bankruptcy was Sep. 15, 2008. The gray line in the background is financial CP outstanding
(billion dollars) for reference only.
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Table 3.20 Identifying the Breakdown of Liquidity Backup during the Great Recession by
Using a Dummy Variable
Dependent variable:
gCP,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
gDe,t−1 0.116 0.094 0.334
∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.095) (0.090) (0.098) (0.112) (0.116)
gCP,t−1 −0.022 −0.033 −0.036
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
gCP,t−2 0.108
∗∗ 0.113∗∗
(0.037) (0.037)
gCP,t−3 −0.032 −0.032
(0.037) (0.037)
gDe,t−2 0.560
∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.101) (0.092) (0.100)
gDe,t−3 0.462
∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.098) (0.089) (0.098)
∆Libor-OIS,t−1 0.287 0.346
(0.256) (0.260)
∆OIS-TBill,t−1 0.222 0.221
(0.342) (0.341)
gDe,t−1 ∗ Ct−1 −0.320 −0.316 −0.648∗∗ −0.687∗∗ 0.462 0.429
(0.220) (0.220) (0.220) (0.219) (0.393) (0.393)
gDe,t−2 ∗ Ct−1 −1.368∗∗∗ −1.397∗∗∗ −1.405∗∗∗ −1.455∗∗∗
(0.224) (0.223) (0.241) (0.242)
gDe,t−3 ∗ Ct−1 −0.665∗∗ −0.653∗∗ −0.409 −0.410
(0.221) (0.223) (0.250) (0.251)
∆Libor-OIS,t−1 ∗ gDe,t−1 −1.128∗∗∗ −1.142∗∗∗
(0.246) (0.245)
∆OIS-TBill,t−1 ∗ gDe,t−1 −0.139 −0.151
(0.408) (0.407)
Constant −0.023 −0.021 −0.130 −0.139 −0.243∗ −0.267∗
(0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.106) (0.107)
Observations 833 833 831 831 831 831
R2 0.003 0.004 0.076 0.087 0.100 0.113
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.0002 0.069 0.077 0.089 0.099
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Each column in this table reports a linear regression of the same dependent variable: the growth rate
of financial CP outstanding at date t (gCP,t = Financial CPt/Financial CPt−1) but different independent
variables. The sample is weekly time series data from December 12, 2001, to November 29, 2017. Independent
variables include: the growth rate of deposits in all domestically chartered commercial banks (gDe,t =
Depositst/Depositst−1), the time dummy variable, which equals one if the time t happens in the Great
Recession (from Aug. 1, 2007, to Jun. 24, 2009) (Ct), the weekly change in the spread between the 3-
month London inter-bank offered rate and the 3-month overnight indexed swap rate (∆Libor-OIS,t), and the
weekly change in the spread between the 3-month overnight indexed swap rate and the 3-month T-Bill rate
(∆OIS-TBill,t).
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CHAPTER 4. UNDERPRICING AND UNDERREACTION IN INITIAL
PUBLIC OFFERINGS: THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC RISK
Xiangou Deng (Iowa State University)
David M. Frankel (Melbourne Business School)
Zhongzheng Zhou
4.1 Abstract
Using theoretical and simulation tools, we study how strategic risk among investors can help
explain both underpricing and underreaction in initial public offerings (IPOs). We assume the post-
IPO value of a firm is higher if the IPO raises more capital for the firm. Hence an IPO subscriber
faces strategic risk: the value of subscribing depends on the aggregate subscription rate. As this
risk is resolved immediately after the IPO, the IPO itself is underpriced. Moreover, since individual
investors have limited wealth, a higher offer price raises the risk of undersubscription. Investors
respond by demanding a larger discount: the offer price appears to underreact to public news.
4.2 Introduction
Initial public offering (IPO) is an important milestone for entrepreneurial firms. The proceeds
from IPOs can help to finance the future growth of firms and make them more liquid through
stock market trading. The IPO also provides a way for trading the company’s shares, enabling
its existing shareholders to diversify their investments and to crystallize their capital gains from
backing the company. The act of the IPO itself helps improve the reputation of the company, and
the attendant publicity may bring indirect benefits, such as attracting more talented managers and
lowering the cost of funding the company’s operations and investments.
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An important aspect of the IPO process is the underpricing of newly issued shares, representing
a discount from its fair market price measured by the difference between the closing price on the
first day of trading and the IPO offer price. IPO underpricing is one of the best-documented
empirical findings in finance and the underpricing phenomenon is persistent over time and across
countries. Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975) documented that when companies go public, the
shares they sell tend to be underpriced, in that the share price jumps substantially on the first
day of trading. Boehmer and Ljungqvist (2004) provide evidence of underpricing in the United
States from 1960 to 2003, in main countries of Europe from 1990 to 2003 and in main countries of
Asia-Pacific and Latin America from 1990 to 2001. To be specific, in the United States, there are
8, 249 IPOs from 1980 to 2016. The average first-day return for the IPOs is 17.9% (equally-weighted
average return) and the aggregate amount of “money left on the table” is $155.14 billion, where
the “money left on the table” is defined as the first-day price gain multiplied by the number of
shares sold. Compared with the total proceeds of IPOs ($839.65 billion), 18.5% of firms’ potential
proceeds has been left to the investors. Figure 4.1 displays the mean first-day return and “money
left on the table” for IPOs in the United States from 1980-2016. Such “money left on the table”
constitutes a substantial opportunity cost of going public for issuing firms. However, owners and
managers seem unconcerned about situations of underpricing. In a survey of chief financial officers
(CFOs) that took their firms public, Krigman et al. (2001) find that CFOs of virtually all of the
most underpriced firms are highly satisfied with the performance of their lead IPO underwriters.
Why are the firms willing to sacrifice such a great amount of money in the process of IPOs?
In this chapter, we present an explanation for this underpricing phenomenon by examining the
strategic risk in IPOs. The concept of strategic risk comes from the global games literature.
Generally, we consider a situation in which payoffs from agents strategies depend on an uncertain
state of the world about which agents obtain very informative but noisy signals. Because agents
do not have the same assessments of the state of the world, this creates strategic uncertainty in
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Figure 4.1 IPO Underpricing in the U.S.
equilibrium. The risk comes from this kind of uncertainty is called strategic risk. Strategic risk is
widely examined in researches on global games1.
However, strategic risk is seldom examined in the literature on IPOs. In our setting, shares
sold in an IPO are more valuable if the firm reaps more revenue from the IPO. There are two
motivations for this assumption. Trivially, a firm can use its IPO proceeds productively, which
lets it pay higher dividends in the future. In addition, Stoughton et al. (2001) suggest that the
success of a firm’s IPO acts as a quality signal to the firm’s small stakeholders, who may choose
whether or not to do business with the firm or to adopt the firm’s platform. Such stakeholders
may include customers, suppliers, makers of ancillary products such as software and replacement
parts, and potential future investors. For the firm to survive and thrive, such stakeholders must
1For example, see Carlsson and Van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (1998), and Chassang and Miquel (2010)
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be willing to do business with it. Importantly, this informational effect may be large even if a firm
seeks relatively little capital in its IPO. With the assumption that liquidating dividend is increasing
in IPO proceeds, investors in an IPO face strategic risk: the value of the shares depends on the
IPO’s success, which depends on other investors’ decisions to subscribe.
We will show in a global games setting that the strategic risk leads to underpricing. Intuitively,
an agent’s reservation price is the price at which she is just willing to subscribe to the IPO. But
if, given her information about the IPO, she is indeed just willing to subscribe, then she knows
that some others are likely to have received slightly more negative information than her own and
thus will choose not to subscribe. Hence, her reservation price reflects a positive probability of
undersubscription, which - if it occurs - will lower the firm’s value. Once the IPO concludes and
the subscription rate is known, this strategic risk disappears. Accordingly, shares trade at a higher
price in the aftermarket2.
Strategic risk can generate underreaction as well. The term underreaction describes the well-
documented fact that the final offer price does not fully react to favorable information received in the
process of pricing the IPO, which indicates that the price revision over the course of bookbuilding
and the first-day underpricing return are positively correlated3. Intuitively, when good news tells
the firm that the IPO is more attractive to investors, the firm can raise the IPO price. But since
individual investors have limited wealth, a higher offer price raises the risk of undersubscription.
Hence the risk of undersubscription is now greater: investors face even more strategic risk. Thus,
this price revision worsens underpricing, which appears in the data as underreaction.
Besides, our empirical result shows that underpricing is positively correlated with oversubscrip-
tion, our model can also give an explanation for this. Intuitively, since firm sees only a noisy signal
of fundamentals. Being concerned with the risk of undersubscription, when the firm observes a bad
2Underpricing in this model does not require risk aversion. Rather, it occurs because the firm must charge a low
share price in order to induce the agents to subscribe in the presence of undersubscription risk. Indeed, our model
assumes risk-neutrality; under risk aversion, the underpricing would be worse.
3For example, see Hanley (1993), Edelen and Kadlec (2005), Bradley and Jordan (2002), and Lowry and Schwert
(2004)
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signal and is overly pessimistic, it will lower its offer price to attract more investor to subscribe.
Therefore, there is more underpricing and more oversubscription.
Historically, there are four main kinds of explanations for IPO underpricing. The first kind
of explanation for underpricing claims that it is due to winner’s curse 4: when the firm’s growth
prospects are high, informed investors will subscribe, shrinking the stock available to retail investors.
Since retail investors face a winner’s curse, they are not willing to pay the firm the true value
of its shares. This kind of explanation shows how underpricing happens. However, it did not
explain the underraction phenomenon and the positive relationship between oversubscription and
underpricing. The second explanation of underpricing is the signal of firm quality5. If companies
have better information about the present value or risk of their future cash flows than do investors,
underpricing may be used to signal the companys ”true” high value. This is clearly costly, but if
successful, signaling may allow the issuer to return to the market to sell equity on better prices
at a later date. This explanation does not explain for the underreaction phenomenon and the
relationship between oversubscription and underpricing, either.
The third explanation for underpricing is moral hazard6. Intuitively, a firm conducts an IPO
through a third party underwriter. The underwriting has an incentive to reward itself or top clients
with underpriced shares. This theory can also be used to explain underreaction in IPOs. However,
this theory does not take the subscription rate into account. The fourth explanation is information
revelation theories. Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), and Spatt
and Srivastava (1991) show that if some investors are better informed than either the company
or other investors, the underwriter has the incentive to design a mechanism through the process
of bookbuilding which will induce investors to reveal their information truthfully by making it in
their best interest to do so. To ensure truth-telling, the allocations have to involve underpriced
stock. In this explanation, IPO underpricing serves as the cost of extracting the informed investors
private information. Bookbuilding allows firms to extract positive information and raise the offer
4For example, see Rock (1986)
5For example, see Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989)
6See Baron and Holmström (1980), and Baron and Holmström (1980)
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price in response even though the price will rise further in the after-market because some money
has to be left on the table. Thus the price revision over the course of bookbuilding and the first-day
underpricing return are positively correlated. This setting can also explain the phenomenon of IPO
underreaction. But it does not take the subscription into account, either.
This chapter differs from the related literature in the following ways. First, unlike the theory
of winner’s curse and signaling, our model can explain the phenomenon of underpricing and un-
derreaction at the same time. Although the theory of moral hazard and information revelation
can also explain the underreaction, they did not take the subscription into account, which ignores
the relationship between underpricing and oversubscription. Our theory can explain all these three
phenomena. Second, different from the explanation of winner’s curse, information revealing and
signaling, there is no need for us to assume that there is an information gap (some investors are
informed and some are uninformed) among investors. In fact, we can show that even when the
investors share the same information, underpricing may still exist in our setting. Third, unlike the
explanations which referred to moral hazard and psychological reasons, Chapter 4 assumes that
all agents engaged in the IPO process are fully rational. With the assumption that moral hazard
caused the underpricing, Baron and Holmström (1980), and Baron (1982) construct a screening
model where the uninformed party offers a menu, from which the informed party selects the one
that is optimal given her unobserved type in the roadshow process. However, this kind of road show
commitment is not widely observed in reality. Chapter 4 gets rid of this commitment and tends to
be more realistic. Fourth, Chapter 4 takes the endogeneity of stock value into consideration, which
has seldom been examined before in the studies of IPOs. IPO revenue can be used to finance the
firm’s investment, and a successful IPO will help to improve the firm’s reputation. So the firm’s
value, and hence the stock value, may be affected by the IPO process itself. However, few research
on IPOs has examined this effect. Chapter 4 seeks to fill this gap.
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4.3 The Model
There is a fixed measure m > 0 of agents, each endowed with one unit of capital. There is also
a single firm with a worthwhile project. All participants are risk-neutral and fully rational. The
firm is assumed already to have initiated the process of an IPO, paid all filing fees, etc.
All participants first see a public signal y of an exogenous stochastic state θ ∼ N
(
y, τ2
)
.7 The
state θ can be thought of as the unobserved quality of the firm’s project. We regard the public
signal y as being revealed during the firm’s road show. On seeing y, the firm decides whether to
go forward with the IPO or to withdraw it.
If the firm goes forward and raises k units of capital in the IPO, its final value is eθf (k) where
f is a differentiable and strictly increasing function that satisfies
ι
d
= f (0) > 0 and Ω
d
= max
k∈[0,m]
f ′ (k)
f (k)
∈ (0,∞) . (4.1)
If the firm withdraws the IPO, its final value is eθf (c) where c > 0 is a known constant. Interpreting
c literally, it equals the fixed cost of carrying out the IPO versus withdrawing it. However it can
also capture the equivalent, in terms of lost capital, of the damage from an IPO that spectacularly
fails versus one that is quietly withdrawn in the face of of “adverse market conditions”.
Assume henceforth that the firm decides to go forward with the IPO. It then announces a
number s ∈ [0, 1] of shares that are offered for sale, as well as a price p ≥ 0 per share. Rather than
working with s directly, it is more convenient to assume the firm chooses a price p and a capital
target t = ps ∈ [0, p]; the number of shares s is then given by t/p. We will assume, without loss of
generality, that the capital target t does not exceed the aggregate capital m of the agents as the
firm cannot raise more than m units of capital.
After the firm announces p and t, each agent i ∈ [0,m] then sees a private signal xi = θ + εi of
the state θ, where εi ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
, σ > 0 is a scalar, and θ and the εi’s are all mutually independent.
7This can be obtained most simply if θ is uniformly distributed on the whole real line and y equals the public
signal θ+ ν where ν ∼ N
(
0, τ2
)
is independent of θ. In section 4.3.1.1, we present an alternative derivation in which
the prior distribution of θ is normal.
110
The agents then decide simultaneously whether or not to subscribe: to offer to buy up to 1/p shares
at the price p.8 Figure 4.2 shows the time line of the IPO model.
Figure 4.2 Timeline of the IPO Model
Let ` ∈ [0,m] be the measure of agents who subscribe or, equivalently, the amount of capital
bid by the agents (as each has one unit). If ` does not exceed the capital target t, each subscriber
transfers her capital to the firm in return for 1/p shares. If instead ` exceeds t, the IPO is rationed:
each subscriber transfers t/` < 1 units of capital in return in return for t/ (`p) < 1/p shares while
the firm raises t units of capital. An agent’s sole alternative investment is a risk-free asset that
pays a zero net return. Hence, an agent’s net realized payoff from subscribing is
πtp (θ, `) =

1
p
[
eθf (`)− p
]
if ` ≤ t
t
p`
[
eθf (t)− p
]
if ` ∈ [t,m]
(4.2)
while the firm’s realized payoff is
Πtp (θ, `) =
(
1− min {t, `}
p
)
eθf (min {t, `}) .
An implication is that the firm’s maximum payoff from a capital target t < c is less than its payoff,
eθf (c), from withdrawing the IPO. Thus, if the firm carries out the IPO, it will choose a capital
target
t ∈ [c,m] . (4.3)
8An agent cannot offer to buy more shares since she has only one unit of capital to invest. We say ”offer to buy”
because demand for shares can exceed supply, in which case the IPO is rationed. (See below.)
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The following standard result from probability theory will be used without proof.
Proposition 4.3.1. Suppose we have a variable θ ∼ N(y, Vθ) to estimate. We observe the variables
xj = θ + εj for j = 1, ..., J , where each εj ∼ N(0, Vj) is independent of every εj′ and of θ. Define
the precision of variable j to be wj = 1/Vj. Define x0 = y, V0 = Vθ, and w0 = 1/V0. Then the
posterior distribution of θ is
θposterior ∼ N
(∑J
j=0wjxj∑J
j=0wj
,
1∑J
j=0wj
)
(4.4)
By Proposition 4.3.1, conditional on the public signal y and the private signal xi, the state θ is
normal with mean
θxi =
y
τ2
+ xi
σ2
τ−2 + σ−2
=
σ2y + τ2xi
σ2 + τ2
(4.5)
and variance S2 where
S =
στ√
σ2 + τ2
. (4.6)
A threshold equilibrium is one in which an agent i invests if and only if her posterior mean θxi
is not less than some threshold κ, which may depend on the public signal y and the firm’s choices
t and p.9 In such an equilibrium, the measure who invest for given θ and κ is
` = `κθ,y
d
= mPr
(
θxj ≥ κ|θ
)
= mPr
(
θxj ≥ κ|θ
)
= mPr
(
εj
σ
≥ σ
2 (κ− y) + τ2 (κ− θ)
τ2σ
∣∣∣∣ θ)
= m
[
1− Φ
(
σ2 (κ− y) + τ2 (κ− θ)
τ2σ
)]
(4.7)
by the law of large numbers. Hence, if an agent has posterior mean θ and thinks that each other
agent uses the threshold κ, her relative payoff from subscribing is
πt∗p
(
θ, κ
)
=
∫ +∞
θ=−∞
πtp
(
θ, `κθ,y
)
dΦ
(
θ − θ
S
)
. (4.8)
We will assume two conditions that jointly imply the existence of a unique threshold equilibrium.
First, the private noise σ is not too small:
σ > h
(
Φ−1
(
1− c
m
))
(4.9)
9Below we give sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique threshold equilibrium.
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where h (z) = Φ
′(z)
1−Φ(z) denotes the standard normal hazard function. Second, the public noise is
not too small relative to the private noise:
τ2
σ
> max
{
mΩ√
2π
, h
(
Φ−1
(
1− c
m
))}
. (4.10)
Our main result is as follows. It shows that there is a unique threshold equilibrium where agents
will only invest if their posterior judgement for the mean state θxi exceeds the threshold at which
the relative payoff from subscribing is zero. Intuitively, if an agent gets a high private signal which
indicates that the state is good, he will then expect a good performance of the firm. From his point
of view, he believes that other agents also tend to observe a high private signal which encourage
them to expect a good state. Since good state means higher firm value, agents are more likely to
subscribe. So, in this way, given other agents are adopting threshold strategies (investing if they
believes that the posterior state mean is higher than a threshold), an agent will also adopt the
threshold strategy to get a positive expected payoff if he has a high enough posterior mean state.
At the threshold, the expected payoff should be zero: if the expected payoff is negative, agents
will not subscribe; if the expected payoff is positive, agents are then willing to subscribe at a lower
posterior mean state.
Theorem 4.3.1. Assume (4.9) and (4.10). For any choices p and t of the firm, the agents
have a unique threshold equilibrium, where the subscription threshold κ is the unique solution to
πt∗p,y (κ, κ) = 0.
Proof. Follows directly from Claims 4.6.1, 4.6.2, and 4.6.3. See Appendix.
4.3.1 Simulations - A Toolkit
We now show how to simulate the large-noise model. We begin with some preliminaries.
4.3.1.1 Making y Stochastic
We have assumed that the state θ is normal with constant mean y. Hence the firm will (for
generic parameters) have a unique optimal IPO price p. In order to obtain a distribution of IPO
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prices (and thus of price revisions), the mean y must instead be stochastic. We accomplish this by
modelling the prior distribution N
(
y, τ2
)
as itself a posterior distribution that results from seeing
a public signal of θ which can be interpreted as information that arises from the road show. The
mean y then varies with the realization of this public signal. In short, we will be able to assume
that y is normal with zero mean and an arbitrary variance V > 0 and that, conditional on y, the
state θ has the distribution N
(
y, τ2
)
where τ must be chosen to satisfy (4.10).
To see why, let us now suppose that the true prior distribution of the state θ is N (0, Vθ).
10
Before anyone acts, all participants see a public signal Z = θ+η of the state, where the signal noise
η ∼ N (0, Vη) is independent of θ. By the usual formula for the sum of two independent normal
variables, unconditional on θ, the public signal Z is normal with mean E [Z] = 0 and variance
V ar (Z) = Vθ + Vη. And by Proposition 4.3.1, given Z, the state θ is normally distributed with
posterior mean y = E [θ|Z] = 0/Vθ+Z/Vη1/Vθ+1/Vη =
Vθ
Vθ+Vη
Z and variance
τ2 = V ar (θ|Z) = 1
1/Vθ + 1/Vη
=
VθVη
Vθ + Vη
. (4.11)
Moreover, when viewed as a random variable (as it is a function of the random variable Z), the
posterior expected value y = E [θ|Z] of the state θ is itself normally distributed with mean
E [y] = E [E [θ|Z]] = Vθ
Vθ + Vη
E [Z] = 0
and variance
V = V ar (E [θ|Z]) = V ar
(
Vθ
Vθ + Vη
Z
)
=
(
Vθ
Vθ + Vη
)2
V ar (Z) =
V 2θ
Vθ + Vη
. (4.12)
4.3.1.2 Bounds on p and t
For each realization y, the we must compute the firm’s optimal price p and capital target t. The
simplest (but not most efficient) way is by grid search. However, the grid must be finite. Thus,
10The zero mean is a normalization: if the mean µ is nonzero, we can replace θ and the firm value function f ()
with θ − µ and eµf (), respectively.
114
we require upper and lower bounds on each variable. The bounds on t are simple: t must lie in
[c,m]. And conditional on t, the price p cannot be less than t; else the number s = t/p of shares
will exceed one.
It remains to compute an upper bound on p. The idea of the bound is that if the price is too
high, the IPO will raise little capital with high probability, so the IPO is not worth its cost c. The
bound py, which is increasing in the public signal y, is as follows.
Claim 4.3.2. Given a parameter y, a firm that does an IPO will never choose a price p that exceeds
the bound
py = f (m)
(
τ√
2π
f (m)− f (c)
f (c/2)− f (c)
) τ3
σ2+τ2
exp
 y + τ32 τ2+τ+1σ2+τ2 + S22
+ στ
2
σ2+τ2
Φ−1
(
1− c2m
)
 . (4.13)
Proof of Claim 4.3.2. See Appendix.
4.4 The Simulation
In this section, we will do a simulation to the theoretic model and compare the simulation result
to the empirical data.
4.4.1 Methodology for the Simulation
We now show how to simulate the model. The procedure is thus as follows. One first chooses
parameters m > 0, c ∈ (0,m), and V > 0. One then chooses a function f ; for simplicity, we restrict
to the two-parameter family f (k) = (a+ k)b where a, b > 0. Once a and b are selected, equation
(4.1) pins down the parameters ι = ab and Ω = maxk∈[0,m]
f ′(k)
f(k) = maxk∈[0,m]
b(a+k)b−1
(a+k)b
= ba . Finally,
one chooses parameters σ and τ satisfying (4.9) and (4.10). There thus are seven parameters:
(m, c, V, a, b, σ, τ).
In order to draw realizations y from the distribution N (0, V ) we fix some large positive n and,
for each i = 1, ..., n−1, let yi = V Φ−1 (i/n). As this implies Φ (yi/V ) = i/n, each yi is that y which
occurs at exactly the (i/n)th percentile in the distribution N (0, V ). One thus can treat each yi as
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occurring with equal probability (n− 1)−1. That is, letting yni = yi,
Φ
(
yni+1
V
)
− Φ
(
yni
V
)
=
i+ 1
n
− i
n
=
1
n
,
whence for any integrable function g (y),∫ ∞
y=−∞
g (y) dΦ
( y
V
)
= lim
n→∞
n−1∑
i=1
g (yni )
[
Φ
(
yni+1
V
)
− Φ
(
yni
V
)]
= lim
n→∞
[
1
n
n−1∑
i=1
g (yni )
]
.
For each yi in (yi)
n−1
i=1 , one then computes the equilibrium threshold κ
t
p,yi (the threshold κ that
satisfies πt∗p,yi (κ, κ) = 0)
11 for each target t ∈ [c,m] and price p ∈
[
t, pyi
]
in a fine grid. One then
searches this grid for the target t and price p that jointly maximize the IPO payoff
Π (t, p, yi) =
∫ +∞
θ=−∞
(
1−
`tp,yi (θ) ∧ t
p
)
eθf
(
`tp,yi (θ) ∧ t
)
dΦ
(
θ − yi
τ
)
(4.14)
where “∧” denotes the pairwise minimum and `tp,y (θ) denotes the subscription rate `
κtp,y
θ,y that
results from the equilibrium threshold κtp,y when the state is θ, the public signal is y, and the
firm’s choices are (p, t).12. Let us denote the optimal choices as ti and pi, and let Π (yi) denote the
firm’s maximized IPO payoff Π (ti, pi, yi). Let I be the set of indices i for which the firm’s optimal
IPO payoff Π (yi) exceeds its payoff Π0 (yi) =
∫ +∞
θ=−∞ e
θf (c) dΦ
(
θ−yi
τ
)
from withdrawing the IPO.
As the firm will carry out the IPO if and only if i lies in I, computed moments should thus be
restricted to i in I.
For each i in I, the distribution of the state θ is N
(
yi, τ
2
)
. We simulate this distribution as
follows: for each j = 1, ..., n − 1, we let θji = yi + τΦ−1 (j/n), whence Φ
(
θji−yi
τ
)
= jn so that θ
j
i
is the realization that is at the (j/n)th percentile of a N
(
yi, τ
2
)
random variable. For each yi, we
thus assign each θji the same probability weight (n− 1)
−1. For each θji , the final (end of trading
day) value of a share is pji
d
= eθ
j
i f
(
`ji ∧ ti
)
where ∧ denotes pairwise minimum and `ji denotes
11By (4.15) and (4.16), κ lies in
[
ln
(
p
f(m)
)
− S
2
2
, ln
(
pm
cι
)
− S
2
2
]
. Hence, to find κtp,y one can perform a bisection
search on this finite interval.
12The function `κθ,y is defined in (4.7).
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the subscription rate `κθ,y that arises from the parameters θ = θ
j
i and y = yi and the subscription
threshold κi = k
ti
pi,yi .
13
Finally, in order to compute price revisions we require an initial filing price p0, which is chosen
prior to observing y. We will assume for simplicity that the filing price is chosen to minimize the
mean squared pricing error 1|I|
∑
i∈I (pyi − p0)
2 conditional on the IPO going through.14 Hence, p0
is computed as the mean 1|I|
∑
i∈I pyi of the final IPO prices pyi over all public signals yi for which
the firm chooses to carry out IPO. The quantities of interest are then computed as follows for each
pair (i, j) such that i is in I:
1. Price Revision: Ri =
pi−p0
p0
.
2. Underpricing: U ji =
pji−pi
pi
.
3. Oversubscription: Oji = `
j
i/ti.
4.4.2 The Sample Data
The sample we would like to study consists of firms completing an initial public offering be-
tween January 2007 to December 2015 in United States and India. In United States, the data
of subscription in IPO are not available as in many other countries. Fortunately, we have found
that the data of subscription are publicly available in India. So, we add the data of India to our
study. The data of United States comes from Thomson Financial’s Securities Data Company (SDC)
database. The data of India comes from National Stock Exchange (NSE), Bombay Stock Exchange
(BSE) and Chittorgarh Infotech, a company which specialized in providing financial information in
India15. We exclude unit offers, closed-end funds (including REITs), financial institutions, ADRs
of companies already listed in their home countries, limited partnerships, and penny stocks (IPOs
13A formula for `κθ,y appears in equation (4.7).
14It seems reasonable that large price revisions have a reputation cost for the firm’s underwriter. If this cost is
quadratic, we obtain the given formula for p0.
15The data are collected from the following websites. National Stock Exchange(NSE): https://www.nseindia.com/
products/content/equities/ipos/historical_ipo.htm, Bombay Stock Exchange(BSE): https://www.bseindia.
com/markets/PublicIssues/IPOIssues_new.aspx?expandable=3&id=2&Type=P, and Chittorgarh Infotech: http://
www.chittorgarh.com/ipo/reports/ipo_report_listing_day_gain.asp
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with offer prices below five dollars). In addition, we only consider the native companies which is
different from most former empirical studies.
A brief description of the data is in Table 4.1. In the sample, there are 935 IPOs for United
States and 297 IPOs for India. We can see that the mean and median of initial return for the U.S.
and India are quite close and they are quite larger than 0 (about 16% ∼ 17%), which suggests the
existence of underpricing in the IPOs in both United States and India. The means of initial return
are much higher than the medians, which suggests that the distributions skew to the right. The
mean of price revision is negative in the U.S., while is positive in India. But both are relatively small
in absolute value. Besidesthe medians of price revision are quite near 0 for both countries. For the
oversubscription variable in India, we can see that the IPOs in India are generally oversubscribed
(most of the oversubscription values are greater than 1).
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics for Sample data
Underpricing Price Revision Oversubscription
U.S. India U.S. India India
Mean 0.161 0.1683 −0.0287 0.0263 19.5102
Standard Error 0.009 0.0244 0.0051 0.0035 1.6943
Median 0.0833 0.086 0 0.037 4.51
Standard Deviation 0.2766 0.4197 0.156 0.0611 29.1998
Sample Variance 0.0765 0.1761 0.0243 0.0037 852.6258
Kurtosis 8.9803 4.4852 0.4542 38.0987 4.6685
Skewness 2.3456 1.5728 −0.4775 −4.6714 2.1224
Range 2.5664 3.1067 1.1045 0.6616 160.12
Minimum −0.3964 −0.6892 −0.65 −0.5707 0.44
Maximum 2.17 2.4175 0.4545 0.0909 160.56
Count 935 297 935 297 297
Table 4.2 describes the correlations between the key variables in the U.S. and India. We can
see that the IPOs in both U.S. and India tend to display the characteristic of underreaction: the
price revision is positively correlated with underpricing. This is one of the most important results
indicated from our theoretic model and it is also consistent with previous studies. Intuitively, good
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Table 4.2 Correlation Coefficients for Sample data
Nation Statistics Underpricing Price Revision Oversubscription
US
Underpricing 1 0.4683
Price Revision 0.4683 1
India
Underpricing 1 0.0971 0.5106
Price Revision 0.0971 1 0.0713
Oversubscription 0.5106 0.0713 1
news about the state variable lead firms to raise IPO price, which induces a higher price revision.
Since agents’ wealth is limited, the risk of undersubscription is now greater: investors face greater
strategic risk. This leads to a higher underpricing, which appears in the data as underreaction.
Also, we can see that underpricing is positively correlated with oversubscription rate.
4.4.3 Simulation Results
Based on the theoretic model, the simulation data are generated by setting default parameters
value as follows: σ = 1; τ = 1; m = 2; a = 1; b = 1.1; c = 1; α = 1. We generate 99 public
signals y and 999 economic states θ from their normal distributions which are described in Section
4.4.1. In the simulation, 21 IPOs are conducted. Therefore, we have 21 ∗ 99 = 20979 data points
in the simulation. The key variables in the simulation are described in Table 4.3. We can see that
the data display underpricing in the simulation.
Table 4.4 displays the correlations between the key variables in the simulation. We can see that
the correlation coefficient between underpricing and price revision is 0.128, which indicates the
existance of underreaction. This is consistent with the empirical results in India and the U.S. and
the value of the simulated correlation coefficient between underpricing and price revision is quite
similar to the value in India (0.097). The correlation coefficient between underpricing and over-
subscription is 0.6. It shows that there exists a very strong positive relation between underpricing
and oversubscription. This is also consistent with the empirical result in India and the values of
the simulated correlation coefficient between underpricing and oversubscription are close to that in
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India. Therefore, our simulation tends to be consistent with the empirical results for the correla-
tions among underpricing, price revision and oversubscription. In this way, we provide a simulation
result which generates underpricing and underreaction from the strategic risk of undersubscription,
which lends additional support to our hypothesis that underpricing and underreaction are caused
by the risk of undersubscription.
Table 4.3 Summary Statistics for Simulation data
Underpricing Price Revision Oversubscription
Mean 0 0.9546 0.6656
Standard Error 0.0021 0.0188 0.0019
Median −0.0994 0.0495 0.7325
Standard Deviation 0.3104 2.7258 0.2762
Sample Variance 0.0964 7.4299 0.0763
Kurtosis 1.1766 24.4785 −0.7322
Skewness 1.3685 3.9308 −0.6379
Range 1.1873 39.9483 0.9986
Minimum −0.3025 −0.9854 0.0014
Maximum 0.8848 38.963 1
Count 20979 20979 20979
Table 4.4 Correlation Coefficients for Simulation data
Statistics Underpricing Price Revision Oversubscription
Underpricing 1 0.1284 0.2926
Price Revision 0.1284 1 0.6023
Oversubscription 0.2926 0.6023 1
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter examines how strategic risk among investors can help explain both underpricing
and underreaction in initial public offerings (IPOs). The strategic risk we studied comes from the
assumption that the post-IPO value of a firm can be higher if the IPO raises more capital for the
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firm. With this assumption, the value of subscribing depends on the aggregate subscription rate.
As this risk is resolved immediately after the IPO, the IPO itself is underpriced. Moreover, since
individual investors have limited wealth, a higher offer price raises the risk of undersubscription.
Investors respond by demanding a larger discount: the offer price appears to underreact to public
news.
In this chapter, we first use a theoretic model in a global game setting to display the strategic
risk of undersubscription in IPO and show how the undersubscription risk can lead to underpricing
and underreaction. Then, we conduct a simulation for the model and compare the simulated results
to the empirical results in India and the U.S. The simulation results tend to be consistent with
the empirical results, which lends further support for our hypothesis that the strategic risk of
undersubscription can be used to explain underpricing and underreaciton.
This chapter provides a new insight for understanding the underpricing and underreaction in
IPOs. Our results suggest that undersubscription risk can be an important concern for investors
who plan to participate in IPOs. Also, the introduction of the endogeneity of firm value in the
stock market in our analysis may shed new light on the studies of IPOs. These results can also be
useful for policy makers in the stock market.
4.6 Appendix: Proofs and Technical Results
We first show that there are dominance regions: that it is strictly dominant (not) to subscribe
when a player’s posterior mean θ is sufficiently high (low). This result does not assume (4.9) or
(4.10).
Claim 4.6.1. For p and s satisfying t = ps > 0:
for all θ < ln
(
p
f (m)
)
− S
2
2
, πt∗p
(
θ, κ
)
< 0 for any κ; (4.15)
for all θ > ln
(pm
cι
)
− S
2
2
, πt∗p
(
θ, κ
)
> 0 for any κ. (4.16)
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Proof. Since t = ps ≥ c > 0, we must have p > 0 and s > 0. By (4.2),
p ∗ πtp (θ, `) ∈

[
eθι− p, eθf (t)− p
]
if ` ≤ t[
t
m
[
eθf (t)− p
]
, eθf (t)− p
]
if ` ∈ [t,m]
Combining these cases and using t ≥ c and f (t) ≥ ι, we obtain, for all `,
πtp (θ, `) ∈
[
eθ
p
cι
m
− 1, e
θ
p
f (m)− 1
]
which, using
∫ +∞
θ=−∞ e
θdΦ
(
θ−θ
S
)
= eθ+S
2/2 and (4.8), implies
πt∗p
(
θ, κ
)
∈
[
eθ+S
2/2
p
cι
m
− 1, e
θ+S2/2
p
f (m)− 1
]
,
from which the claim immediately follows.
We next show that if a player believes that others are playing a threshold strategy, then an
increase in her posterior mean θ strengthens her own incentive to subscribe.
Claim 4.6.2. Assume (4.9) and suppose that some player i believes that each other player j will
play threshold strategy with threshold κ (i.e., subscribe if and only if θxj > κ). Then player i’s
relative payoff πt∗p
(
θ, κ
)
from subscribing is increasing in her posterior mean θ.
Proof. For any ε, let θ
′
= θ + ε. By the change of variables θ′ = θ − ε (whence θ′−θS =
θ−θ′
S ), we
have
πt∗p
(
θ
′
, κ
)
=
∫ +∞
θ=−∞
πtp
(
θ, `κθ,y
)
dΦ
(
θ − θ′
S
)
=
∫ +∞
θ′=−∞
πtp
(
θ′ + ε, `κθ+ε,y
)
dΦ
(
θ′ − θ
S
)
and thus, renaming θ′ to θ,
πt∗p
(
θ
′
, κ
)
− πt∗p
(
θ, κ
)
=
∫ +∞
θ=−∞
[
πtp
(
θ + ε, `κθ+ε,y
)
− πtp
(
θ, `κθ,y
)]
dΦ
(
θ − θ
S
)
whence
d
dθ
πt∗p
(
θ, κ
)
=
∫ +∞
θ=−∞
[
d
dθ
πtp
(
θ, `κθ,y
)]
dΦ
(
θ − θ
S
)
. (4.17)
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We now evaluate the integrand. By (4.2),
d
dθ
πtp
(
θ, `κθ,y
)
=
 Γ
t
p,y (θ, κ) if `
κ
θ,y ≤ t
Γ
t
p,y (θ, κ) if `
κ
θ,y ≥ t
where Γtp,y (θ, κ) =
eθ
p
[
f
(
`κθ,y
)
+ f ′
(
`κθ,y
)
∂
∂θ `
κ
θ,y
]
is positive and
Γ
t
p,y (θ, κ) =
eθ
p
 t
`κθ,y
f (t)− t(
`κθ,y
)2 [f (t)− e−θp] ∂∂θ`κθ,y

=
eθ
p
t
`κθ,y
(
f (t)
σ
(
σ − σ
`κθ,y
∂
∂θ
`κθ,y
)
+ e−θp
1
`κθ,y
∂
∂θ
`κθ,y
)
.
To ensure that Γ
t
p,y (θ, κ) is also positive, it thus suffices to check that whenever `
κ
θ,y ≥ t, we have
σ >
σ
`κθ,y
∂
∂θ
`κθ,y = σ
m
`κθ,y
∂
∂θ
(
`κθ,y
m
)
= h
(
zκθ,y
)
(4.18)
by (4.7), where
zκθ,y =
σ2 (κ− y) + τ2 (κ− θ)
τ2σ
= Φ−1
(
1−
`κθ,y
m
)
. (4.19)
But by (4.7) and since h is increasing, `κθ,y ≥ t implies that h
(
zκθ,y
)
does not exceed h
(
Φ−1
(
1− tm
))
which, in turn, is not greater than h
(
Φ−1
(
1− cm
))
as t ≥ c. By (4.9), then, (4.18) holds whenever
`κθ,y ≥ t.
By Claim 4.6.2, a finite threshold κ is an equilibrium if and only if a player’s relative payoff
from subscribing πt∗p
(
θ, κ
)
is zero when her posterior mean θ equals the threshold κ: if and only if
πt∗p,y (κ, κ) =
∫ +∞
θ=−∞
πtp
(
θ, `κθ,y
)
dΦ
(
θ − κ
S
)
(4.20)
equals zero. Claim 4.6.1 implies that πt∗p,y (κ, κ) is positive (negative) for sufficiently high (low)
thresholds κ. The next claim states that under (4.10), πt∗p,y (κ, κ) is continuous and increasing in κ.
Claim 4.6.3. 1. πt∗p,y (κ, κ) is continuous in κ. 2. Assume (4.10). Then π
t∗
p,y (κ, κ) is strictly
increasing in κ wherever πt∗p,y (κ, κ) is zero.
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Proof. Part 1. Obvious as πt∗p,y (κ, κ) is defined in terms of continuous functions. Part 2. For any
ε, let κ′ = κ+ ε. By the change of variables θ′ = θ − ε (whence θ′−κS =
θ−κ′
S ), we have
πt∗p,y
(
κ′, κ′
)
=
∫ +∞
θ=−∞
πtp
(
θ, `κ
′
θ,y
)
dΦ
(
θ − κ′
S
)
=
∫ +∞
θ′=−∞
πtp
(
θ′ + ε, `κ+εθ′+ε,y
)
dΦ
(
θ′ − κ
S
)
and thus, renaming θ′ to θ,
πt∗p,y
(
κ′, κ′
)
− πt∗p,y (κ, κ) =
∫ +∞
θ=−∞
[
πtp
(
θ + ε, `κ+εθ+ε,y
)
− πtp
(
θ, `κθ,y
)]
dΦ
(
θ − κ
S
)
,
whence
d
dκ
πt∗p,y (κ, κ) =
∫ +∞
θ=−∞
[
d
dε
πtp
(
θ + ε, `κ+εθ+ε,y
)]
ε=0
dΦ
(
θ − κ
S
)
. (4.21)
By (4.7), 1`κθ,y
[
∂
∂θ `
κ
θ,y +
∂
∂κ`
κ
θ,y
]
= − σ
τ2
h
(
zκθ,y
)
where zκθ,y is defined in (4.19). Hence, by (4.2),
[
d
dε
πtp
(
θ + ε, `κ+εθ+ε,y
)]
ε=0
=
 Λ
t
p,y (θ, κ) if `
κ
θ,y ≤ t
Λ
t
p,y (θ, κ) if `
κ
θ,y ≥ t
where Λtp,y (θ, κ) denotes
eθf
(
`κθ,y
)
p
1− σ
τ2
f ′
(
`κθ,y
)
f
(
`κθ,y
) h (zκθ,y) `κθ,y

and Λ
t
p,y (θ, κ) denotes
t
p`κθ,y
(
eθf (t) +
σ
τ2
h
(
zκθ,y
) [
eθf (t)− p
])
. Let θκt,y be the state θ at which `
κ
θ,y = t. By (4.7), `
κ
θ,y is increasing in θ, so θ ≷ θ
κ
t,y as `
κ
θ,y ≷ t. By
(4.2) and (4.8), we can write πt∗p,y (κ, κ) as a sum A+B where A denotes
∫ θκt,y
θ=−∞ π
t
p (θ, `
κ
θ ) dΦ
(
θ−κ
S
)
and B denotes
∫ +∞
θ=θκt,y
πtp (θ, `
κ
θ ) dΦ
(
θ−κ
S
)
. Using (4.21) we can write ddκπ
t∗
p,y (κ, κ) as the sum A
′+B′
where A′ denotes
∫
θ:`κθ,y≤t
Λtp,y (θ, κ) dΦ
(
θ−κ
S
)
and B′ denotes
∫
θ:`κθ,y≥t
Λ
t
p,y (θ, κ) dΦ
(
θ−κ
S
)
. Since `κθ,y
is increasing in θ by (4.7), it follows from (4.2) that πtp,y
(
θ, `κθ,y
)
is negative (positive) for all states
θ below (above) some threshold θ∗ that depends on t, p, and κ. Hence, if πt∗p,y (κ, κ) is zero, then
A < 0 < B. To show that ddκπ
t∗
p,y (κ, κ) is positive, it thus suffices to show that A
′ > 0 and
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B′ > B. For the former inequality, h (z) `κθ,y = mΦ
′
(
zκθ,y
)
∈
(
0,m/
√
2π
)
by (4.19) whence, by
(4.1), 1 − σ
τ2
f ′(`κθ,y)
f(`κθ,y)
h
(
zκθ,y
)
`κθ,y is at least 1 −
σΩm
τ2
√
2π
. Thus, by (4.10), Λtp,y (θ, κ) is positive when
`κθ,y ≤ t, whence A′ > 0. As for B′, assume θ ≥ θκt,y so that `κθ,y ≥ t. Then zκθ,y ≤ Φ−1
(
1− cm
)
by
(4.3) and (4.19) whence h
(
zκθ,y
)
does not exceed h
(
Φ−1
(
1− cm
))
which, by (4.10), is less than τ
2
σ .
Thus, Λ
t
p,y (θ, κ) exceeds
t
p`κθ,y
[
eθf (t)− p
]
= πtp
(
θ, `κθ,y
)
and so B′ > B as claimed.
Proof of Claim 4.3.2. We first require the following preliminary result:
Lemma 4.6.4. For any ε > 0 and real number θ0 satisfying
θ0 > ϕy (ε)
d
= τ
[
τ2 + (τ + 1)
(
1
2
+
y
τ
)
− ln
(√
2π
τ
)
− ln ε
]
, (4.22)
we have
Eθ
[
eθ1θ≥θ0
]
< ε (4.23)
where the expectation is taken under the firm’s belief that θ ∼ N
(
y, τ2
)
.
Proof. Using the change of variables z = θ−yτ , dz = (dθ) /τ ,
Eθ
[
eθ1θ≥θ0
]
=
∫ +∞
θ=θ0
eθdΦ
(
θ − y
τ
)
=
τey√
2π
∫ +∞
z=
θ0−y
τ
eg(z)dz (4.24)
where g (z) = zτ − z2/2. As g is strictly concave and has a slope of -1 at z = τ + 1, it follows that
g (z) ≤ g (τ + 1)− (z − τ − 1) = τ2 + (τ + 1) /2− z
for all z. Hence,
∫ +∞
z=
θ0−y
τ
eg(z)dz ≤ exp
(
τ2 + τ+12 +
y−θ0
τ
)
which when substituted into (4.24) yields
Eθ
[
eθ1θ≥θ0
]
≤ τe
y
√
2π
exp
(
τ2 +
τ + 1
2
+
y − θ0
τ
)
. (4.25)
Finally, the right hand side of (4.25) is less than ε if and only if (4.22) holds.
For any public signal y, let κtp,y denote the subscription threshold that results from the firm’s
choices (p, t): the unique solution to
πt∗p,y
(
κtp,y, κ
t
p,y
)
= 0. (4.26)
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Further, let
`tp,y (θ) = `
κtp,y
θ,y (4.27)
denote the subscription rate that results from the public signal y and the firm’s choices (p, t) when
the state is θ.16 By Claim 4.6.1, κtp,y is not less than ln p− ln f (m)− S2/2. By (4.7), this implies
a bound on the subscription rate at θ given y and the choices (p, t):
`tp,y (θ) ≤ m
[
1− Φ
((
σ2 + τ2
) (
ln p− ln f (m)− S2/2
)
− σ2y − τ2θ
τ2σ
)]
. (4.28)
As this bound is increasing in the state θ, for any price p the subscription rate `tp,y (θ) is at most
c/2 as long as θ does not exceed17
θp,y
d
=
(
σ2 + τ2
) (
ln p− ln f (m)− S2/2
)
− σ2y − τ2σΦ−1
(
1− c2m
)
τ2
. (4.29)
Hence, the firm’s relative payoff from doing the IPO is strictly less than∫ θp,y
θ=−∞
eθ
[
f
(
`tp,y (θ)
)
− f (c)
]
dΦ
(
θ − y
τ
)
+
∫ +∞
θ=θp,y
eθ
[
f
(
`tp,y (θ)
)
− f (c)
]
dΦ
(
θ − y
τ
)
< E
[
eθ
]
[f (c/2)− f (c)] + E
[
eθ1θ≥θp,y
]
[f (m)− f (c)]
where the expectations take y as given and assume θ ∼ N
(
y, τ2
)
. Under this belief, E
[
eθ
]
equals
ey+τ
2/2. Thus, the firm’s relative payoff must be negative as long as
E
[
eθ1θ≥θp,y
]
<
f (c/2)− f (c)
f (m)− f (c)
ey+τ
2/2.
By Lemma 4.6.4, this must hold if
θp,y > τ
[
τ2 + (τ + 1)
(
1
2
+
y
τ
)
− ln
(√
2π
τ
)
− ln
(
f (c/2)− f (c)
f (m)− f (c)
ey+τ
2/2
)]
=
τ3 + τ2 + τ
2
+ y − τ ln
(√
2π
τ
f (c/2)− f (c)
f (m)− f (c)
)
which by (4.29) can be transformed to p > py. Q.E.D.
16The function `κθ,y is defined in (4.7).
17The bound in (4.29) is obtained by setting the bound in (4.28) equal to c/2 and solving for θ.
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CHAPTER 5. FUTURE WORK SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
5.1 Deposit Insurance and Shadow Banking System
Does deposit insurance bring extra moral hazard issues for commercial banks? The answer is
no. Although deposit insurance weakens depositor discipline, regulator discipline is built from the
fact that the deposit insurance transfers risks from depositors to the regulator, so the regulator
has the incentive to monitor banks. Compared to depositors, the regulator has more information
about banks’ financial positions, so it is able to monitor banks more effectively than depositors.
Empirically, even with no deposit insurance, the effectiveness of depositor discipline is questionable.
Moreover, unregulated shadow banks suffered much more impact than regulated commercial banks
during the Great Recession. It further demonstrates the existence of regulator discipline. After
the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, we have more reliable rules and regulations on the banking
system. We could believe that regulator discipline trumps depositor discipline in monitoring banks.
In terms of the liability side of the balance sheet, deposit insurance separates the debt of
the banking system into two parts: covered deposits and uncovered shadow banking financing
instruments. The whole banking system is half-covered. When the market risks increase, investors
transfer their funds from shadow banks to commercial banks as an increase in deposits. The success
of the half-covered banking system depends on whether commercial banks offer liquidity backup to
shadow banks. In most cases, it works. However, when market risks are so large that commercial
banks would rather keep the increase in deposits as cash on hand than give liquidity support to
shadow banks, the half-covered banking system fails.
During the Great Recession, liquidity did not flow out of the banking sector but was reallocated
internally. Deposits increased, but the volume of shadow banking financing instruments decreased.
Commercial banks that relied more heavily on core deposit and equity capital financing could still
lend and purchase securitized assets compared to other banks. After the bankruptcy of Lehman
129
Brothers, commercial banks kept the large increase in deposits as cash on hand, which could be
crucial liquidity backup for shadow banks (see Table 3.2). This may have been due to the counter-
party risks or the newly introduced policy by the Federal Reserve to pay interest on bank reserves.
Or sometimes, commercial banks would rather squeeze their credit and acquire securitized assets at
fire-sale price liquidated by shadow banks than offer liquidity backup to high risky counter-parties
(Acharya et al. (2010)). Although there were unprecedented government bailouts after Lehman’s
bankruptcy, securitized assets have already been priced at extremely risk-averse preference from
fixed-income investors. Using their securitized assets as collateral, shadow banks cannot raise
enough funds compared to times when securitized assets are in nearly risk-neutral pricing. No
liquidity can arbitrage securitized assets back to nearly risk-neutral pricing, and even if any, it
takes a too long time to go back, and survival could be a problem.
After the Great Recession, BHCs were potential winners and owned more and more shadow
banking subsidiaries. Although the number of independent shadow banks decreased, we have the
internal FTQ circle in BHCs. BHCs can enjoy the synergy by holding commercial banks and shadow
banks together. However, deposits may not be enough for some BHCs to survive in the next crisis.
Funds will transfer from some BHCs to others, and regulations should be able to stimulate BHCs
with rich liquidity to help BHCs in trouble but not stand by and profit from the trouble. Chapter
3 also proposes that regulations should focus on not only sufficient capital, but also sufficient core
deposits.
In Chapter 3, since I have time series data, and VAR models can identify the concurrent
correlation and dynamic correlation for time series data with endogenous variables, I use the VAR
models to identify the two hypotheses about deposits and financial CP outstanding. Future research
could collect high-frequency micro-level panel data about shadow banks and commercial banks. The
VAR model cannot be used for panel data. However, if we only consider the dynamic correlation
(liquidity backup from commercial banks to shadow banks) and ignore the probable problem of
endogeneity, a simple regression model based on Gatev and Strahan (2006) and Cornett et al.
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(2011) can be used as follows:
∆Financial CPi,t/Assetsi,t−1 = Tt +Bi + β1∆Depositt−1 + β2∆Depositt−1 ∗ Ct−1
+ β3Capitali,t−1/Assetsi,t−1
+ β4Capitali,t−1/Assetsi,t−1 ∗∆Depositt−1
+ β5Capitali,t−1/Assetsi,t−1 ∗∆Depositt−1 ∗ Ct−1
+ β6 ln(Assetsi,t−1)
+ β7 ln(Assetsi,t−1) ∗∆Depositt−1
+ β8 ln(Assetsi,t−1) ∗∆Depositt−1 ∗ Ct−1 + ei,t,
where Tt is the time effect that sweeps out aggregate shocks and Bi is shadow bank-level fixed effect
that absorbs unobserved heterogeneity at each shadow bank. In addition, Ct−1 is the time dummy
variable, which equals one if the time t−1 happens in the crisis. ∆Depositt−1 is the change of total
deposits at time t− 1. All other variables are shadow bank-level data. If the results of Chapter 3
hold, we expect to find significantly positive β1 and significantly negative β2. The heterogeneity in
shadow banks is also interesting if we have the panel data. Personally speaking, I expect healthy
and large shadow banks can receive more liquidity backup from commercial banks. Hence, we may
find significantly positive β4 and β7.
There is one caveat: Chapter 3 only considers the liquidity risks and therefore, the liability side
of financial institutions. Most financial institutions failed in the Great Recession because of their
holdings of MBSes, especially subprime MBSes. When the prices of their assets (mostly MBSes)
declined, financial institutions could be insolvent even with no liquidity problem. The neglected
credit risks and bubbles in prices of collateral (mostly real estate) largely account for the price
decline of securitized assets. Liquidity risks also play a role in explaining the price decline. As the
story in Chapter 3, when the liquidity backup from commercial banks broke down, shadow banks
could not roll over their debt and had to liquidate their securitized assets. The liquidation leads
to the further price decline of MBSes. Excluding the neglected credit risks and bubbles, MBSes
are priced from nearly risk-neutral to extremely risk-averse valuation because extremely risk-averse
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investors dominate the markets. It is hard to say that the failed financial institutions hold a large
number of MBSes intentionally or they cannot resell the MBSes they issued or underwrote. From
a risk-neutral perspective, their holdings of MBSes may be correct, but they cannot survive into
the time when markets are full of liquidity and dominated by nearly risk-neutral arbitragers again.
5.2 Underpricing in Initial Public Offerings
Some issuers go public (equity financing) because they need to raise funds for working capital
or payment of debt. They are more compatible with our model than the issuers who go public
only for marketability. The latter founders just want to turn their private company to the public
in order to monetize their assets. Further research could identify the use of proceeds of IPOs. If
our model can explain the reality, IPOs which use the proceeds for working capital or payment of
debt should have significantly larger underpricing than that for marketability.
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